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Abstract
The screen, as recent studies in a number of fields indicate, 
is a cultural object due for critical reappraisal. Work on the 
theoretical status of screen objects tends to focus upon the 
materialisation of surface; in other words, it attempts to 
rethink the relationship between the supposedly 'superficial' 
facade and the 'functional' object itself. I suggest that this 
work, while usefully chipping away at the dichotomy between 
the 'superficial' and the 'functional', can lead us to a more 
radical conclusion when read in the context of subjectivity. By 
rethinking the relationship between the surface and the  
obverse face of the screen as the terms of a dialectic, we can 
‘read’ the screen as the vital component in a process which 
constitutes the Subject. In order to demonstrate this, I 
analyse productions of subjectivity in literary texts of the 
twenty-first century — in doing so, I assume the novel as 
nonpareil arena of the dramatisation of subjectivity — and I 
propose a reading of the work of Jacques Lacan as hitherto 
unacknowledged theorist par excellence of the form and 
function of the screen. Lacan describes, with the function of 
desire and the formation of the screen of fantasy, the primary 
position this ‘screen-form' inhabits in the constitution of the 
Subject. Lacan’s work forms a critical juncture through which 
we must proceed if we are to properly read and understand 
the chosen texts: The Book of Strange New Things by Michel 
Faber; The Tain by China Miéville; Oryx and Crake by 
Margaret Atwood; and Austerlitz by W.G. Sebald. In each 
text, I analyse the particular materialisations of the screen 
and interrogate the constitution of the subject and the locus 
of desire. By analysing the vicissitudes of subjectivity in 
these texts, I make a claim for the study of the screen as 
constituting a central question in the field of contemporary 
literature. 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Introduction:
Step Away From the Limit!
What lurks in the background is, of course, the pre-modern 
notion of "arriving at the end of the universe": in some 
well-known engravings, the surprised wanderers approach 
the screen/curtain of heaven, a flat surfaced with painted 
stars on it, pierce it and reach beyond [...]1
This work is concerned with screens. It focuses on many 
kinds of screen — computer monitors, mirrors, photographs, 
windows — and considers the manner in which they are 
represented in literature. At the theoretical level, it is 
concerned with thinking about the screen, with that particular 
form of object itself, the structural notion that makes a screen 
what it is — that which makes a screen what it is for the 
experiencing Subject, in other words, and how this 
relationship between the two is depicted in literary text.
Before we step forward, however, we will step back. This 
backwards step allows us to broaden our field of view, to 
attempt to discern the frame which marks out the screen 
(through) which we behold. This strategy is not regressive: 
instead it is an attempt to define an alternative approach 
towards the method in which we figure the screen as an 
object, by tracking the subjective relationship with the screen 
in a manner which does not restate the classical notion in 
which the veil of heaven is pierced by the inquisitive traveller, 
to paraphrase Žižek. Perhaps the contemporary version of 
this act would be in beholding and manipulating the screen of 
   Slavoj Žižek, 'The Matrix, or, Malebranche in Hollywood’, Philosophy Today, 42:4 (1999), 11-26 1
(12).
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an electronic device, a translucent surface of glass or 
composite materials. But, thinking of this translucent material 
of which certain screens are composed: is this material 
composition not the first hint of the manner in which screens 
continue to mislead us? Not because the apparent 
translucency of this clear screen suddenly exposes to the 
viewer a revelation (which was hidden beyond the veil of 
heaven for the surprised wanderers), but because it tricks us 
into thinking that our attention, in studying the screen, must 
be directed towards it, must be focused upon the information 
disclosed by it as such. 
If Žižek defines a pre-modern relationship of subject and 
screen in the engravings of the wanderers at the very curtain 
of heaven, then the recent example which he appends to his 
analysis demonstrates the manner in which the modern 
representation of the screen has clung onto this particular 
notion of 'peeling back the curtain'. In the final scene of Peter 
Weir's The Truman Show (1998), following the revelation that 
Truman's life is the product of a staged spectacle in which he 
has been unwittingly engaged since birth, the eponymous 
star 'steps up the stairs to the wall on which the "blue sky" 
horizon is painted, and opens up there the door' ('The Matrix, 
or, Malebranche in Hollywood' 13). This basic action of 
folding back a screen to reveal a passage towards sublime 
experience is produced all the more readily as a popular 
fiction because of the rise of cinema. As Martin Loiperdinger 
says, discussing apocryphal accounts of the audience's fear 
of the onrushing locomotive they witnessed on the screen at 
the first showing of Lumière's L'Arrivée d'un train en gare de 
La Ciotat (1895), 'the fear and panic of the audience facing 
Lumière’s locomotive is retold in the form of an anecdote, 
[but] its status reaches much higher: reiterated over and over 
again, it figures as the founding myth of the medium, 
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testifying to the power of film over its spectators'.  In spite of 2
the fact that critics have exploded this founding myth and 
demonstrated that audiences were sufficiently aware of the 
artificiality of the images on the screen, it nevertheless 
remains true that early cinema repeatedly re-stages this 
fearful interaction between viewer and screen. Robert W. 
Paul's The Countryman and the Cinematograph (1901) 
depicts a hapless country-dweller reacting with shock and 
panic at the image of the oncoming steam train which is 
projected upon the screen facing him, and in Edwin S. 
Porter's Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show (1902) the 
eponymous rube, confronted with series of projected images 
(which includes the earlier Edison Manufacturing Company 
film The Black Diamond Express (1896), another ‘locomotive 
picture’), tears down the cinema screen in an attempt to halt 
the action unfolding within and behind. He succeeds, by 
discovering the reality beyond the diegesis of the film, by 
stepping forward beyond the veil. There, he finds the 
projectionist, with whom Uncle Josh proceeds to fist-fight as 
revenge for falling victim to the optical illusion. The initially 
bewildering experience of a trompe l'oeil, and the ultimate 
unveiling which accompanies the disclosure of the truth 
behind the screen of trickery, is the operation which links the 
actions of the irate Uncle Josh with those of the surprised 
wanderers at the curtain of heaven. In other words, one's first 
response, traditionally, is not to step back from the screen; 
instead, one finds a way through it.
 
The suspicion which characterises the present work is that 
this 'traditional response' is encoded within the very form of 
the screen itself. The very same object can both obscure 
space from subjective view and disclose objective, visual 
information. In either guise, the object presents a portal; it 
   Martin Loiperdinger, 'Lumiere's Arrival of the Train: Cinema's Founding Myth', trans. Bernd 2
Elzerm, The Moving Image, 4:1 (Spring 2004), 89-118 (92).
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reveals the possibility of something beyond the phenomenal 
experience of the subject, either by negating space or 
representing it, and therefore awaits this moment of puncture 
by the subject.
The Subject enters view here, and does so in a manner that 
we will claim to be entirely typical: with a screen. It will be 
argued here that the only way to properly approach the 
question of the screen is with the question of the subject, and 
that claim is made on the basis of an analysis of the work of 
Jacques Lacan. In Lacan, I suggest, we have already 
discovered the exemplary theorist of the screen; moreover, 
the proof of this is to be found in his theory of subjectivity. It is 
precisely this fact (of the indivisible connection between the 
subject and the screen) which has tended to obscure in the 
reception of his work the radical contribution which he makes 
to the thinking of the screen. In the same way that the screen 
itself is theorised in his work as performing a complex 
function of mediation and obfuscation upon both itself and 
object — the screen, in Lacan, vanishes and materialises 
according to angle of view — so has this theory itself tended 
to escape the purview of Lacanian critics, captivated instead, 
as they are, by the startling theory of the subject which 
emerges alongside it. We should explain here what it is that 
differentiates Lacan's work from other popular theories of the 
subject. I will briefly outline the process which produces the 
subject in Lacanian theory. I will then argue that his break 
from the other major Western theories of subjectivity can be 
clearly traced through his radical application of the figure of 
the screen as an irreducible fact in the formation of the 
subject. Following this, I will briefly explain how the figure of 
the screen appears in Lacan, as the so-called 'screen of 
fantasy'.
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Lacan proposes, in his work, a particular approach to the 
question of the human ‘condition’ ; he repeatedly returns to 3
this question of the ‘condition’ of the human as a way to 
signal the inherent problem of discussing a subject which 
must split from itself in order to pose this question in the first 
place. For Lacan, this condition is the result of the 
constitution of subjectivity. The subject is a symbolic form 
which is described in and by language, law, and social 
custom, and all other systems of consensual social 
interrelation. As such, the 'birth' of the subject is defined by a 
constitutive split, a 'cut'  which excludes from the subject the 4
experience of immanent being, which cannot become 
articulated in these symbolic structures — there is always a 
deadlock which is encountered in the process of translating 
the wants and needs of the physical body into the desires of 
the speaking subject. The constitution of subjectivity, in other 
words, is, contrary to popular conception — which extends 
from the Cartesian moment of the cogito until the present day 
— an act of deprivation of self-presence.  As the human 5
animal enters the social realm (enacted firstly for the child by 
its maternal and paternal figures) it is moulded by a dual 
process: through specular captation, it identifies with the 
immanence of image (Lacan calls this the Imaginary 
 This is 'the condition—which is imposed on him [the nascent subject] by the existence of 3
discourse—that his need pass through the defiles of the signifier' (Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. 
Bruce Fink [New York: Norton, 2006], 525).
 See 'The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious' in 4
Écrits: 'The cut made by the signifying chain is the only cut that verifies the structure of the subject 
as a discontinuity in the real.' (Écrits 678)
 See, particularly, the sections 'The Unconscious and Repetition' and 'The Field of the Other and 5
Back to the Transference' in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan 
Sheridan, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (London: Karnac, 2004). Understanding this deprivation of self-
presence furnishes us with the precise meaning of the double sense of the 'there' in the sentence 
'But the subject is there to rediscover where it was — I anticipate — the real.' (The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 45); the subject is 'located' there, in the Symbolic, 
always outside of the Real, and it is there 'for a reason': to perform the function of remaining 
beyond the Real, towards which it gestures, as the place where it always was but never is.
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register)  and through symbolic prohibition and subordination 6
of the image, it forms ego and demand  through language 7
(Lacan calls this the Symbolic register). These registers are 
disturbed by a third, the register of the Real, which manifests 
as an insistent ‘lack’ or gap that cannot be filled by image or 
symbol.  With the Real, we find Lacan interrogating the 8
problem of introducing the radical point of negation of a 
system into the system itself. 
For Lacan, therefore, the subject’s very experience of reality 
is constituted as fantasy. The fantasy is constructed as a 
screen which masks the ‘lack’ — the radical point of negation 
— as which subject is structured. The subject is a lack, 
because it 'contains' a lack which is 'in the Real’, and 
therefore can only ever be found to be lacking. The Real is 
the realm of that 'being' which is cut from the subject: it 
'exists' only as a foreclosed mode of non-experience, as 'that 
something extra' which we can anticipate in the experience of 
desire, but never fully grasp — possess, 'return' to ourselves 
— in an objective state. This is the experience of desire in 
the work of Lacan. We do not fantasise about what we 
desire; rather, we teach ourselves to desire by virtue of the 
formation of our fantasy.  We allow our desire to become 9
'objectivised' by fabricating our own secret formula which will 
 See 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the / Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience' 6
in Écrits for Lacan's account of the formative function of the Imaginary for the subject.
 See 'Sexuality in the Defiles of the Signifier' in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 7
Psychoanalysis for an account of demand as the effect of speech (and signifier) upon the subject.
 See 'Tuché and Automaton' in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis for Lacan's 8
clearest elucidation of the subjective encounter with the Real.
 This is the meaning of the 'matheme' $<>a: 'Fantasy is defined by the most general form it 9
receives in an algebra I have constructed for this purpose—namely, the formula ($<>a) in which 
the lozenge (<>) is to be read as "desire for," being read right to left in the same way, introducing 
an identity that is based on an absolute non-reciprocity.' (Écrits 653). What Lacan here calls the 
'lozenge' graphically suggests the masking and fetishising function of the screen in both form and 
relation. The lozenge indicates a relationship between the barred subject of the signifier and the 
objet a (terms which will both be explained in the coming pages) by pointing to both, but it also 
suggests a plane surface intervening between the two.
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make ourselves comprehensible to the other. It is in this 
sense that we see the exact manner in which the screen 
structure is implicated in Lacan, by 'screening' the space in 
between subject and object. It is an architecture which 
intervenes in the experience of the subject, constructing and 
mediating lack (Real), image (Imaginary), and sign 
(Symbolic).
Lacan's theoretical elucidation of the subject is an attempt to 
correct what is, according to him, the apparent failure of 
reason since Freud: 
It is nonetheless true that the philosophical 
cogito is at the center of the mirage that 
renders modern man so sure of being himself 
in his uncertainties about himself, and even in 
the distrust he has long since learned to 
exercise regarding the pitfalls of pride. 
(Écrits 430)
For Lacan, this 'mirage' is the crucial fact of subjectivity. 
According to him, what Freud uncovers in the discovery of 
the unconscious is the ultimate rebuke of the rational self-
present subject: 'The radical heteronomy that Freud's 
discovery shows gaping within man can no longer be 
covered over without whatever tries to hide it being 
fundamentally dishonest.' (Écrits 436). Lacan repeatedly 
issues this challenge  and it echoes the anti-philosophical 10
position of Nietzsche, who already deposes man's claim to 
 'I will now dare to define the Cartesian I think as participating, in its striving towards certainty, in 10
a sort of abortion' (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 141); 'It should be noted 
that this experience sets us at odds with any philosophy directly stemming from the cogito.' (Écrits 
93).
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rational self-presence years before the third strike  of 11
psychoanalysis against the narcissistic delusion of man: 'the 
intellect is human, and only its own possessor and progenitor 
regards it with such pathos, as if it housed the axis around 
which the entire world revolved.'  Lacan's realisation of the 12
importance of the Freudian discovery for the twentieth-
century project of 'emptying' the subject is by no means 
unique, of course. Foucault's statement on the disjunction 
between the 'I think' of 'traditional' philosophical thought and 
the 'I speak' of modernist literature encounters the same 
problematic break: '"I think" led to the indubitable certainty of 
the 'I' and its existence; "I speak", on the other hand, 
distances, disperses, effaces that existence and lets only its 
empty emplacement appear.'  But Lacan and Foucault's 13
positions on the effect upon the subject of this 'I speak' are 
markedly different, as Juliet Flower MacCannell notes:
Structuralism sees language as a positive 
force, like Foucault's discursive practices that 
coercively shape the subject and imprint its 
arbitrary social character. Lacan took the 
opposite position. For him, the subject is 
hollowed out by language; the crucial impact 
 'Humanity, in the course of time, has had to endure from the hands of science two great outrages 11
against its naive self-love. The first was when humanity discovered that our earth was not the 
center of the universe, but only a tiny speck in a world-system hardly conceivable in its magnitude. 
This is associated in our minds with the name "Copernicus," although Alexandrian science had 
taught much the same thing. The second occurred when biological research robbed man of his 
apparent superiority under special creation, and rebuked him with his descent from the animal 
kingdom, and his ineradicable animal nature. This re-valuation, under the influence of Charles 
Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors, was not accomplished without the most violent opposition 
of their contemporaries. But the third and most irritating insult is flung at the human mania of 
greatness by present-day psychological research, which wants to prove to the "I" that it is not even 
master in its own home [...]' (Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, trans. G. 
Stanley Hall [New York: Horace Livelight, 1920], 247).
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Guess and Ronald 12
Spiers, trans. Ronald Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 141.
 Michel Foucault, The Thought From Outside, trans. Brian Massumi (New York: Zone Books, 13
1987), 13.
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of the symbol lies not in what it actively marks 
on the subject, but in what it takes from it.14
It is with this hollowing effect of language in mind that we can 
recognise the importance of the figure of the screen for 
Lacan's theory of subject, and the reason why his radical 
interpretation of the subject is so vital to our project. As 
Lorenzo Chiesa says, 
[Lacan's] notion of subjectivity is profoundly 
incompatible with any philosophy—from 
deconstructive doxa to certain mistaken 
readings of Lacan—which limits itself to 
delineating the contours of a vanishing 
substanceless subject “at a safe distance”: the 
Lacanian subject is a subjectivized lack, not a 
lacking subject or subject of impossibility, even 
though he presupposes the assumption and 
overcoming of a purely negative moment.15
Chiesa, like many other scholars and biographers of Lacan,  16
organises Lacan's career as a progressive movement 
recognising the successive prevalence of each of the three 
registers in his work. In this codification the third and final 
period of his teaching (usually defined as the period 
 Juliet Flower MacCannell, 'Jacques Lacan, 1901 - 1981' in The Edinburgh Encyclopedia of 14
Modern Criticism and Theory, ed. Julian Wolfreys (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2002), 196-205 [202].
 Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosphical Reading of Lacan (Cambridge, 15
Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), 6.
 See Alain Vanier, Lacan, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 2000); Slavoj Žižek, The 16
Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989); Jonathan Scott Lee, Jacques Lacan (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1990); Philippe Julien, Jacques Lacan's Return to Freud: The 
Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary, trans. Devra Beck Simiu (New York: New York UP, 1994). 
As Babette Babich astutely notes, 'Given the tripartite Caesarian (historically Gallic) and trinitarian 
resonance inevitable in Western culture and irresistible for any Lacanian, Borromean knot-struck 
analysis, this third period represents Lacan's ultimate take on the Real.' ('On the Order of the Real: 
Nietzsche and Lacan' in Disseminating Lacan, ed. David Pettigrew and Francois Raffoul [New 
York: SUNY Press, 1996], 43-68 [43].)
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spanning the beginning of Seminar XI in 1964 until his death 
in 1981) comes to represent the culmination of his teaching 
as an exploration of the Real above all else. The reason that 
it is necessary to note this fact is that it is this ultimate 
configuration of psychoanalysis as an inquiry of the Real 
itself which finally distinguishes Lacan, as MacCannell 
suggests, from the structuralist theorists of his era.  For it is 17
in Lacan's 'Real' period that he comes to express the relation 
between screen and subject in the constitutive interplay of 
fantasy and Real: 'it is in relation to the real that the level of 
phantasy functions. The real supports the phantasy, the 
phantasy protects the real.' (The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis 41). The 'subjectivized lack' both 
supports and is protected by fantasy, and it is this coadjuvant 
relation which Lacan details when he says that 'the phantasy 
is never anything more than the screen that conceals 
something quite primary, something determinant in the 
function of repetition' (The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 60). For Lacan, the Subject is an effect of the 
Object: while the subject is organised by the Symbolic 
prohibition of the phallus, it is also subjected to the insistent 
remainder of being from the Real, which takes the form of 
objet a.  As Lacan shows, the subject emerges from the gap 18
between meaning (the Symbolic) and being (the Real).  19
 It is also why, ultimately, Derrida's famous critique of Lacan in 'La facteur de la verite' (The Post 17
Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987], 411-496) perhaps misses its mark, at least if one considers Lacan's thought 
according to the schema of progression mentioned above. The text that Derrida perhaps should 
have read is Lacan's Encore, a product of his 'Real' period which addresses the supposed 
'phallogocentrism' of the letter in a manner which was not possible in the text that Derrida does 
read (the 'Seminar on "The Purloined Letter"', which is a product of Lacan's 'Symbolic' period — 
roughly corresponding to the 1950s — where he had not yet fully articulated the importance of the 
Real). 
 See Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, trans. A.R. Price, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller 18
(Cambridge: Polity, 2014), particularly the sections entitled 'Revision of the Status of the Object' 
and 'The Five Forms of the Object a', for Lacan's key elucidation of this term. I also discuss it 
further in this introduction, and in the following chapter.
 See the chapter 'The Subject and the Other: Alienation' in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 19
Psychoanalysis.
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What constantly negotiates this boundary between the 
subject before it falls into the Real is the screen of fantasy. 
There is, here, a dialectic of occlusion and representation 
encoded in the structure of fantasy itself. What is hidden is 
nothing other than the Real itself, while what becomes 
'written' on the phantasmatic screen (the Imaginary structure 
of reality) is the Symbolic 'substance' (objective 'knowledge' 
which 'fills in' the subjective experience of reality). This 
screen of fantasy performs the vital action of negotiating with 
the Real, and guarantees the psychic stability of the subject. 
The crucial role of the phantasmatic screen has tended to be 
under-theorised by Lacanian critics. André Nusselder's 
philosophical exploration of the screen of fantasy and its 
structuring effect in human-computer interaction  is an 20
exception amongst this group. His work recognises the role 
of fantasy as a protective operation of the subject in Lacan. 
As he notes, 'The fantasmatic screen protects us against (a 
too direct) intrusion of the real.' (Interface Fantasy 110), and 
it is this basic reading of fantasy which underpins my own in 
this work. This reading of fantasy draws our attention to the 
importance of avoiding the simple reduction of the Lacanian 
subject to a primarily linguistic concern. Instead we see that 
the subject is not merely the effect of the signifier  but that, 21
rather, the signifier reveals that the subject is involved in a 
radical encounter with the lack which is beyond the subject 
itself insofar as that lack is the subject itself. The 
'subjectivised lack' described by Chiesa is ultimately an 
encounter with the Real, and that encounter must produce 
both Imaginary and Symbolic effects. The Symbolic effect is 
perhaps most readily summarised by the notion of the 
 In The Surface Effect: The Screen of Fantasy in Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 2012) and 20
Interface Fantasy: A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009).
 A status to which it is often reduced by those who do not read Lacan's dictum that 'the 21
unconscious has the radical structure of language’ (Écrits 496) too closely.
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subject who does not speak but instead is spoken by 
language. The Imaginary effect, on the other hand, is 
exemplified by Lacan's concept of the 'Mirror Stage', which 
explains the production of a phantasmatic image of 
wholeness which persists with the subject for the remainder 
of his or her life (provided, of course, that the subject remains 
psychically stable). The present study departs from 
Nusselder's work in two important respects: firstly, while 
Nusselder attempts to '(re)articulate the "Lacanian subject" in 
the age of information' (Interface Fantasy 7) by examining 
the psychological experience of cyberspace (as mediated by 
the computer screen), the present work is concerned with the 
attempt to define the ways in which many kinds of screen 
perform this mediatory function, and so to delineate certain 
common properties of the screen which we could say are first 
recognised by Lacan; secondly, because of this insistence 
upon a continuum of screen-objects which are linked by 
screen-function, we here necessarily highlight the 
phenomenal field as an elementary dimension of Lacan's 
theory of subject in a sense that Nusselder does not. The 
phenomenal field of the subject is bound up in what I call the 
dialectical function of the screen, where the action of 
occlusion and representation produces, via the oscillation 
between the two, a never-quite-stable third position. This 
third position is the Lacanian subject. Both of these 
departures from Nusselder, noted above, will be further 
elaborated in the course of this introduction. 
What I propose here, therefore, is a reading of Lacan which 
pays attention to his depiction and theorisation of this screen, 
and the screen's relationship to subject and being — in other 
words, the relationship of the screen to the three registers, 
and the work it performs in order to constitute the subject as 
such. But I also propose a reading, alongside Lacan, of Žižek 
— and this is not simply an expedient or purely interpretative 
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manoeuvre. This strategy should not be conceived, as it is in 
Nusselder, as a negative or reductive one; while Nusselder 
warns of 'the danger of getting trapped in a Žižekian reading 
of Lacanian theory' (Interface Fantasy 3), his entire project is 
in fact oriented around the following quotation from Žižek, 
which appears as the epigraph of the introduction to Interface 
Fantasy and is discussed throughout that chapter in the 
manner of a 'gateway post' :  22
And is not this dispositif — the frame through 
which one can glimpse the Other Scene — 
the elementary dispositif of fantasmatic space 
from the prehistoric Lascaux paintings to 
computer-generated Virtual Reality? Is not the 
interface of the computer the last 
materialization of this frame? What defines the 
properly "human dimension" is the presence 
of a screen, a frame, through which we 
communicate with the "suprasensible" virtual 
universe to be found nowhere in reality.23
Žižek clearly signals the necessity of recognising the 
relationship between physical and phantasmatic 
manifestations of the screen. For him the physical screen is 
always the instantiation of a continuum which Lacan 
recognises with the theoretical structure of the phantasmatic 
screen (a thesis which Žižek, nonetheless, never 
 To paraphrase Derrida's own criticism of Lacan's choice of the 'Seminar on "The Purloined 22
Letter"' as an introductory text in the Écrits: 'the "Seminar" is placed at the head of the collection, 
prefaced by an opening which grants it a determining strategic place' (The Post Card 421).
 Slavoj Žižek, 'Cyberspace, or the Unbearable Closure of Being', in Endless Night: Cinema and 23
Psychoanalysis, Parallel Histories, ed. Jane Bergstrom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), 96-125 [98].
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systematically develops).  The screen as a reproducible 24
physical form should not be considered ex nihilo 'practical' 
object, but instead, as Žižek says, a 'human dimension'. 
Without the form of the screen there is no human subject, 
and therefore no human.
The point, anyway, is not to criticise Nusselder's aversion to 
the paradigmatic Žižekian 'version' of Lacan which structures 
much contemporary popular discussion of the latter, but 
instead to ask if there is not in fact a virtue to be found in 
articulating Lacan, where appropriate, with Žižek, as I do 
here. In the same way that Lacan proposes a return to Freud 
on the basis of an analysis of the latter in light of the linguistic 
advances of Saussure, I propose that Žižek performs 
something similar, but characteristically 'twisted', with Lacan: 
Žižek returns to Lacan on the basis of an analysis of the 
latter in the light of a Benjaminian reading of the 'debased' 
popular products of late capitalist, postmodernist Western 
culture. In other words, he returns to Lacan, not with the 
modernist structure of an 'advance' with which Lacan re-
articulates the Freudian discovery, but with a postmodernist 
'post-structure' of retrograde cultural value: 'it is clear that 
Lacanian theory serves as an excuse for indulging in the 
idiotic enjoyment of popular culture.'  We cannot escape the 25
fact that the primary material of Žižek's exploration of 
Lacanian theory — popular cinema — presupposes a 
sensitivity to the form of the screen. In his work, Lacan draws 
upon his clinical experience as a practicing psychoanalyst. 
While Lacan was a clinician, Žižek is not. Žižek presents the 
importance of the screen in Western culture in a manner 
 This reading is to be understood in contrast to Nusselder's own analysis, which does not focus 24
upon the relationship of the 'elementary dispositif' to the continuum of screen-objects, but instead 
the 'final' particular manifestation of that screen in the virtual interface of cyberspace.
 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture 25
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), viii.
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which Lacan does not, precisely because the target of 
Žižek's analysis is cultural. When Žižek, in Trouble in 
Paradise, states that 'Capitalism is the first socio-economic 
order which de-totalizes meaning',  we are to understand 26
that this implies an unconscious structure in which any 
particular Symbolic value is expressed asymptotically. In 
other words, Žižek adapts Lacan for the purpose of cultural 
analysis in a Jamesonian manner, interrogating the Real of 
cultural value insofar as it pertains to a particular set of 
postmodernist 'post-ideological' coordinates which permit the 
uncovering of the 'unsaid', the slips and distortions, in basic 
Freudian parlance, of the late capitalist era. 
Even at the outset of Žižek's first major Lacanian study, 
Looking Awry, the very figure of looking, upon which the 
investigation is based, implies the object form of the screen. 
The 'theoretical motif' (Looking Awry 3) of looking askance is 
itself a reference to the anamorphic relation of Subject and 
Object (gaze) in the scopic field in Lacan,  and the simple 27
act of 'looking awry' always presupposes a plane view which 
frames an 'ideal' version of the object in the first place. If it 
did not, then how could Žižek state that 'such a mise-en-
scene of theoretical motifs renders visible aspects that would 
otherwise remain unnoticed' (Looking Awry 3)? Therefore, 
while I agree with Nusselder's statement that Žižek '[does 
not] approach the question of fantasy and the interface in 
a ... systematic manner' (Interface Fantasy 3), I do not agree 
that this lack of 'rigour' (Nusselder's term) should force an 
investigation of the screen of fantasy to marginalise or 
exclude Žižek. Instead, I suggest that our task is precisely 
the opposite; an investigation of this question of fantasy must 
 Slavoj Žižek, Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism (London: 26
Allen Lane, 2014), 7.
 See 'Anamorphosis' in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis; I discuss these 27
terms further on in this Introduction.
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seriously analyse Žižek because the figure of the screen 
attains the status of doxa in his work. If it is not 
systematically theorised by him then that is because, in his 
work, the figure structures, at a formal level, the inquiry itself. 
Over the course of these pages, I attempt to explore this 
particular theorisation of the screen via its textual 
representation in contemporary literature. My intent is to 
perform a reading of the screen which describes it as a figure 
of literature and as a theorisable cultural object. In other 
words: this object produces an effect upon the Subject, is 
implicated in the subject, in the textual production of the 
subject, in contemporary literature. This act of theorisation is 
not simply instrumental. It is immanent. As we unfold each 
text, our reading will intertwine the textual and theoretical 
analysis of the figure of the screen, appending neither one 
element to the other but conceiving both as a single act of 
criticism. I attempt to elucidate theoretical concepts as they 
arise in response to textual analysis, articulating each in light 
of the other. 
As Siân Adiseshiah and Rupert Hildyard contend in their 
volume on twenty-first century fiction, the question of the 
subject, and the constitution of such, is one which retains 
vital importance for contemporary literature, because it is a 
question which must be repeatedly articulated in response to 
social and cultural factors:
[...] things really have changed in the twenty-
first century – not just because of the latest 
nightmares of history [...] – but because of the 
continuing hollowing out of human cultures 
and economies by the processes of 
globalisation, consumerism and marketisation. 
The integuments of meaning woven by family, 
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gender, community, class, place, politics, 
religion, nation, even nature have been burst 
asunder, in the West at least, by the 
acceleration of technology, communication 
and globalisation. Is the autonomous 
individual central to liberal humanism anything 
more in the twenty-first century than the 
subject produced by mediatisation, 
consumerism and the work regime-digital 
surveillance? That might be one question 
which literary criticism exists to ask.28
For Adiseshiah and Hildyard, the subject depicted in twenty-
first century literature is something more than a mere mirage 
produced by the unfathomable tectonic shifts of global 
capitalism and free-market economics; but their 
characterisation of the literary production of such a subject 
situates a curious ambiguity at its heart:
What happens now in the fiction discussed in 
this collection is the continuing challenge of 
modernism, now focused not so much on 
narrative linearity and character as on the 
complication and problematisation of realism, 
and on suspicion of the personal 
transcendence offered by middle-brow fiction 
as a deliverance from the always unsettling, 
often traumatic challenges of the twenty-first 
century. A destabilised realism is characteristic 
not just of texts that explicitly invoke the 
supernatural but those which though soberly 
secular are a world away from postmodern 
scepticism. Temporal disordering is repeatedly 
 Siân Adiseshiah and Rupert Hildyard eds., Twenty-First Century Fiction: What Happens Now 28
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 2.
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used to disorient the conventional ideological 
structuring of experience. The uncanny and 
haunting frequently enforce the 
unpredictability and unknowability of 
experience. All these elements can be 
regarded as ‘neo-modernist’ in their challenge 
to accepted patterns of thought as well as in 
their rejection of postmodern scepticism. The 
uncertainty, helplessness and deep pessimism 
that are often the dominant mood of these 
texts are matched by the utopian vision, 
ethical responsibility and attention to the local 
and the unnoticed that occasionally punctuate 
them.
(Twenty-First Century Fiction 12)
The particular problematic form of realism described by 
Adiseshiah and Hildyard is one which variously articulates 
the 'destabilisation', 'disorder', 'disorientation', 
'unpredictability', and 'uncertainty' of experience. While we 
must acknowledge the terms upon which Adiseshiah and 
Hildyard make their claim — they theorise on the basis of a 
small but judicious selection of critical essays on the work of 
contemporary authors — we must also ask whether this 
installation of another space of uncertainty at the heart of 
experience is sufficient for the task of differentiating the 
contemporary literature of the twenty-first century from its 
pre-millennial postmodernist forebears. The characterisation 
of twenty-first century literature not simply as an incomplete 
or tentative field (which, of course, it is) but as itself a 
reflection upon the incompleteness or partiality of experience 
is supported by other critical attempts to adumbrate the 
literary topos of the new millennium. Witness Danel Olson's 
conclusion to the introductory chapter of his exhaustive 
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collection 21st Century Gothic: 'The secrets I found were 
[that] the new Gothic, despite its fresh masquerade, still 
takes us back to the haunting themes of the old Gothic [...]'.  29
Read The 21st-Century Novel, the report from the Edinburgh 
World Writers' Conference of 2012-2013, with its strands on 
the formal and financial effects of technology upon the novel, 
the question of political engagement and popularity in literary 
writing, and the final chapter on 'Style Versus Content’, and 
one is left with the question of whether there is a kind of 
‘content’ which marks the break between post- and pre-
millennial literature at all. One might also surmise (from that 
particular volume at least) that the authors of contemporary 
fiction do not appear particularly inclined to tackle this 
question. Even Gabriel Josipovici's exasperated renunciation 
of contemporary literature in What Ever Happened to 
Modernism?  might warrant a sympathetic reading in this 30
context. Of course, my own claim here is to no 
comprehensive statement. I do suggest that by 'stepping 
away' and re-examining the screen (which is something akin 
to Nicholas Royle's project of 'veering' which 'impels us to 
think afresh and otherwise about the borders or opposition 
between interior/exterior or inner/outer')  we find that a 31
strand of twenty-first century literature focuses not only upon 
reaffirming the superpositioned heart of the subject, or of 
restating the inescapable modernist values of Western 
literature, but upon the work of the subject engaged in 
refusing the deep plunge beyond the curtain of heaven, and 
instead becoming ever more sensitive to the fine threads 
which hold that curtain closed — which keep the screen, and 
the subject, intact.
 Danel Olson, 21st Century Gothic: Great Gothic Novels Since 2000 (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 29
2011), xxxi.
 Gabriel Josipovici, What Ever Happened to Modernism? (London: Yale UP, 2010), x. 30
 Nicholas Royle, Veering: A Theory of Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2012), 7.31
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Is this an essentially conservative goal? I would argue that it 
is not. My intent is not to reaffirm the subject as an 
immutable construct at the heart of the text, but rather to 
demonstrate the tidal forces which are at work in the 
constitution of such; the subject is neither its own missing 
centre nor its impassive facade, but instead the interplay 
between each. And this interplay is to be detected in the 
traces and marks borne by the screen. It is this crucial 
dialectical movement which is often overlooked when critics 
incorrectly accuse Lacan of negatively theorising the subject. 
Peter Zima's chapter on Lacan in Subjectivity and Identity 
falls into this trap: '[Lacan] is a structural thinker who, at the 
beginning of postmodernity, sets out to show how the 
individual subject is turned into a prisoner of interlocking 
structures.'  This notion, that Lacan's subject extends no 32
further than the being stripped of all agency, residing in the 
prison-house of language, ignores the central tenet of his 
'Real period': that 'The true aims at the real'.  In other words, 33
the attempt to define a Symbolic term (such as the subject) 
always leads to the Real by virtue of the instability of the 
'knot' which binds each field together. Since no self-evident 
subject exists, it can only ever 'aim at the Real'. The notion 
that Lacan defines an essentially conservative, negative 
formulation of the subject is a misreading and a 
misunderstanding of the complex oscillation between 
Symbolic and Real which defines it. The role of the Imaginary 
is easily grasped in this case: it is like the trick used in early 
Hollywood cinema, in which vaseline smeared around the 
camera lens allowed Rita Hayworth or Marlene Dietrich's skin 
to 'glow' via an onscreen effect of halation. The screen of 
 Peter V. Zima, Subjectivity and Identity: Between Modernity and Postmodernity (London: 32
Bloomsbury, 2015), 167.
 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of 33
Love and Knowledge 1972-1973 (Encore), trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 1998), 91.
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fantasy is the figure which thematises the Imaginary role in 
the production of a subject. It defines the co-ordinates by 
which the subject persuades him- or herself that this 
continual oscillation between Symbolic and Real can be 
made sensible, and alluring. The screen is always implicated 
in the disjunction between the suprasensible and the 
sensible, because 'What speaks without knowing it makes 
me "I", subject of the verb' (Encore 119); in that place 
between knowing and not-knowing, for Lacan, is what we 
commonly call 'reality'. Reality, for the subject, is glimpsed 
through the screen.
My goal is also to bring literary criticism in line with cognate 
fields which have, in recent years, begun to investigate the 
theory of the screen. Recent screen-focused studies have 
tackled the question of textural, environmental, architectural, 
artistic, and technological surfaces with a view to 
understanding the screen as something other than an object 
which topologically renders the function of representation. 
Narrowing the focus of the theorisation of the screen to its 
purely representative dimension is the kind of strategy which 
results in the materiality of the object being disregarded. New 
research on the theorisation of the screen has focused on 
the material effects of the screen and surface in a variety of 
fields, and not simply upon its representative aspect: from 
gothic architecture in the aforementioned The Gothic Screen 
to Joseph Amato's anthropological history of surface in 
Surfaces: A History. Giuliana Bruno's Surface: Matters of 
Aesthetics, Materiality, and Media crystallises for us the 
particular issue of the screen which arises from these 
studies, focusing on screens in body, art, fashion, and 
cinema. This screen, according to Bruno, is an occlusive and 
connective surface; it gestures towards the subject at the 
moment that it also deprives the subject. In my opinion, 
Bruno's project, like that of the many who have worked to 
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refashion the theory of the screen in recent years, is 
curiously reminiscent of Lacan's. Bruno, for her part, 
mentions Lacan once:
we must reflect on the "superficial" relation 
between the forms of canvas, wall, and 
screen, for the surface not only mediates their 
fabrication but also their modification. The 
hypothesis put forth here is that a fundamental 
intersection of these forms has taken place, 
and today we can witness an important 
change on the surface of media. [...] It is 
important to review the architecture of this 
form, for the screen, when it does not remain 
undertheorized, has too often been treated in 
film theory as a trope akin to the window and 
the mirror. But the fabric of the screen 
discloses a change here. This screen is not a 
window. It slips away from any conceptual 
framing in pure perspectival geometry and 
ideal. And it is also not a mirror. This type of 
screen is not reflective of any form of split 
identity, and it supersedes the architecture of 
the Lacanian gaze.34
Bruno's idea is that the textural surfaces of screens enfold all 
kinds of meanings which do not only correspond to the visual 
marks which appear upon them. Her claim transposes a 
Derridean notion of play upon visual texts: meaning is formed 
by the complex interplay of surface, projection, and the 
mediation of the interior and exterior levels of the marks 
which appear as a result of topological difference. And the 
materiality of surface marks this shift in thought. The screen 
 Giuliana Bruno, Surfaces: Matters of Aesthetics, Materiality, and Media (Chicago: University of 34
Chicago Press, 2014), 75.
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described by Bruno is one which exists as an apparent 
multiplicity of materially-distinct yet theoretically continuous 
forms of itself. She emphasises the connective materiality of 
the object itself, as opposed to the visual information which is 
projected upon it, by way of the screen's property to bear 
projection upon its surface. Her claim that the type of screen 
of which she speaks can 'supersede' the 'architecture' of the 
Lacanian gaze is an example of this distinction. 
For Lacan, however, the gaze is not simply implicated in the 
mirror form of a 'split identity', but is instead the mark of a 
subject emptied of 'meaning' beyond a symbolic level. 
Identity is only split insofar as it is split between the subject, 
which can 'assume' identity as formal possibility, and the 
subject's being, which is cut from Symbolic experience and 
cannot fall under the aegis of any identity. In his theory, there 
is a phantasmatic screen upon which the image of the gaze 
is projected (the gaze itself is defined as an object by Lacan, 
existing beyond the subject); at the level of the scopic drive, 
the subject is always 'looking through a lens' (a symbolic 
lens) as such, distorted by his or her desire and caught in the 
gaze of that which he or she looks toward in order to fill this 
gap.  So, while the object in which the gaze irrupts may 35
appear to be a material screen (Lacan reads paintings in this 
sense, as we will discuss shortly), that screen is already 
functioning as the phantasmatic screen for the subject. The 
screen of fantasy, which is vital to the function of the subject 
in Lacan, can never be superseded because it is already 
acting for the Subject by screening the marks of the Real 
from his or her view. 
The screen of fantasy is only reproduced, for Lacan, in 
paintings, which reveal the painter's desire to pacify the gaze 
 See 'The Line and Light' in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.35
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and 'trick' or satisfy the eye (which Lacan respectively calls 
dompte-regard and trompe-l'oeil). I suggest, however, that 
we require an additional understanding of the interaction 
between the phantasmatic and the material screen, towards 
which Bruno points the way. Lacan's model of the gaze 
works because of a certain inimical function of the screen 
which is expressed in its materiality (for Lacan, in a painting, 
but I suggest that Bruno shows this function can be 
witnessed in many other screen-objects too) but is already 
present for him in the immaterial form of screen which is vital 
to the constitution of the subject. This function of the screen 
is that which is coming to be recognised ever more clearly by 
writers like Bruno and Amato: 
Surfaces, to suggest a general kind of 
dialectic [...] establish the contexts, 
configurations, and juxtapositions of thing and 
flesh, nature and society, and they nurture life 
and awaken the mind. Humans forever and 
constantly move in and out of the world's 
surfaces, traveling between things and 
objects, the other and the self. Outsides point 
toward and come to identify insides.36
It is a dialectical motion which produces two distinct, 
antithetical effects, of representation and occlusion, and 
synthesises them, not in the form of an object, but in the form 
of the Subject. Lacan understands the result of this dialectic 
long before anyone else. It is not simply a mediation of 
separate physical effects (the object both masks and 
represents space) potentially produced in a single object, but 
the guarantee of a space of negotiation with the subject. The 
dompte-regarde is produced in painting but the form of the 
 Joseph A. Amato, Surfaces: A History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), xiv.36
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screen, constituting a surface, on a conceptual level is what 
appears to prompt Lacan to say that 'he who looks is always 
led by the painting to lay down his gaze'. (The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 109). Lacan is at 
pains to ensure that we understand that the painting is no 
closer to the function of representation than is the immaterial 
'picture' of the subjective experience of the gaze.  37
Meanwhile his esoteric treatment of the screen at a 
conceptual level provides nothing less than a framework for 
the very function of painting that he goes on to describe:
[...] the screen re-establishes things, in their 
status as real. If, by being isolated,  an effect 
of lighting dominates us, if, for example, a 
beam of light directing our gaze so captivates 
us that it appears as a milky cone and 
prevents us from seeing what it illuminates, 
the mere fact of introducing into this field a 
small screen, which cuts into that which is 
illuminated without being seen, makes the 
milky light retreat, as it were, into the shadow, 
and allows the object it concealed to emerge.
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 107-8)
What Lacan is describing here is the material effect of a 
screen as it intervenes in the play of light. By bringing the 
concealed object to light (ironically, in the absence of light) 
Lacan shows how a screen is already functioning qua 
dompte-regarde. Why shouldn't we consider, therefore, the 
 '[...] should we see the principle of artistic creation in the fact that it seems to extract [...] that 37
something that stands for representation? Was it to this that I was leading you when I made a 
distinction between the picture and representation? Certainly not' (The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis 110).
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many versions of the screen beyond the painting which now 
work (and I suggest, are on a broader cultural level, assumed 
to work) to trap the gaze and negotiate not only a laying 
down of its volatile Real effects, but indeed to negotiate the 
very space of mediation itself? For it is this outcome towards 
which Lacan points us in his analysis. 
Lev Manovich has long since demonstrated that a genealogy 
of the screen exists, one which figures certain representative 
features inherent in the painting, the cinema screen, and the 
computer screen.  We can offer an advance upon this 38
genealogy however, following Erkki Huhtamo's criticism of 
Manovich's work for being too schematic and prescriptive, 
and consider the continued accretion of function and 
meaning which, according Huhtamo and Amato among 
others, has marked the history of the screen. Huhtamo, for 
example, has written on the history of the screen in his 
attempt to construct what he calls a 'media-archeology' of its 
cultural, social, and ideological role. He notes that the word 
'screen' itself first appears in English in the fourteenth 
century and is certainly in use from the sixteenth century 
onwards to refer to both a floor-standing object used to 
partition space and ward off draughts and heat, and a 
handheld version used to veil the face. 'Whether from heat, 
cold or a gaze, the screen was a surface that protected by 
creating a barrier against something uncomfortable or 
intruding.'  (There appears to be an inescapably Lacanian 39
dimension apparent in any reading of that 'something 
uncomfortable'.) From the eighteenth century onwards, 
however, the screen begins to acquire a meaning contrary to 
this original occlusive sense: Huhtamo notes Charles 
 See Manovich's The Language of New Media (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 95-100.38
 Erkki Huhtamo, 'Elements of Screenology: Toward an Archaeology of the Screen’, ICONICS: 39
International Studies of the Modern Image, 7 (2004), 31-82 [35].
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Musser’s work on the history of screen practices, which 
places silent cinema and the earlier Phantasmagoria as 
succeeding forms of an older tradition of spectacle of 
illustrative projection based around the magic lantern show. 
‘By 1910 the word had come to be used metonymically, 
meaning the film culture itself, and often written with capital 
letters: The Screen.’ ('Elements of Screenology' 38). This 
brief etymology establishes the fundamental dialectic which 
persists in the form of modern screens. While one aspect of 
the screen occludes, the other communicates; while one 
aspect is interior, in other words inward-facing because it 
partitions and encloses space, the other is exterior, outward-
facing because it appears to represent space.
While Bruno is incorrect in claiming that the Lacanian 
architecture of the gaze can be 'superseded', she does 
identify the necessity of expanding the definition of the 
affective screen beyond that of Lacan's much narrower study 
of 'the painting':
The surface is here configured as an 
architecture: a partition that can be shared, it 
is explored as a primary form of habitation for 
the material world. Understood as the material 
configuration of the relation between subjects 
and with objects, the surface is also viewed as 
a site of mediation and projection.
(Surfaces: Matters of Aesthetics, Materiality, 
and Media 3)
Not only mediated, one might add; it is structured in a 
material sense. The issues of the screen as cultural object, 
the 'architecture' of the surface which marks it, and the 
subjective response to this materiality of object — an object 
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which, judging by these examples of recent cross-disciplinary 
work, continues to accrete cultural and symbolic meaning — 
these issues must be confronted in literature, too, for there is 
a necessity in understanding the production and 
representation of the screen as something other than an 
object which simply falters and breaks down in a level of 
unresolved aporetic tension between its representative and 
occlusive aspects. In other words, there must be a way to 
figure this object in literature which does not fall into the trap 
of a classic postmodernist reading of this problem. Bruno's 
conception not only allows but requires the consideration of 
different forms of the screen in the attempt to theorise the 
object. Her work attempts to tease out the connections 
between screens of many stripes, and it is this kind of 
thinking which leads me to suggest that there is something at 
stake for us in extending this inquiry, which has perhaps 
more traditionally interested fields of visual culture, into that 
of literary culture.
Binding this inquiry together is the dialectical conception of 
the screen which underpins my work. The antithetical 
functions of the screen — occlusive and yet representative 
— which result from two separate and very different historical 
objects, as Huhtamo has shown, are combined in the cultural 
meaning and work of the screen in my thesis. In other words, 
I am suggesting that the only way to properly theorise the 
ubiquitous screen which arises in the twenty-first century is to 
remain attuned to the duality of its function and not allow the 
tension between its work as partition and projective surface 
to remain unresolved. There is an effect of the screen which 
includes both of these functions, affecting the subject 
simultaneously: as we see in Lacan, this effect, this 
dialectical outcome is the very production of the subject itself. 
It is towards this outcome that I believe the recent work of 
screen theorisation leads us.
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The underlying premise of this work, therefore, is that we can 
read, in each of the texts I have chosen, a dramatisation of 
the generative moment of the subject. If this word, 
'dramatisation', bears a heavy load, then it is only because 
the arena in which it performs its work is already well-
reinforced. My contention is that we can only understand the 
screen by theorising it as a function of the subject; the two 
are inseparable in our investigation. We only conceive of the 
full extent of the form of the screen itself when we relate it to 
a construction of subjectivity. Therefore, the choice of the 
novel form qua proving ground of this thesis is founded upon 
what is perhaps a distinctly 'old-fashioned' notion: the belief 
in a theoretical investigation borne by textual analysis. In this 
sense, I make no claim to the theorisation of the particular 
form of the novel which has not already been explored in 
Mikhail Bakhtin, György Lukács, Northrop Frye, Ian Watt 
(and of course we could continue the list: Shklovsky, James, 
Adorno, Barthes, Johnson, Todorov...). 
Text, instead, is to be conceived as providing to us nonpareil 
access, as it has for a very long time, to the arena of 
dramatised subjectivity. This conceptual delimitation, of 
course, excludes a metatextual level of inquiry from the 
investigation. It is clear, when we follow Lacan on the 
structure of fantasy, that the literary text in fact performs 
exactly the function that we associate with the screen in 
these terms. Indeed, as Žižek demonstrates, the screen of 
fantasy always functions for the subject on an ad hoc basis, 
the screen being 'filled' with the Symbolic 'matter' of the 
experiencing subject's 'reality'. For example, Žižek reads a 
scene depicting a sexual encounter in David Lean's film 
Ryan's Daughter exactly in this manner, noting that the 
staging of the act accompanied by the sounds of a nearby 
waterfall is what 'fills in' the phantasmatic frame for the 
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couple: 'the waterfall sound itself functions as the 
phantasmatic screen that filters out the Real of the sexual 
act.'  What this demonstrates is that the subject necessarily 40
performs the 'screening' of the Real before any 
understanding of the screen-object is possible, since in this 
case it is the sound that screens the traumatic Real. The 
subjective encounter with the literary text is, therefore, the 
subjective encounter with the phantasmatic screen, since the 
literary-text-as-screen produces an effect upon the subject by 
furnishing it with the Symbolic material, to render the process 
in strictly Lacanian terms, which 'fills in' the fantasy frame in 
both a phantasmatic and objective sense. In my reading 
here, however, I suggest that the text demonstrates its ability 
to provide us with a record of a subject as phenomenon of 
screen. In other words, the Symbolic 'stuff' of the text is a 
reduplication of the act in which the reader-as-Subject is 
already engaged. By excluding this metatextual level of 
inquiry, the analysis intends to focus upon the central 'act' of 
the texts themselves; the encounter of subject and screen. 
When the subject comes into contact with the screen, in each 
text, this encounter upholds the subject, in the same manner 
in which the presubjective being 'in the Real' is produced as 
subject by introduction to the Symbolic realm. 
Contact with the screen therefore suggests a continuous 
interaction between screen and subject which produces, and 
reproduces, each in respect of the other. Importantly, this is 
not to suggest a moment of psychological formation, but 
instead a moment which explores the stability of the Subject, 
the fantasy (in Lacanian terms) which is developed in order 
to allow the Subject to continue to become subject. Each 
chapter tackles the constitution of the subject in relation to 
the screen, and in doing so coalesces around a central 
 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (London: Granta, 2006) 50.40
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theme: in Chapter 1, on Michel Faber's The Book of Strange 
New Things (2014), we think upon materiality; in Chapter 2, 
on Margaret Atwood's Oryx and Crake (2004), upon being; in 
Chapter 3, on China Miéville's The Tain (2001), upon 
narcissism; and in Chapter 4, on W.G. Sebald's Austerlitz 
(2000), upon trauma. The chapters are each formulated 
along the lines of individual case-studies. This structure, 
consisting of largely discrete, free-standing chapters, is 
designed to address the central topic alongside key areas of 
Lacanian theory: by discussing the topics of being, 
narcissism, and trauma, which are important terms in Lacan's 
discourse of the subject, we proceed in the same manner as 
Royle's 'veer' or Žižek's 'look, awry'. The figure of the screen 
will fall into focus only when we approach it from radical and 
incommensurate points. Commonalities between each 
chapter are to be read as implicit expressions of the central 
figure of the screen, therefore, because its theoretical 
structure is what will provide the framework for the study of 
the text. 
Conversely, the analysis of each text is what will allow us to 
probe and uncover the intricacies of the theory itself. Chapter 
1 functions as an introduction to the relationship between the 
screen as figure and the screen as object. It does so by 
tracing the question of the apparent materiality of the screen 
in The Book of Strange New Things, investigating the 
manner in which the screen structures the intersubjective 
relation in that text. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the discussion 
can be said to centre on an area which corresponds to each 
of the three registers: in Chapter 2, on being, we glimpse the 
presubjective Real; in Chapter 3, on narcissism, the 
Imaginary moment of protective ego-formation; and in 
Chapter 4, on trauma, the breakdown of the Symbolic order. 
These demarcations are not absolute, and it is by no means 
the case that each chapter investigates each register in 
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isolation. The last chapter, it should be noted, is outsized in 
both length and influence, because it constitutes the most 
broad-ranging section of the work. The text which is studied 
in this chapter, Austerlitz demands such a discussion 
because it charts (with brilliance, we should note) the 
breakdown of the subject, an event which always 
necessitates a precise interrogation of each of the three 
registers. This chapter, therefore, more than the other 
chapters, necessarily surveys the field of subjective reality 
which is constituted by that Borromean knot-relationship of 
the three registers. 'It's easy for you to see that no two rings 
of string are knotted to each other,' says Lacan of that special 
knot, 'and that it's only thanks to the third that they hang 
together' (Encore 124). Austerlitz details the effects of cutting 
that ring of string which holds the others to itself, in exactly 
the manner that the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real are 
tethered to each other. There can be no more opportune 
moment to view the ultimate function of the screen in Lacan 
than that one. It is for this reason that the final chapter runs 
so large, and occupies its ultimate position within the work.
The presentation of the texts in the order of an inverse 
chronology should not be read as an investigative strategy. 
The chapters are not structured in this way in order to 
penetrate further into the theorisation of Subjectivity. Instead, 
they are structured around our backwards step. We step 
away from the screen in order to attune the strategy of our 
look — as, we will learn, the subject also must. As in Žižek's 
oft-repeated assertion, that only in psychoanalysis are we 
allowed not to enjoy,  we should remain attuned to the 41
boundaries of subject and being which are held open by their 
own constitution, the possibilities for inscription of subject 
 'Its great task is to break the hold over us of the superego injunction to enjoy, that is, to help us 41
include in the freedom to enjoy also the freedom not to enjoy, the freedom from enjoyment.' (Slavoj 
Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011), 74.)
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which the very inscription of subject draws for us. This is 
what, ultimately, we find demonstrated in these texts: not a 
reaction to Adiseshiah and Hildyard’s fresh 
'nightmares' (Twenty-First Century Fiction 2) of the twenty-
first century, but a document of the manner in which it 
remains always possible to draw the subject in light of those 
historical contingencies. The subject is projected and 
occluded in our analysis. The subjects here are those for 
whom the possibility remains not to enjoy; viewed through 
the screen, viewed against their screen, we should realise 
that this very fact represents, in itself, a great victory for 
twenty-first century literature. 
 38
Screen of Faith, Trace of Doubt: 
Materiality and Gaze in Michel Faber's The 
Book of Strange New Things
Michel Faber's novel The Book of Strange New Things tells 
the story of a Christian missionary who travels to an alien 
planet in order to minister to the planet's native race. The 
concept itself — in the sense that it transplants aspects of 
the missionary narrative to the genre of Science Fiction — is 
reminiscent of Stanislaw Lem's Fiasco, James Blish's A Case 
of Conscience and, most strikingly, Mary Doria Russell's The 
Sparrow. The novel does not stray too far, even, from the sort 
of missionary narrative found in non-SF works such as 
Barbara Kingsolver's The Poisonwood Bible: it concerns the 
travails of a teacher of faith who is deeply affected in some 
way by his contact with a foreign culture. Where The Book of 
Strange New Things diverges from these novels is the 
manner in which this contact adversely affects the 
missionary. While Emilio Sandoz' tragic misunderstanding of 
Jana'ata culture in The Sparrow leads to his horrifying 
brutalisation at the hands of his alien host (to give only one 
example of the way these novels depict the Pauline hazards 
of missionary work), the protagonist of The Book of Strange 
New Things, Peter Leigh, instead finds himself in a kind of 
paradise, ministering to natives eager for the word of God, 
and supplied by his sponsor with unlimited resources from 
which to build his church. He muses, in a letter to his wife 
near the beginning of the novel, that 'the way things are 
shaping up, it looks like my yoke is going to be easier than 
that of just about any missionary since the beginning of 
Christian evangelism. When you think of Saint Paul, getting 
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beaten up, stoned, shipwrecked, starved, imprisoned ... I'm 
almost looking forward to my first setback! (ALMOST)'.  42
There is no sign that Peter's faith awaits a moment of peril: 
nothing points toward the kind of looming crisis (and 
renunciation) of faith which we witness in Father Sandoz' 
account of his missionary expedition, for example. Instead 
Faber's novel explores the interstices which constitute the 
workings of that faith, the practice of everyday life which is 
just as vital to the continued functioning of the subject. In 
order to understand Peter's growing attachment to Oasis, we 
might recall a quotation which Fredric Jameson attributes to 
Andre Gide: 'Thank God Balzac never found the truth or the 
system he had been looking for all his life!'  The suggestion 43
for Gide, according to Jameson, is that, had Balzac found 
what he was looking for, he would no longer have been 
Balzac, nor capable of the work that only he could produce. 
Along these lines, we could say that Peter Leigh, having 
already found 'the truth' of the Bible, finds 'the system' on the 
planet Oasis: the effect of this discovery is to radically alter 
his relationship with that which he has left behind.
Peter's wife Bea's messages, sent to him via a device called 
'the Shoot', appear to describe a rapidly deteriorating 
situation on Earth. But while Peter reads of food shortage, 
environmental disaster, and economic collapse at home, he 
is either unable or unwilling to comprehend the severity of 
the situation, instead becoming preoccupied with the simple 
and seductive pleasures of his Oasan mission, learning the 
native language, building his church, living the Arcadian 
lifestyle of the Oasans. Unlike Father Sandoz in The Sparrow 
or Father Ruiz-Sanchez in A Case of Conscience, Peter's 
 Michel Faber, The Book of Strange New Things (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2014), 141.42
 Fredric Jameson, Archeologies of the Future (London: Verso, 2007), 315.43
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mission to Oasis accompanies no dark night of the soul; 
instead, it is Bea, back on Earth, whose faith begins to wane. 
In one of her final letters to Peter, Bea writes:
The Saviour I believed in took an interest in 
what I did and how I behaved. The Saviour I 
believed in made things happen and stopped 
things happening. I was deluding myself. I am 
alone and frightened and married to a 
missionary who's going to tell me that the fool 
has said in his heart there is no God, and if 
you don't say it it will just be because you're 
being diplomatic, because in your heart you're 
convinced I made this happen through my 
faltering of faith, and that makes me feel even 
more alone. Because you're not coming back 
to me, are you? You like it up there. Because 
you're on Planet God. So even if you did come 
back to me, we still wouldn't be together. 
Because in your heart you'd still be on Planet 
God, and I'd be a trillion miles away from you, 
alone with you by my side.
(The Book of Strange New Things 477)
The novel details the story of this estrangement from Peter's 
point of view. This passage reveals both this central theme of 
estrangement and, more importantly, the particular 
formulation of it which our analysis of the text must tackle. 
The fracturing of the relationship between Peter and Bea, the 
pair who have happily spent their lives together on 'Planet 
God' and for whom that shared notion has apparently 
become shattered, is the engine of the plot; but it is upon this 
phrase, 'alone with you by my side', I suggest, that the stakes 
of the novel are balanced. Faber's skill is, on the broadest 
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level, to depict the many discrepancies which overwhelm 
Peter and Bea's relationship and qualitatively present them 
as more or less coextensive with one another. The widening 
spiritual and experiential gap between the two is presented in 
concert with the physical and social gap which more 
concretely divides them. The phrase 'alone with you by my 
side' suggests both that something more essential than the 
conjunction of subjective and objective incompatibility is to 
blame for their issues; indeed, it suggests that the very 
compatibility of Peter and Bea cannot salve these wounds. 
Neither together nor apart, their separation has only shone 
light upon the gap which already existed between them: this 
would constitute a very Lacanian reading of the problem 
indeed, and I want to return to that thought shortly. 
We can also read this 'alone-togetherness' from another 
angle, thinking of the object which is presented in the text as 
both intervening between and conjoining Peter and Bea. This 
object is the aforementioned 'Shoot': first mentioned by Peter 
as 'that thing that USIC installed in our house' (The Book of 
Strange New Things 54), it appears throughout the novel as 
an unobtrusive piece of computer equipment which is rarely 
described as consisting of much more than a screen. The 
purpose of the Shoot is simple; it allows for the transmission 
and reception of electronic messages across unimaginably 
vast distances, a kind of email system which provides the 
only means of communication between Earth and Oasis. In 
other words, without this device, there is no communication 
between Peter and Bea: without this screen, there is no 
language. (There is no other method of communication 
available to Peter and Bea, no phone or video calls, and the 
Shoot cannot transmit images.) Its function therefore leads 
us to describe it as a 'device' for multiple reasons; it is, within 
the reality of the text, literally a device which allows the 
protagonist Peter to maintain written contact with his wife; it 
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is on the narrative level a plot device upon which the novel 
can hang an epistolary framework; and on a textual level it is 
a rhetorical device through which the problems of 
communication and mediation are explored in the context of 
the intersubjective relationship. 
At stake for us in the analysis of this text, I suggest, is the 
attempt to think the role of the screen in both an 
intersubjective sense and a materially affective sense. How 
does it function as a mediatory object in the relationship? 
How does it affect the subject? Marcel Theroux has noted 
that the novel's strength lies in its estrangement of the 
ordinary: 'As well as the literature of authenticity, Faber 
reminds us, there is a literature of enchantment, which invites 
the reader to participate in the not-real in order to wake from 
a dream of reality to the ineffability, strangeness and brevity 
of life on Earth.'  Lacan provides us with a method for 44
analysing the relationship between Peter and Bea which 
investigates the very structure of this subjective 
estrangement. This particular kind of reading is enlightening 
because it emphasises the deadlocks of desire which mark 
their relationship and, indeed, provides a framework for 
uncovering the work of the screen for the subject; but I 
suggest that there is also something missing in readings of 
Lacan and that these must be reappraised if we want to bring 
our thinking of the screen-object in line with current work on 
the subject.
My particular claim is that the screen which we find in The 
Book of Strange New Things is an example of one which 
must be figured in terms of its material presence, and that 
this materiality must not be figured as a secondary effect of 
its apparent simple mediating function. As Siegfried Kracauer 
 Marcel Theroux, NYT Book Review: The Book of Strange New Things, <http://www.nytimes.com/44
2014/11/02/books/review/michel-fabers-book-of-strange-new-things.html> accessed 7/7/15.
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notes, 'inner life manifests itself in various elements and 
conglomerations of external life, especially in those almost 
imperceptible surface data which form an essential part of 
screen treatment.'  And though we are not dealing with a 45
visual text, the 'materiality' of the object, its depiction in the 
literary text as such, is expressed here in similar terms; that 
is, in terms of scene or stage for an inner life. The screen-
object remains a physical medium, however, because of its 
status as physical object, as the object which intervenes 
between them, which separates and yet conjoins the two 
interlocutors, performing this dialectical function. 
This material status as medium is important for us to bear in 
mind throughout our analysis, because this second kind of 
functioning of screen-as-medium which appears to be 
conspicuously absent in the text as such. In this reading of 
the text, the screen, in its material, objective sense, is a 
confounding, veiled presence: absent and yet the 
(non-)function of which makes everything else possible. 
Nevertheless, I contend, we can find traces of an extant 
materiality of screen woven throughout the text, working to 
produce subjective and spatial effects of occlusion and 
representation. In the first section of this chapter, I suggest 
that the encounter with the materiality of the screen cannot 
be reduced to a side-effect of the encounter with the function 
of the screen: this materiality must be considered in the first 
instance, even as it does not appear in the text in the first 
instance as such. By closely reading The Book of Strange 
New Things, I attempt to demonstrate the presence and 
importance of this 'veiled' materiality. Following this, I attempt 
to deal with this 'veiled' presence in terms of the 
consequences that it produces for a Lacanian reading of the 
novel: I suggest that this screen can be read as performing 
 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film 45
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1947), 7.
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the dompte-regarde even though it does not function as fine 
art. This reading takes into account the material effects of 
that object which are adumbrated by the text, suggesting that 
an analysis of the affective materiality of the screen 
demonstrates the necessity of considering the work of the 
screen-object in the negotiation with the gaze. I propose that 
a proper reading of the screen-object in The Book of Strange 
New Things must follow Lacan's analysis along its own 
levels. In other words, this 'veiled' materiality which denotes 
an obvious connotation in Lacanian theory from a completely 
opposite angle — that of the veiled signifier of the 'not-One' 
or empty subject — is reduplicated in our reading as a veil, 
another screen, which partitions and projects one thought of 
the screen-object from/upon the other: we must read Lacan 
as one who already understands the effect of the screen-
object as existing beyond the constraints of painting alone.
Near the end of the novel, Bea sends a message — simply 
'There is no God' (The Book of Strange New Things 454) — 
and Peter's reaction to it illuminates the question of the 
materiality of the screen:
There was no further message from Bea. At 
his command, a network of ingenious 
technology searched the cosmos for her 
thoughts and found nothing. Only that same 
cry of desolation, still glowing on the screen, 
just those four awful words, hanging in a 
contextless grey void. No name attached — 
neither his nor hers. Just the raw sentence.
(The Book of Strange New Things 460)
This description simultaneously points out the materiality and 
immateriality of the exchange: the conjunction of Peter and 
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Bea in the moment is revised as a conjunction of the 
materiality of the Shoot (or the object signified by it, which 
stands for the technological device and process itself) and 
the apparent immateriality of the act of communication. Peter 
and Bea are figured together only in negative terms: neither 
can be attached (via their name) to the 'raw sentence'. And 
yet the raw sentence wields total performative power over 
both: it accomplishes and makes present Bea’s irrevocable 
alienation from her faith and from Peter. Peter thinks of Bea's 
messages as 'a frozen Present, yet to be experienced' (The 
Book of Strange New Things 232), and in that sense the 
messages are all the more revealed as the issue of a 
monolithic partition, which both strips the message of its 
signified (the other: Bea) revealing a terrifying instantiation of 
the Real in its namelessness, and is the gateway or passage 
to a future anterior moment when Bea will have already 
experienced a present yet to materialise for Peter. 
The logic of the operational process of the Shoot — Peter's 
'command' initiates the machine's search for Bea's 'thoughts' 
which returns the empty result — belies the ultimately 
metaphysical description of the operation itself. Of course the 
medium through which Bea's thoughts (and Peter's own) are 
made comprehensible is language, but the possibility of the 
transmission of that language is entirely predicated upon the 
'network of ingenious technology' that serves the Shoot. In 
this way the description of the Shoot works to minimise the 
significance of language itself in the process, instead 
emphasising a kind of conjoined space which appears to 
issue from the material object. The Shoot itself is 
'concentrated', in a rhetorical sense, by a metonymical action 
which identifies the most potently symbolic part of the device: 
the screen, standing in for the unfathomable technology 
which is created by the necessity of communication itself and 
therefore by the presence of the screen itself; the screen, 
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'contextless grey void' which is nothing of the sort. For only 'a 
slim contraption of plastic and steel' (The Book of Strange 
New Things 171) it wields an outsized influence, not only 
over the characters but over the text itself: while the screen 
alone stands for the unknowable (and ultimately irrelevant) 
technology which powers the Shoot, it also subsumes the 
very act of communication, shaping the flows of Peter and 
Bea's relationship by virtue of its materiality. Like a black 
hole, it is detectable by the manner in which it affects its 
surroundings. And like Lacan's treatment of paintings, which 
reproduce the effects of an immaterial screen tracing the 
extent of the subject's vision, this screen requires the 
consideration of its materiality: it is just that its materiality is 
veiled, hidden in the text — which is not the same thing as 
saying that it does not possess materiality at all. 
This materiality fits like a cipher in the text: it is both a 
nonentity and a code which reveals that which is missing 
from view. Consider Peter's reaction to Bea's letter informing 
him of a tsunami which has devastated the Maldives: 'In 
normal circumstances, he would have embraced her; the 
pressure of his arms against her back and the nudge of his 
cheek against her hair would have said it all. But now, the 
written word was all he had' (The Book of Strange New 
Things 130). Peter conceptualises his ability to communicate 
with Bea as the materiality of the act: there is a physical 
dimension which expressly excludes the written word, and 
works instead via an intimate haptic relation based upon the 
pressure of contact between arms and back, cheek and hair. 
This materiality is what appears will have made that 
consoling gesture successful: of course it can never be so, 
can never come to fruition while this particular system of 
communication via the screen mediates and partitions the 
interlocutors. The partition 'forces' Peter to employ the written 
word alone, the description of it as being 'all he had' 
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signalling that very materiality which it apparently lacks, as if 
completely insubstantial. He continues, shortly after he 
finishes composing his reply:
He read the text of his message over, but 
didn't tinker with it any further, feeling 
suddenly faint with hunger and fatigue. He 
pressed a button. For several minutes, his 793 
inadequate words hung there, trembling 
slightly, as if unsure what to do. That was 
normal for the Shoot, he'd found. The process 
kept you in suspense each time, tempting you 
to fear that it would fail. Then his words 
vanished and the screen went blank, except 
for the automated logo that said: APPROVED, 
TRANSMITTED.
(The Book of Strange New Things 132)
 
The curious thing about this passage is the way in which it 
actually works to undercut the opposition — between the 
'authentic' materiality of hapticity and the deficient 
immateriality of the written word — which appears in the 
previous quotation. Again, the written word is figured as 
lacking, 'inadequate'. But the description of Peter’s message 
imbues the words with a material quality, the efficacy of 
which can be measured in the effect it produces upon the 
subject. The sudden faintness experienced by Peter is the 
result of a journey from which he has shortly returned — his 
first to meet the native Oasans — but he suffers no real 
effects until this very moment, the moment in which he is also 
forced to regard the ‘raw’ sentences of his message. And the 
echo of his abrupt malaise is to be found in the suddenly 
skittish '793 inadequate words' which 'hung there, trembling 
slightly'. This point in the passage inverts our understanding 
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of the object of Peter's unease: rather than simply 
experiencing discomfort with the inadequacy of the form of 
communication itself, it is instead the irruption of the 
materiality of the screen (which structures this 
communication) which appears to be affecting Peter. 
Consider the objective, material quality of the words 
themselves: they do not merely figuratively 'hang', like 
charged words in spoken discourse, but instead are literally 
hung on the screen, suspended and trembling, visually and 
materially constituting an interruption of Peter's fantasy of 
irrevocable communication with his wife. The blank screen 
which appears to envelop the words themselves is again 
figured without materiality; but this very lack of apparent 
materiality only calls attention to the fact that it is only with 
the material construction of the screen that this 
communication is possible. The screen-object itself appears 
to be both irrupting and lurking within the text. 
The hapticity that appeared to be reserved only for the 
meeting of the two bodies of Peter and Bea is actually plainly 
represented as a mere fantasy compared to the 
manipulations which control the screen itself. The hapticity 
structuring this communication in fact constitutes the only 
true material relation we can glimpse in this passage: that of 
Peter and the Shoot. He presses buttons in order to type out 
a message to his wife. He presses another button to finalise 
and perform the act of communication with his wife. In fact, 
we cannot fail to notice the language which marks the 
passage of that moment, in which Peter presses a button 
which makes the message 'tremble' while he experiences 
'fear that it would fail'. The contact that we witness occurs 
only between Peter and the Shoot, and in its curiously 
intimate appearance it is structured by a simultaneously 
veiled and pronounced materiality. The hapticity of the 
relation, the possibility of contact between Peter and the 
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screen, demonstrates the materiality of the screen which is 
encoded by the text; Peter suffers a form of 'performance 
anxiety' over the encounter with an object which we are 
hardly told is there. And yet there is bound up in this moment 
a kind of exquisite denial, as Peter's 'lacking' words are 
expropriated by the screen and invested by him with a 
libidinal excess which responds, 'trembling', to his touch, as 
he experiences a fear of failure. At this moment, the fantasy 
of intimate contact with his wife is reinvested in the encounter 
with the screen of the Shoot. 
In Lacan's theory of the sexual relation, the male subject , 46
enraptured in phallic jouissance — the masturbatory 
'jouissance of the idiot' (Encore 81) — never gets close to his 
partner, the Other: his desire, insofar as it can be said to be 
his own, is located in the Other and directed at the other 
whom he supposes to possess the Other, or the Other 
'quality' (which is beyond the bounds of possibility). The very 
thing which that other is supposed to possess is called 'objet 
a' by Lacan, or the object of the small other (as opposed to 
the big Other — the third position of Symbolic law which is 
proposed by language, and which hangs over the subject) in 
order to emphasise the process by which the subject is 
'emptied' of its content (the subject being constituted by the 
fact that it must symbolise itself outside of itself in language), 
and in which it supposes that this other object can fill that 
hole or gap. Objet a, which Suzanne Barnard calls 'an 
unsymbolizable scrap of the real' , marks the trace of the 47
Real in what Lacan calls the semblance of being, the 
Symbolic basis of subject which ‘mirrors’ being: caught 
 In other words, the subject identifying with the 'position' of the male, rather than the biologically 46
male human — a vital distinction in Lacan, and one which we will discuss further in Chapter 2.
 Suzanne Barnard, 'Tongues of Angels: Feminine Structure and Other Jouissance’, Reading 47
Seminar XX, eds. Suzanne Barnard and Bruce Fink (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 171-185 
(179).
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between the registers of the Symbolic and the Real, objet a 
'only dissolves, in the final analysis, owing to its failure, 
unable, as it is, to sustain itself in approaching the 
real' (Encore 95). We cannot fail to notice that the 
'completion' of Peter's attempt to touch his wife via the 
screen at this moment, signified by the towering and yet 
impotent message 'APPROVED, TRANSMITTED', is only the 
result of a solitary endeavour which is masked by the 
possibility of a satisfactory reciprocal communication 
represented by the screen. Two readings are apparent: the 
screen is a Symbolic object, supposed to contain objet a, 
masking an impossible intersubjective relation between Peter 
and his partner — it is the scrap of a transcendental Real 
which is only revealed as an excremental, insignificant object 
in the final encounter; and the screen is performing a double 
function, defined by its materiality as an object which 
partitions, masks, occludes, and separates the two at the 
moment that it also projects, receives, represents, and 
communicates information between them.
We can see how objet a assumes two forms here. Peter's 
fantasy of contact dissolves in the face of the materiality of 
the screen but is then immediately reconstituted in terms of 
the screen itself; the object which Peter will suppose to allow 
himself to move towards the Other takes form, firstly, in Bea's 
body and then in the screen. The interruption of this fantasy 
of contact with Bea can be read as constituting the 
perception of the stain of the Real, or in other words a 
moment in which the screening fantasy (which should 
ordinarily prevent the subject's encounter with that which is 
unbearable and traumatic) breaks down. We can draw an 
immediate parallel between the irruption of the screen which 
we have noticed in our reading thus far and with this 
'appearance' of the stain of the Real. As Žižek says, objet a 
is an insubstantial object which ‘in itself is "nothing but 
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confusion", and which acquires a definite shape only when 
looked at from a standpoint slanted by the subject’s desires 
and fears — as such, as a mere "shadow of what it is 
not"' (How to Read Lacan 69). The veiled materiality of the 
object in the text confirms this. In this reading, it would not be 
the materiality of the screen which affects Peter but instead 
the horrifying confrontation with that which marks the subject 
in the field of objects and reveals its constitutive emptiness 
and lack. The episode of the final, disappointing, time Peter 
and Bea make love — in the back of their car, on the way to 
the airport before Peter departs for America and his 
spaceflight — and Peter's obsession over it attains new 
significance when we view it in such terms and in light of our 
reading of the material screen. Peter writes, in his first 
message to Bea after arriving on Oasis:
Bea, forgive me for not being able to let this 
go, but I'm still upset about what happened in 
the car. I feel I let you down. I wish I could 
take you in my arms and make it right. It's a 
silly thing to obsess about, I know. I suppose it 
just makes me confront how far away we are 
from each other now. Have any husband and 
wife ever been separated by so vast a 
distance? It seems like only yesterday I could 
reach out my arm and you'd be right there. On 
our last morning in bed together, you looked 
so satisfied and serene. But in the car you 
looked distraught.
(The Book of Strange New Things 54)
The 'fear of failure' which Peter later experiences in relation 
to the Shoot finds its origin in this moment. What is intriguing 
is the way in which Peter infers Bea's disappointment in a 
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visual sense as opposed to a vocal one. The apparent 
authenticity of haptic communication, which Peter longs for in 
his separation from Bea, fails to function, paradoxically, when 
they are together. In the moment, and in the airport 
afterwards, Bea reassures Peter that he has no reason to 
worry: in spite of this, Peter fixates on how Bea looks. It is in 
the act of looking that Peter actually exemplifies the Lacanian 
dictum that subjects relate only to what they are missing in 
the Other. While Peter becomes anxious about his impotency 
to the extent that he is unable to read Bea’s distraught face 
as anything other than a sign of his own ‘lack’ (a lack of what 
he can give to the Other), as impinging upon his own 
subjective fantasy, the revelation later on in the novel that 
Bea’s plan all along was to become pregnant illustrates the 
fundamental manner in which each partner ‘misses’ the 
other’s intent. Bea is unsatisfied because she wants to 
become pregnant, and not because of Peter's impotency, as 
he supposes. Nevertheless, it is Peter's lack which haunts 
him, and becomes a mistake which he must attempt to rectify 
in language: in the very realm which he mistrusts in favour of 
the imaginary power of touch. On the other hand, we can see 
in the above passage that there is also already a problem of 
materiality which weighs on Peter’s mind: that of distance 
and hapticity. His obsession with his performance forces him 
to confront the problem of distance and the reality of the 
mediation of their communication. It introduces a new 
relationship in which that which is at arm’s length is only the 
screen. There is a telescopic effect inherent to their 
communication. The vast distance which has 'never before 
separated husband and wife' is now potently symbolised by 
the Shoot. This dual reading opens a gap for us when we 
attempt to consider the materiality of the screen itself; for, in 
Lacan, the screening fantasy is never material as such, and 
yet it is structured and called forth by an object, objet a. The 
screen-object appears to function in the way Lacan describes 
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the painting, following the screen implicated in the gaze. The 
screen we see here is involved in a materially-affective 
relation with the subject, the hapticity (the possibility of 
contact) of which affirms this effect. Is it possible for us to 
read the screen of the Shoot as a trap for the gaze, a screen-
object which works in more than a representative sense?
Nicholas Daly, in his study of the interruptive meetings 
between technology and the body which structure modern 
subjectivity, notes that the figure at the centre of J.G. 
Ballard's Crash is 'the post-crash body, a body scarred but 
also strangely liberated and libidinized by the encounter with 
the machine' : by contrast, the encounter with technology in 48
The Book of Strange New Things reveals the suggestion of a 
libidinal relation between body and machine which is 
problematised by a deeply ambivalent regard for the 
materiality of that relation. So, while Daly frames a set of 
increasingly integrated depictions of the relationship between 
the subject and the machine — from the sensation drama 
and fiction of the 1860s which stages the near-collision of the 
body and locomotive, through the acculturation of cinematic 
sexuality and mortality of the early twentieth century, and 
culminating in Crash, in which the collision is finally depicted 
'one last time ... [in] pre-microchip culture' (Literature, 
Technology, and Modernity 8) — when we jump to a twenty-
first century depiction of that relation, we cannot help but 
notice that the materiality of that technological object has 
come to be figured idiosyncratically by comparison. Is there 
an interruption already woven into the relationship between 
Peter and the Shoot, one which is the result of an obviation 
of the ecstatic, climactic impact which appears to structure 
Daly's study? Without the possibility of impact, the materiality 
of the screen appears decidedly unthreatening by 
 Nicholas Daly, Literature, Technology, and Modernity, 1860-2000 (New York: Cambridge UP, 48
2004), 116.
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comparison. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to notice that the 
true hapticity presented by the text is not one which 
facilitates human contact, but instead one which demands 
human-machine contact, and that this hapticity is structured 
around a materiality of the screen. Peter's relationship with 
his USIC colleagues (USIC is the corporation which has 
established the base on Oasis) is cordial, but that cordiality 
masks an apparent distance which seems to mark all human 
relationships in the text. There is an awkward disinterest 
which marks the relationships between the employees; they 
are all talented scientists and engineers who appear to Peter 
to be missing a vital human component. The stale corporate 
atmosphere of the base only exacerbates this situation, 
replacing emotional interaction with canned radio 
documentaries and trite motivational posters: 'The USIC 
mess hall was humming, not with human activity, but with 
recorded music' (The Book of Strange New Things 62). But 
more relevant is the distance which develops between the 
USIC employees and the people they leave behind. 
Grainger, Peter's closest contact at the USIC base on Oasis, 
articulates this 'distance' when she informs him that 'This 
happens. This happens to all of us':
'The rift,' she said. 'It grows and grows, and 
finally ... there's too much of it to cross. It's like 
...'
Words failed her, and she resorted to a 
gesture instead. Releasing her grip on the 
steering wheel for a few seconds [...] she held 
up her hands, palms parallel, separated by a 
few inches, as though about to press them 
together in medieval prayer. But instead, she 
parted them wider, letting the fingers splay 
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limply, as though each hand was toppling off 
an axis, falling through space.
(The Book of Strange New Things 340-1)
Grainger communicates to Peter the apparently common 
experience of all the USIC employees on Oasis, the one 
which he recognises is affecting his relationship with Bea: 
that of the widening experiential rift between those on Oasis 
and those on Earth. What is interesting about this episode is 
that Grainger illustrates the concept with a gesture which 
emphasises the hapticity of the relation; language literally 
fails her, and cannot encompass the problem of this rift. The 
concept can only be symbolised, for her, in thinking of the 
possibility of contact. This gesture seems to me to be a 
reiteration of the interruptive paradigm of the screen which 
we witness in the text, a relation which, in contrast to Daly's 
study of 'pre-microchip culture', expressly excludes impact, 
and which in fact figures the exact opposite of an impact in 
its relational model. In The Book of Strange New Things the 
screen is touched and not-touched, a material object with an 
immaterial, phantasmic presence.
The goal for us would be to describe this screen-object as 
doing nothing other than revealing the gaze itself. This initial 
suggestion of the screen as an absent presence already 
invites a classic Lacanian reading: it is tempting to figure this 
screen in two senses, both as a kind of phallic signifier, the 
signifier of the 'not-One', structuring the relationship between 
Peter and Bea in its absence, and as an object prompting the 
eruption of a gaze revealing through anamorphosis the stain 
of the terrifying and disruptive Real. But the consideration of 
these effects in a computer screen which displays nothing 
but text also invites us to diverge from Lacan and consider 
the immanence of the physical, haptic experience of the 
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object itself. The text seems to provoke an additional reading 
of the materiality of the screen, not least because it is very 
clear that there is constitutive effect experienced by Peter in 
relation to the screen:
The words were sincere but felt a little forced. 
That is, he would have spoken them 
spontaneously if Bea had been cradled in his 
arms, her head nestled under his shoulder, 
but ... Typing them onto a screen and sending 
them into space was a different thing. It 
changed the colour and tone of the 
sentiments, the way a cheaply photocopied 
photograph loses warmth and detail. His love 
for his wife was being cartoonised and he 
lacked what it took to display it as the vividly 
figurative painting it should be.
(The Book of Strange New Things 399)
It seems clear from this passage that there is evinced an 
architecture of the screen which produces an effect in the 
text. Consider the constitutional position of the screen in 
Peter and Bea's communication. In this position, where the 
screen is responsible entirely and materially for the possibility 
of communication between the two, there is enacted a subtle 
enfolding of the contradictions of the screen within 
themselves: the result is the formation of a partitioning object 
which also connects and commutes as it occludes. In the 
passage, Peter directly experiences the paradox of the 
'contextless void’. While the materiality of the object itself 
seems to be unrepresented by the text, it is only this very 
materiality which can account for the effects that it itself 
produces. Here we witness the screen's effect upon Peter's 
attempt to communicate with Bea. It is not, as first appears, 
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the problem of a translation of spoken language into written 
communication, but instead one of spontaneous 
intersubjective experience translated into material form. That 
is why, in spite of the fact that the Shoot cannot display 
images, the descriptive load of this passage is borne by 
visual and not mental metaphor. Peter lacks the skill to 
'display' the 'figurative painting' of his love, rather than the 
skill to write or expressly communicate it. His problem is not 
simply that he cannot communicate with his wife, but that he 
cannot adapt to the radical form of the object itself. 
Therefore, rather than figuring Peter's inability (he literally 
has a 'lack of what it takes') to communicate with Bea only as 
an example of Lacan's famous statement on the lack of the 
sexual relationship, il n'y pas de rapport sexuel, we must also 
consider the manner in which the screen as a material object 
is implicated in the revelation of that impossible relationship. 
It is not simply in the action of 'typing' his sentiments that 
Peter feels they are altered, but by typing them 'onto a 
screen and sending them into space' [emphasis added]: 
materiality and its effects are invoked by this situational 
distinction. The intrusive object which disrupts the Imaginary 
completeness of Peter's wordless communication with Bea 
must be acknowledged in its materiality. This intrusion upon 
the subject's imaginary space is in some ways a call to the 
experience of space itself, as Jacques Rancière notes in The 
Future of the Image, thinking of 'the way in which, by drawing 
lines, arranging words or distributing surfaces, one also 
designs partitions that enable one to partake in communal 
space, [...] configurations of what can be seen and what can 
be thought, forms of inhabiting the material world.'  Rancière 49
draws attention to the subjective interventions involved in the 
construction of materiality which must exist in order to allow 
 Jacques Rancière, The Future of the Image trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2007), 91.49
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the object its own intervention, such as we see with the 
screen in The Book of Strange New Things. Imaginary space 
for Lacan is space, of course, or rather, the Imaginary is 
indistinguishable from that which the subject experiences as 
space. But the ‘form of inhabiting the material world’ in 
Rancière is the very form of the partition itself: it is the 
partition which creates the possibility of communal space 
through the simultaneous act of exclusion of space. It is this 
dual experience of the screen which Peter encounters when 
he recognises his own deficiency. The ability to 'display' 
sentiment is rendered highly problematic when the form of 
the object is split along its own partition: Peter wants to 
communicate, to represent his sentiment towards Bea, but 
fails to understand the manner in which the screen must also 
occlude the display of sentiment. In the gap between Peter's 
'cartoonised' love and the proper 'figurative painting that it 
should be' is the very partition envisioned by Rancière; and 
of course this partition is found already in the very form of the 
display precisely because of the materiality of the screen 
which requires it. This materiality is the thing which enjoins 
the figurative and material aspects of the screen, so that they 
both function simultaneously as the subject contends with 
and experiences the object itself. It is called forth by, and 
could not exist without, the interruptive materiality of the 
Shoot which conjoins Peter and Bea.
In Lacan, of course, there is always an interruptive presence, 
too. The intersubjective relationship is both predicated upon, 
and is a function of, the desire of the Other. Man’s desire is 
the Other’s desire, as he says. The illusion of the sexual 
relationship is that it is constituted without mediation and can 
be signified as a total, symmetrical relation; the fact that 
Lacan wants to make clear, however, is that, after all, we are 
never alone with our partners: 
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You are my wife — after all, what do you know 
about it? You are my master — in reality, are 
you so sure of that? What creates the 
founding value of those words is that what is 
aimed at in the message, as well as what is 
manifest in the pretence, is that the other is 
there qua absolute Other. Absolute, that is to 
say he is recognized, but is not known. In the 
same way, what constitutes pretence is that, in 
the end, you don't know whether it's a 
pretence or not.50
Although delivered relatively early in his career before he had 
fully grasped the importance of the dimension of the Real in 
psychoanalysis, this quote indicates to us the manner in 
which Lacan conceives of the Other in both a Symbolic and a 
Real dimension. As Žižek notes:
we need to resort to performativity, to symbolic 
engagement, precisely and only insofar as the 
other whom we encounter is not only the 
imaginary semblable but also the elusive 
absolute Other of the Real Thing with whom 
no reciprocal exchange is possible.51
In other words, the 'founding value' of the performative 
utterance — the fact that, by naming another as your master, 
you oblige them to enter into that relationship with you and 
treat you as if they were such — which characterises the 
subject's engagement in the Symbolic mode does not 
encompass the total aspect of the Other. If, in the Symbolic 
 Jacques Lacan. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses, ed. Jacques-Alain 50
Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 1993), 48.
 Slavoj Žižek. 'The Real of Sexual Difference' in Reading Seminar XX, eds. Suzanne Barnard and 51
Bruce Fink (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 57-75 (70).
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sense, desire is first and already determined by the Other, 
since desire can only be articulated according the symbolic 
structure of language, law, and society which precedes it in 
the subject, then in the real sense desire is experienced as 
the desire of the Other, of the Other itself desiring. Symbolic 
space allows the articulation of terms with which desire can 
be said to follow or transgress social norms: this is the Other 
in its Symbolic dimension as a Third term intervening in the 
subject’s pursuit of desire. But the real dimension of the 
Other is as 'Thing'  which calls forth the subject’s desire, 52
announcing desire in its unfathomable raw state: this is 
Žižek’s reading of the ‘orders’ of the Other. It is in this Real 
dimension of the Other that we witness the necessity of the 
Symbolic semblance — objet a — which tends towards the 
Real. Because the ‘Real Thing’ (in other words, das Ding, the 
Thing) is utterly unfathomable, and approaching it is 
unbearable for the subject, the subject must designate the 
thing in the other (objet a) in which it locates desire — it is for 
this reason that objet a maintains a banal, excremental 
character. The sublime forever eludes it. 
Although the Other is that which utterly exceeds the subject 
— is, as Žižek calls it, the 'automatism that runs the 
show’ (How to Read Lacan 40) — it is also experienced by 
the subject in the impenetrability of another subject, in the 
essential confusion by which the other appears to be both 
subject and object: in, for example, the fact that what ones 
wife 'knows about it' is not what oneself 'knows about it'. This 
is the result, for Lacan, of the subject's assumption of the 
Symbolic space, or in other words the entry into language, 
which in an utterly constitutive way supposes the other to 
know. This assumption of the other, a specific subject whom I 
imagine gives me access to the interiority of their being, is 
 The 'Thing', or das Ding will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2. It is to be conceived as the 52
'primordial' object of the Real itself.
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guaranteed by the possibility of the Other: the 'big' Other that 
is language, which creates the possibility of an other term in 
the first place by allowing my interaction with it. But the Other 
as Thing escapes this Symbolic dimension every time the 
subject becomes close to witnessing it ‘head-on’ as such. 
That is why Lacan says, as we noted earlier, that objet a 'only 
dissolves, in the final analysis' unable 'to sustain itself in 
approaching the real.'
This impossibility of sustaining itself in the Real is a mark, 
perhaps counterintuitively, of its visibility, and the point at 
which this thought of the Other and objet a becomes relevant 
to the thought of the screen in The Book of Strange New 
Things. For Lacan, as Žižek notes, ‘the object-cause of 
desire is something that, viewed from in front, is nothing at 
all, just a void: it acquires the contours of something only 
when viewed at a slant’ (How to Read Lacan 68). The object-
cause of desire (objet a) is that which exists beyond the 
subject, ‘apparently something’, but really only animated by 
the particular (phantasmatic) rendering of the subject’s desire 
in the first place. The anamorphic status of the object-cause 
of desire (and the anamorphotic outcome of its appearance 
as gaze) is most famously illustrated by Lacan in his reading 
of Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors. Thinking of this object-
cause emphasises for us the importance of understanding 
Lacan’s particular use of the term ‘screen’ in the field of the 
gaze. This screen is an immaterial projective/occlusive 
surface which is implicated in the function of the extra-
subjective gaze. For Lacan the screen is implicated in the 
scopic field, which entangles the form of the gaze with the 
function of desire. The 'gaze' here is a defamiliarising term 
with an 'inside-out structure’ (The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis 82): it is 'inside-out' in the sense 
that it is figured by Lacan as emanating from a point beyond 
the subject. It is important to understand that the structure of 
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the gaze, in Lacan's theory, does not amount to 'that which I 
look upon also looks upon me'. The gaze is, for the subject, 
an object which does not consist in vision but in imagination; 
it reaffirms the dictum that man's desire is the desire of the 
Other by emphasising the fact that our position is inherently 
neither subjective nor objective, although we appear to 
ourselves to oscillate between these positions. Instead we 
are subject to the same laws of light which make possible our 
own ability to perceive. In this way, the gaze, like language, 
pre-empts the subject: that is why Lacan calls it 'a gaze 
imagined by me in the field of the Other' (The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 84). The screen 
enters this structure of the gaze at the meeting point of the 
subject and the other's gaze.
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Lacan's diagram of the relation is reproduced above . In the 53
first figure, the 'geometral point' of the eye views the object, 
apprehending an image dependent upon that geometral 
position; in the second figure, the reverse action seems to 
occur, the 'point of light' which emanates from the object 
signalling to the subject at the geometral point that it too, 
shall we say, is 'part of the picture' — a picture in which it 
retains the position of an object itself. The final figure, which 
interlaces the two previous diagrams, confirms the position of 
the 'point of light' as that of the gaze itself, 'existing' beyond 
the 'subject of representation' as a result of the mere 
possibility of the subject possessing the capacity to view 
another object. As Lacan notes, 'That which is light looks at 
me, and by means of that light in the depths of my eye, 
something is painted [...] something that is an 
impression' (The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 96); this 'impression' is the anamorphic stain 
which fundamentally asserts the subject's powerlessness in 
the scopic field:
This is something that introduces what was 
elided in the geometrical relation — the depth 
of field, with all its ambiguity and variability, 
which is in no way mastered by me. It is rather 
it that grasps me, solicits me at every moment, 
and makes of the landscape something other 
than a landscape, something other than what I 
have called the picture.
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 96)
 See the chapters 'The Line and Light' and 'What is a Picture?' in The Four Fundamental 53
Concepts of Psychoanalysis for original diagrams; they are found on pages 91 and 106, 
respectively.
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The 'grasping' of the subject, that action which plays out as 
the gaze makes itself known in the picture, is accomplished 
for Lacan on the level of the final mysterious term — the 
screen. Hal Foster, in 'Obscene, Abject, Traumatic', gives an 
account of its nature:
The meaning of this last term, the screen, is 
obscure. I understand it to stand for the 
cultural reserve of which every image is one 
instance. Call it the conventions of art, the 
schemata of representation, the codes of 
visual culture, this screen mediates the object-
gaze for the subject. But it also protects the 
subject from this object-gaze, for it captures 
the gaze, "pulsatile, dazzling and spread out", 
and tames it in an image.54
The screen, we can see from Lacan's diagram, appears 
coextensive with the image apprehended by the subject. 
Foster notes the dual purpose of this screen, which only 
becomes apparent once the objective nature of the gaze is 
realised. For it is the purpose of the screen to both mediate 
the gaze and to protect the subject from its Real effects. This 
function of mediation which Lacan recognises as imperative 
in the working of the gaze is the expression of a constitutive 
dialectical aspect of the screen. This mediation involves the 
work of both an occlusive and a representative function of 
the screen.
The correlative of the picture, to be situated in 
the same place as it, that is to say, outside, is 
the point of the gaze, while that which forms 
the mediation from the one to the other, that 
 Hal Foster, 'Obscene, Abject, Traumatic’, October, 78 (Autumn, 1996), 106-124 (109). 54
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which is between the two, is something of 
another nature than geometral, optical space, 
something that plays an exactly reverse role, 
which operates, not because it can be 
traversed, but on the contrary because it is 
opaque — I mean the screen.
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 96)
This screen of which Lacan speaks does possess a 
materiality because it always only intervenes between the 
subject and the object from which the gaze erupts. In other 
words the screen is that which seems to pre-empt that which 
we would call a screen in material or objective terms: and yet 
it performs the very work that we associate with the screen-
object. That is why Lacan calls the screen opaque. In spite of 
its immateriality, it produces a structural effect upon the 
resolution of the gaze, so that even when we think our vision 
is unencumbered we are supposed to realise that there is an 
eternality of the screen. Foster draws out the implications for 
this eternal screen: it 'tames' the gaze in an image. So in 
Lacanian terms the image is never possible without the 
screen itself, and this screen, as Foster says, as product of 
symbolic function, is granted to humans alone:
Humans [...] have access to the symbolic — in 
this case to the screen as the site of picture-
making and viewing, where we can 
manipulate and moderate the gaze. In this 
way the screen allows the subject, at the point 
of the picture, to behold the object, at the point 
of light.
('Obscene, Abject, Traumatic' 109)
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So, how does this screen relate to the material screen, the 
screen-object which we find in The Book of Strange New 
Things? Our goal is to think of the screen as possessing a 
materiality, and the material object which we find in the 
narrative — the screen of the Shoot — displays a similar 
dialectical aspect to the conceptual screen implicated in the 
Lacanian gaze. In other words, the screen performs a 
contradictory function of occlusion and representation 
simultaneously. We can discover that function produced in 
the gaze, where the screen is the guarantor of the subject's 
approach towards the object of desire, both preventing and 
allowing the non-relation to function. This aspect of the 
screen is not lost in Lacan. That aspect of the material 
partition, that which divides the space which produces sense-
effects for the subject, which conjoins the visual and 
mediatory sense: it is found in the painting.
The screen in The Book of Strange New Things cannot be 
thought of in only its scopic dimension, either as the object 
from which the gaze erupts (which would ultimately render 
the object itself irrelevant) or as a screen similar to the one 
which is implicated in the field of the gaze. We have shown 
that there is a veiled materiality of object expressed in The 
Book of Strange New Things: that materiality of object, 
precisely because it is veiled, demands the analysis of its 
effects. It is the screen which marks Peter and Bea's material 
separation; it is the thing which prevents them from 
communicating on a level which is not strictly homologous 
with the function of the immaterial screen of the gaze, even if 
we can see that both screens are structured around a similar 
dialectical action. This is the key outcome in our attempt to 
think about the parallel effects of a Lacanian reading and our 
affective reading of the text: we notice that the screen, in 
whatever manner it is figured, appears to express a duality of 
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action, in which it simultaneously represents and occludes 
space according to its own partition. What Lacan does not 
consider (nor has he cause to) is the manner in which this 
model of the screen might be applied in a material sense 
beyond the painting, its effects witnessed in a material sense. 
This is why I tackle this question of the screen in literature: it 
is here that we witness the representation of the subjective 
effects which are provoked by this dialectical action. In other 
words, it is here in which the occlusive and representative 
aspects of the object are shown to resolve themselves by 
producing the subject; indeed, this resolution is already 
achieved because the screen-object is already negotiating 
the space which makes it possible to negotiate the surrender 
of the gaze for the subject. As a result, the subject must form 
a complex relationship with the object itself, which it cannot 
bypass as simply a 'visual device'. The object materially 
affects the subject, and this fact cannot be ignored when the 
screen as a form and as an object assumes the position, 
arguably, of cultural ubiquity. 
What is the effect of the veiled materiality of screen 
expressed in the text? We should be clear on this point and 
not simply explain the effect of the screen as a side effect of 
the physical distance separating Peter and Bea. Distance, 
without the conjoining presence of the screen, would remove 
the possibility of communication. Instead, it is only once 
communication is first possible that it can afterwards be 
prevented. But further than this, the veiled materiality of the 
screen exemplifies the fact that the theorisation of the screen 
in Lacan entirely accounts for the effects of the screen 
experienced by Peter. In this way, there appears to be 
another affective screen arising in our exploration of the 
screen itself: one which works in a similar way (in theoretical 
form alone, not function) as that which Lacan calls the 
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'lamella' ; in other words, it is an amorphous form, plastic, 55
which adopts the structure of an object and yet remains itself. 
Lacan is talking about the 'scrap of the real' which persists 
for every subject from the moment of birth, becoming objet a 
in its objective expression: we might see something similar in 
the thought of our reading here, in which we attempt to work 
towards theorising the screen by remaining sensitive to the 
iterations of itself which arise through our reading. In this 
way, a partition separates our discussion of an immaterial 
screen and a material one. But it is not purely an occlusive 
partition which blocks our view of one or the other; instead it 
performs the function of the screen that I have set out to 
discuss, one which separates and occludes even as it allows 
the representation and projection of space or information. 
And it does so in a way which forms a pliant screen, a veiled 
surface which, when draped over a topology, preserves the 
features of the spaces above and below itself.
This image of a screen which, finally, remains unable to do 
anything but preserve the separate levels of experience in 
which it intervenes is found in The Book of Strange New 
Things. Early in the novel, Peter reflects on the limits of the 
screen: what it can accomplish, what it can project, and what 
it must hide. He writes in a message to Bea:
I miss living through the visible moments of life 
with you. Without you at my side, I feel as 
though my eyes are just a camera, like a 
closed-circuit camera without film in it, 
registering what's out there, second by 
second, letting it all vanish instantly to be 
replaced by more images, none of them 
properly appreciated.
 The lamella is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.55
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(The Book of Strange New Things 159)
Peter's inability to 'properly appreciate' the 'images' that he 
encounters is not, as at first it might seem, an effect of the 
primacy of a visual mode of communication in his and Bea's 
relationship. Instead, it returns to the relation which we 
established earlier: a relation structured around the apparent 
authenticity of a material form of contact, of the hapticity 
which is established as the guarantor of the Imaginary 
completeness of their non-verbal communication. The 
metaphor of the eye as camera obscures the true nature of 
Peter's worry. It is not that he wishes to share the image 
itself, it is that he is worried about the lack of permanence of 
image, the lack of content and object which he cannot 
experience as Bea would, were she alongside him. The 
problem is not that Bea cannot see the image, but that Peter 
cannot record it. The image itself is, after all, simply one 
further remove from the 'inauthentic' written word. Peter's 
desire is to experience contact with his wife, to make that 
which exists for him take object for her.
We can also read Peter's discomfort with the transience of 
the unrecorded image in light of the gaze. Lacan conceives 
of the gaze and the voice as the object of psychoanalysis, in 
the sense that they are objects, for him, which exist beyond 
the subject and prevent the assumption of a total self-
identity: there is always an anxiety to be experienced in my 
relation with the object which reminds me that I do not look or 
speak without the act occurring in the field of the Other. That 
is why Lacan says that 'The objet a in the field of the visible 
is the gaze' (The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 105). The gaze is the eccentric fragment — 
or stain, as Lacan says — which appears upon the image of 
the object in view (the 'image' we will remember, is the extent 
 70
of the subject's vision itself, the fantasy which ‘appears’ on 
the immaterial screen through which the subject must always 
view objects), reminding the subject of the point from which it 
is already gazed upon. This eccentricity of the gaze reveals 
the mediating action of the screen:
Only the subject — the human subject, the 
subject of desire that is the essence of man — 
is not, unlike the animal, entirely caught up in 
this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. 
How? In so far as he isolates the function of 
the screen and plays with it. Man, in effect, 
knows how to play with the mask as that 
beyond which there is the gaze. The screen is 
here the locus of mediation.
(The Four Fundamental Concpets of 
Psychoanalysis 107)
The subject is able to negotiate with the gaze because of the 
presence of the screen. The screen is that which is granted 
to the subject in its constitution in the Symbolic realm. As 
Foster notes: 'This is the function of the screen: to negotiate 
a laying down of the gaze as in a laying down of a 
weapon' ('Obscene, Abject, Traumatic' 109). The screen 
functions by mediating between what Žižek calls 'the dialectic 
of view and gaze'.  Peter, therefore, encounters in the 56
'missing' recording of the image precisely the torsion of the 
eccentric object coming to bear upon his subjectivity. He fails 
to negotiate a laying down of the gaze, to tame it in a form 
which would compensate for the gap between himself and 
his wife. That is why he is so upset about the lack of picture 
or video transmission:
 Slavoj Žižek, 'The Undergrowth of Enjoyment: How Popular Culture can Serve as an Introduction 56
to Lacan’, New Formations, 9 (1989), 7-29 (8).
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If only I could send you a photo or a movie! 
How quickly we adjust to what's provided for 
us and want MORE ... The technology that 
allows me to send these words to you, across 
unimaginable distances, is truly miraculous ( - 
a blasphemous assertion??) yet as soon as 
I've used it a few times, I think: Why can't I 
send pictures as well?
(The Book of Strange New Things 159-60)
As Lacan notes, the function of art may sometimes be that of 
a trompe-l'oeil — a tricking of the eye — but it always works 
as a dompte-regard: a taming of the gaze. Were Peter 
permitted to transmit pictures and videos, they would 
certainly perform this basic function of image, artistic or not. 
That is because for Lacan the image always reveals, in a 
sense which cannot be glimpsed in the act of perception 
itself (though it does occur there too), the hole which marks 
the irruption of the gaze behind the screen. This is a 
reflection of the hole which marks the pupil in the human eye. 
But this theory of function is not concerned purely with 
representation; in fact it is not concerned with representation 
at all. The creation of the work of art reveals the desire of the 
artist: not the desire to represent, as in the trompe-l'oeil, but 
in the desire to tame, dompte-regard. This is the way in 
which Lacan recognises, before any other, the radical work of 
the screen-object. By reading the painting as an expression 
of the artist's desire to contend with that which ceaselessly 
attempts to burst forth from behind it, Lacan provides the 
exact model which describes the very necessity of 
recognising the materiality of the object itself. The 'content' of 
image as such is not where the work of taming is performed: 
'For me, it is a question of creation as Freud designated it, 
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that is to say, as sublimation, and of the value it assumes in a 
social field' (The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 111). This is what most readings of the gaze 
fail to recognise; the structure of the screen, with its 
dialectical function of occlusion and representation, is what 
allows the gaze to first become recognised.  The position of 57
the screen in the architecture of the gaze is fundamental, so 
the question should not revolve around, as it has so often, 
the 'return of the Real' in art. It should instead interrogate the 
return of the Real in the form of the screen-object, in the 
material echo of that immaterial, structural form which Lacan 
theorises as the central component of the vision/gaze 
dichotomy. Lacan shows us the manner in which the 
dialectical tension of occlusion and representation is resolved 
in the screen: in the negotiation of space which permits the 
negotiation with the gaze. The screen-object is already 
negotiating, already permitting the negotiation with the gaze 
which reveals the desire of the subject caught upon its 
surface. The outcome is that we need not regard art as the 
exclusive domain of the dompte-regard: this functions on any 
screen in any culture well-versed in the encounter with the 
ubiquitous and yet mysterious object itself.
So the limit of the technology (upon which the prospects of 
Peter and Bea's communication relies) effects a structural 
limit, not in the possibility of communication but in the 
exposure of the levels of materiality uncovered by this 
relationship:
 And we cannot help but recognise, thinking of Huhtamo's work on the historical development of 57
the screen, that the object itself cannot predate the immaterial, ahistorical screen Lacan implicates 
in the gaze. Therefore we can consider two possibilities for the origin of the screen for Lacan: 
either the screen-object, as it arises through various historical functions and meanings, is an 
expression of a deeply-seated, 'primal' unconscious screen already at work throughout the 
development of human perception; or the screen-object is that which allows Lacan to postulate a 
screen function insofar as we can understand it in this sense in the first place.
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Peter stared at the screen. It was pearlescent 
grey, and his text hung suspended in the 
plasma, but if he adjusted his focus he could 
see his ghostly visage: his unruly blond hair, 
his big bright eyes, his strong cheekbones. 
His face, strange and familiar.
(The Book of Strange New Things 160)
Can there be any clearer demonstration of this passage from 
immaterial to material screen, from the uncovering of desire 
to the affective space which must be revealed as a function 
of that uncovering? Here Peter contends with the experience 
of three levels of the screen: on the screen, the text of 
Peter's message hangs in the representative space luring his 
vision towards it; his gaze is trapped before a shift in 
perspective alerts him to that which is beyond the screen, the 
occluded space signalled by the appearance of Peter's 
reflection, the glinting light which draws the eye, reminding 
the subject that he or she is always gazed upon, always 
unable to contain the gaze, always an object separated from 
objet a by some screen or other; the screen itself, a material 
object upon which these two images are superimposed, 
admitting each, negotiating as it is, producing and 
reproducing the possibility of the subject. 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There Is No Oryx:
Desire, Subject and Meaning in Margaret 
Atwood's Oryx and Crake
I don't want to indulge in overdramatization. All ages have 
thought they had reached the most extreme point of vision 
in a confrontation with something terminal, some extra-
worldly force that threatened the world. But our world and 
society now bring news of the shadow of a certain 
incredible, absolute weapon that is waved in our faces in a 
way that is indeed worthy of the muses. [...] It's not 
something I invented, since we are bombarded everyday 
with the news of a weapon that threatens the planet itself 
as a habitat for mankind.
Put yourself in that spot, which has perhaps been made 
more present for us by the progress of knowledge than it 
was before in men's imagination — although that faculty 
never ceased to toy with the idea; confront that moment 
when a man or a group of men can act in such a way that 
the question of existence is posed for the whole of the 
human species, and you will then see inside yourself that 
das Ding is next to the subject.58
Lacan's disquisition on the end of the world strikes me as 
particularly useful for thinking upon a work of post-
apocalyptic fiction. Here is das Ding, the mysterious Freudian 
object 'in the world', rendered by Lacan as the proto-object of 
the Real itself — in other words, the object before objects 
may become articulated, the very Real rejected at the first 
cut of subjectivity, which becomes 'left over' in the 
constitution of objet a. Unlike the object-cause of desire, 
objet a, however, das Ding is no excremental object which 
 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: 58
Book VII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 2008), 128-9.
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eludes our grasp, fitting into the symbolic order precisely as 
the lack which overflows such order. Instead it is the very 
sublime, traumatic, Real form of the Other, the Other before 
we encounter it as such in the Symbolic field. Ostensibly, 
Lacan's point in this passage appears to be this: when we 
encounter the idea of an extra-worldly force, for example the 
one represented by the extinction-threat of nuclear bombs, 
we approach something like das Ding, which precedes that 
terminal point which all ages have figured as the most 
extreme moment of encounter in human experience. Das 
Ding is 'something that is far beyond the domain of affectivity, 
something moving, obscure and without reference points 
owing to the lack of a sufficient organization of its 
register' (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 127). It is this lack of 
organisation which demonstrates that the Thing is 'next' to 
the subject. In other words, it is the exteriority of the subject's 
exterior, the world of objects; it is radically opposed to the 
constitution of knowledge. This is why Lacan continues the 
fictional scenario above, where one encounters the man with 
his 'finger on the button', so to speak, with an appeal to the 
'subject of knowledge':
You will see that you will beg the subject of 
knowledge who has given birth to the thing in 
question — the other thing, the absolute 
weapon — to take stock, and you will also 
wish either that the true Thing be at that 
moment within him (in other words that he not 
let the other go or, in common parlance, "let it 
all blow up") or that we know why.
(The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 129)
What Lacan depicts here is the subjective encounter with 
that which escapes knowledge. The appeal to the other, 
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here, to that man ready to pose the question of existence, is 
an appeal to make present something which is beyond the 
possible knowledge of the subject. Perhaps this is why, in the 
final confrontation between James Bond and the villain in 
which the fate of the world is at stake, Bond must always foil 
the villain, or why destruction otherwise proceeds according 
to a series of accidents, as in Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove. It is 
not possible to present that moment of failure of the Thing, 
that point in which the Thing is not within the other and 
instead is truly 'in the world', at which we truly encounter the 
terminal moment. We cannot subjectivise this moment.
It is for this exact reason, however, that we can characterise 
post-apocalyptic fiction as a response to apocalypse; in other 
words, it is a response to that moment which cannot be 
depicted, the moment of apocalypse itself. In Lacanian 
terms, what a post-apocalyptic text does is interrogate the 
breakdown of the Symbolic register for the subject. It 
materialises the insistent traumatic Real, that which 'exists' 
beyond the law of society, and questions the very fantasy 
screen which permits social interaction with my neighbour. 
Once we lose the law of prohibition, once our desire is no 
longer safely situated and our consensual phantasmatic 
relationship to the screen breaks down, the anarchic 
relationship to total jouissance draws near, no matter 
whether we are battling murderous gangs, zombies, killer 
robots, or starvation. Margaret Atwood's Oryx and Crake, the 
first novel of what has come to be known as the 
'MaddAddam Trilogy' along with The Year of the Flood (2009) 
and MaddAddam (2013), explores the aftermath of that 
moment when, to quote Lacan, one might pose the question 
of existence for the human species. Through environmental 
destruction, transgenic manipulation, social disintegration 
and cultural apathy, the text follows the collapse of society 
and the apparent destruction of mankind, tracking the lives of 
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a number of characters across both sides of the apocalyptic 
divide. Atwood focalises the narrative through Jimmy, a boy 
out of step with society who grows up in a gated compound 
(reserved for the elite: the families of the scientists working 
for powerful biotechnology corporations) on the East Coast of 
the United States. The technological advances of the 
corporations (genetically modified animals, consumer 
products, miracle drugs) wield much influence over the 
general public, socially and economically deprived and 
confined to the rundown 'pleeblands' which cover most of the 
country. As a teenager, Jimmy befriends the mysterious 
Crake, a young genius who grows up to head his own lab, 
called Paradice, for one of the most powerful corporations; 
he also meets Oryx, who works alongside Crake at Paradice. 
Jimmy believes that Oryx is the girl he has loved since he 
was a teenager, a girl he and Crake first see on an internet 
porn site when she is only a young child, and for whom 
Crake also harbours a secret obsession. Crake, 
unbeknownst to his corporate masters, secretly plots the end 
of humanity, and he succeeds in encysting a hemorrhagic 
virus in his new libido-enhancing drug, the BlyssPluss Pill, 
which appears to kill everyone on the planet excluding 
Jimmy. Jimmy, in his post-apocalyptic isolation, assumes the 
name Snowman,  and acts as a ward for Crake's ultimate 59
'invention': the Crakers, a group of genetically-engineered 
humans designed by Crake to correct what are, according to 
him, the inherent flaws of humanity, and inherit the Earth. 
At stake in our analysis here is the notion that this text does 
in fact, as Lacan states, demonstrate that 'the Thing is next 
to the subject'. In other words, the text is not focused, I 
 Throughout this chapter I refer to Jimmy and Snowman interchangeably: I follow the text in doing 59
so, i.e. according to the character’s self-identification. Generally speaking, the ‘Jimmy’ sections of 
the text refer to his ‘pre-apocalyptic’ life, while the ‘Snowman’ sections correspond to his post-
apocalyptic seclusion. At times I also refer to ‘Jimmy/Snowman’ when the argument appears to 
apply to the character in a general sense.
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propose, on the questions of environmental destruction, 
genetic engineering, the capitalist annexation of scientific or 
artistic discourse, and so forth, but rather it depicts this post-
apocalyptic scenario in order explore the critical relationship 
between the subject and the Thing. The important fact, 
however, is the method it employs to accomplish this: it does 
so by examining the Imaginary and Symbolic processes 
which constitute the screen of fantasy for the subject, 
demonstrated through the textual production of Jimmy/
Snowman's fraught relationships with Oryx and Crake via the 
video, computer, and photographic screens which structure 
and intermediate in these relationships, and Jimmy’s 
narrative depiction as 'a child of the screen' — a boy who, in 
the absence of his uninterested parents, develops a 
formative association between screen fantasies and the 
pursuit of meaning. 
As Atwood says in 'Writing Oryx and Crake': 
The what if of Oryx and Crake is simply, What 
if we continue down the road we're already 
on? How slippery is the slope? What are our 
saving graces? Who's got the will to stop us? 
[...] It's not a question of our inventions — all 
human inventions are merely tools — but what 
might be done with them; for no matter how 
high the tech, homo sapiens sapiens remains 
at heart what he's been for tens of thousands 
of years — the same emotions, the same 
preoccupations.60
While the narrative hinges upon the various applications of 
human invention, the text itself seems to question, according 
 Margaret Atwood, Curious Pursuits: Occasional Writing, 1970-2005 (London: Virago, 2005), 323.60
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to Atwood, the human use of invention, and the manner in 
which human meaning is revealed through this. Atwood's 
final statement here is cryptic: does she mean that humanity 
is essentially immutable, or does she instead mean that 
humanity remains to be fully understood? I believe that her 
intention is for this statement to be read in both senses, and 
that the kind of 'human meaning' she intends to query is 
more complex than it might, at first, appear. There is a crucial 
distinction between this proposal, and prevailing critical 
opinion of the novel. Karen F. Stein, for example, suggests 
that 'At the heart of Oryx and Crake is a compelling and 
urgent question that guides Atwood's speculative fiction: what 
does it mean to be human in an era of biotechnology and 
genetic engineering?' ; Coral Ann Howells proposes that 61
'Atwood is asking the same question that serious moralists 
have always asked: What does it mean to be human?' ; 62
while Lucy Perry states that 'The message of the novel is: 
render human nature irreducibly malleable and permeable, 
and the consequences, which for Atwood seem to be pure 
and simple entropy, will return humanity to a primitivism 
idiosyncratic of a much earlier point in evolutionary history'.  63
In each of these readings, the very term which it seems the 
text itself places into question — the question of the 'human' 
— is the one which is not scrutinised. It appears to me that, 
in order to read the text properly, we must bear this question 
of the human in mind: this question is not 'what does it mean 
to be human?' — rather, I suggest, it is 'how can a human 
mean?' The text wants to interrogate the very possibility of 
 Karen F. Stein, 'Problematic Paradice in Oryx and Crake' in Margaret Atwood: The Robber Bride, 61
The Blind Assassin, Oryx and Crake, ed. J. Brooks Bouson (London: Continuum, 2010), 141-55 
(142).
 Coral Ann Howells, Margaret Atwood (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 171.62
 Lucy Perry, 'Intimations of Immortality: Semiologies of Ageing and the Lineaments of Eternity in 63
Contemporary Prose' in Twenty-First Century Fiction: What Happens Now, eds. Rupert Hildyard 
and Siân Adiseshiah (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 162-82 (175).
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the human meaning, the human, as such, meaning 
something, and whether that is itself possible. In this regard it 
is incredibly suggestive to read Oryx and Crake alongside 
Lacan's hypothetical doomsday scenario: Lacan 
demonstrates the Thing beside the subject at the moment 
preceding apocalypse, and Oryx and Crake continues it at 
the moment following. This reading demonstrates, in other 
words, that very part of the human which cannot mean, the 
very part of oneself which is barred from our knowledge 
precisely because, in order to mean something, we must 
become constituted underneath the sign of the signifier, must 
become subject to it.  
While the post-apocalyptic 'side' of the novel examines the 
subject of knowledge in the situation where knowledge 
rapidly cedes its place to jouissance, its 'pre-apocalyptic' 
obverse, the ‘dystopian’ United States of Jimmy's youth and 
young adulthood, explores the role of the screen of fantasy in 
the constitution of social order:
I would argue that [Oryx and Crake] is not a 
classic dystopia. Though it has obvious 
dystopian elements, we don't really get an 
overview of the structure of the society in it [...] 
We just see its central characters living their 
lives within small corners of that society, much 
as we live ours. What they can grasp of the 
rest of the world comes to them through 
television and the Internet, and is thus 
suspect, because edited.64
 Margaret Atwood, 'The Handmaid's Tale and Oryx and Crake "in Context”', PMLA, 119: 3 — 64
Special Topic: Science Fiction and Literary Studies: The Next Millennium (May, 2004), 513-517 
(517).
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Atwood signals specifically the work of a frame and a screen, 
here: the frame of fantasy, which 'edits', or in other words 
mediates, as screen or a lure, the experience of the object-
cause of desire which 'fascinates' the subject. The 'total 
workings' of society — its very structure, which by definition 
traverses the subject who must enter into it to become 
subject — cannot be made available or comprehensible, 
present, for the subject; one has no way of approaching that 
totality or understanding it 'objectively', and instead one must 
remain enmeshed in the workings of one's own fantasy, 
which 'fills' the gaps in the Symbolic structure of the Other, 
the gaps of the Real, and makes it comprehensible from our 
'point of view'. Atwood demonstrates this impossibility of 
transcending the screen of fantasy (in other words, the 
impossibility of transcending one's own desire and remaining 
subject) which would mean 'fulfilling' desire and closing the 
gap of subjectivity, grasping that Thing in the world fully in its 
immanence, through the 'love triangle' formed by Jimmy, 
Oryx, and Crake. I will organise this chapter as such: by 
focusing on Jimmy, Oryx, and Crake, in turn, at each point 
addressing what I believe are crucial deficiencies to be found 
in the critical analyses of each character and demonstrating 
the prevailing influence of the screen. The point that must be 
corrected here is that these analyses tend to be predicated 
on the question of human rather than subjective meaning. In 
the first section, I ask whether Jimmy/Snowman should not 
properly be termed an 'ethical' character rather than, as he 
so often is described, a 'moral' one, and how this should 
affect our reading of his introduction of Symbolic law to the 
Crakers. I then address a fundamental misconception in the 
reading of Oryx, which either presents her as a simple 
'mystery', what I believe to be a re-inscription of the trope of 
the 'mystery woman', unpresentable by the text, or ignores 
her altogether as a mere foil for the main drama involving 
Jimmy and Crake. Such analyses fail to pay attention to the 
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text's production of Oryx as character twisted already by 
Jimmy's fantasy. The text interrogates the production of 
fantasy and the ‘position’ of the Thing, the irruption of the 
Real, in its depiction of Oryx, demonstrating both the 
constitution of the subject and the foreclosed meaning-
human, the human being. Through Oryx, I argue, the text 
explores the implications of Jimmy's formative life as a 'child 
of the screen'. I move to Crake in the final section, 
addressing his motive as the author of the text's apocalypse 
and his relationship with Oryx, both of which are usually 
dismissed as inscrutable portions of the narrative.  65
Perry and Howells both read Jimmy/Snowman as an 
essentially 'moral' character, one who is altruistically 
concerned, in his post-apocalyptic life, with the wellbeing of 
the Crakers. Perry, for example, claims that 'Snowman 
signifies the literary/historical past: the good or noble savage, 
the idealised indigene of a more primitive, pre-technological 
world. [...] The tree-dwelling Neanderthal figure of Snowman 
represents natural goodness and Romantic primitivism, as 
well as the sort of anti-corporate themes that Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984 were renowned 
for' ('Intimations of Immortality: Semiologies of Ageing and 
the Lineaments of Eternity in Contemporary Prose' 177). 
Meanwhile, Howells suggests that 'Snowman [...] is both 
mouthpiece and butt of Atwood's satire, but [...] he does not 
become alienated from human beings. On the contrary, he 
emerges as a morally responsible man and the novel's 
unlikely hero, who regards the prospect of entering again into 
human relationships with a kind of fearful excitement.'  66
 None of the analysis is conducted in isolation. I discuss all three characters in each section; I 65
have merely chosen to organise each section predominantly around a single character. 
 Coral Ann Howells, 'Margaret Atwood's Dystopian Visions: The Handmaid's Tale and Oryx and 66
Crake' in The Cambridge Companion to Margaret Atwood ed. Coral Ann Howells (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2006), 161-75; 169.
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While I would argue that Jimmy/Snowman should be more 
properly classified as an ethical rather than a moral 
character,  to me it seems that characterising Snowman's 67
actions in terms of moral absolute misses the point. Instead, 
the important fact to understand here is that Snowman, in his 
act of watching over the Crakers, is responsible for derailing 
Crake's intent to create a society beyond the life of the 
signifier by introducing the Crakers to religion, to Symbolic 
law, and to language. In other words, the post-apocalyptic 
section of the book details Snowman's introduction to the 
Crakers of the screen of fantasy — the Crakers, in this 
sense, are beings who are becoming subjects. The post-
apocalyptic section of the novel therefore reflects the ‘pre-
apocalyptic' section in the sense that Jimmy's childhood as a 
subject of the screen comes to fruition in that apparently 
hopeless future. 
The creation of the subject in the shadow of Symbolic law — 
that which ultimately requires prohibition, hierarchy, division, 
and so forth — is exactly what Crake seeks to forestall when 
he creates the Crakers: 
 What is the distinction between these terms, between morality and ethics? For Lacan, the former 67
must be divorced from the level of the evaluation of the 'good'. He proposes this thesis: '[...] the 
moral law, the moral command, the presence of the moral agency in our activity, insofar as it is 
structured by the symbolic, is that through which the real is actualized — the real as such, the 
weight of the real' (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 23). Here we see that with which the subject is 
forced to contend 'in order to act in the right way' (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 22): it is the very 
'condition' of the self, the barred subjectivity which is 'our condition as men' (The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis 22) which we must choose to bear. To act ethically, therefore, is not to act 
according to a prescribed 'good', but instead to, as Joan Copjec suggests, '[...] insist on separating 
ourselves from, rather than surrendering to, this incomprehensible part of our being; we insist, in 
other words, on prolonging the conflict with ourselves.' (Joan Copjec, Read My Desire: Lacan 
Against the Historicists (London: Verso, 2015), 92.) In these terms, Snowman is the psychoanalytic 
subject, the analysand who poses the question of himself: ’what do I mean?' He is riven by desire, 
is selfish, egotistical, estranged from his self: and he chooses to remain so, by affirming his 
commitment to the Crakers. He does this, not for their benefit, but for his own. He does so in order 
to retain his internal conflict, his division, which can only be maintained as such in society, in 
concert with others.
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[...] there would never be anything for these 
people to inherit, there would be no family 
trees, no marriages, and no divorces. They 
were perfectly adjusted to their habitat, so 
they would never have to create houses or 
tools or weapons, or, for that matter clothing. 
They would have no need to invent any 
harmful symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, 
gods, or money.68
Crake seems to implicitly understand that this, the very 
barring of the subject by the signifier, the traumatic birth of 
subject in the realm of the Symbolic, is the birth of desire 
itself. Ursula K. Heise suggests that Crake's plan to create 
true 'posthumans', as Perry (among others) describes the 
Crakers, ultimately achieves the opposite effect:
[...] the Crakers turn into humans rather than 
posthumans by the end of the novel, as their 
newly discovered ability for artistic 
representation — they have made an effigy of 
Jimmy during his absence — signals the 
emergence of just the kind of culture that 
Crake aimed to preclude in his genetic 
programming.69
Snowman sabotages Crake's work at every moment of his 
interaction with the Crakers, because he unwittingly 
inculcates them with the fundamental basis of Symbolic law. 
Perry's contention that 'Snowman is astride the primitive on 
the one side – in his primordial and arboreal nature – and the 
futurist on the other in his (albeit unwitting) perpetuation of 
 Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (Bloomsbury: London, 2003), 305).68
 Ursula K. Heise, 'The Android and the Animal', PMLA, 124: 2 (Mar., 2009), 503-510 (507).69
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Crake’s work' ('Intimations of Immortality: Semiologies of 
Ageing and the Lineaments of Eternity in Contemporary 
Prose' 178) misses a crucial point: that this divided subject is 
'monstrous' (Oryx and Crake 101) for the Crakers not 
because they fear him, but because he represents the vision 
of their future, not their 'primitive' past. When Snowman eats 
the weekly animal offering provided for him by the 
herbivorous Crakers, they 'can't help but peeking. The 
spectacle of depravity is of interest even to them, it seems, 
purified by chlorophyll though they are' (Oryx and Crake 
101). They are interested in Snowman precisely because, in 
his 'depravity', he materialises, for them, that 'X' of obscene 
surplus beyond the ken of the subject which the proto-
subjective Crakers must renounce in order to form, indeed to 
perform, a 'normal' community: the community which is 
subject to social law based on Symbolic prohibition, and 
which, for each subject, is mediated by the screen of fantasy. 
It is a proto-society of the screen, in some senses ominously 
akin to the dystopian America which, via Crake, is ultimately 
responsible for its creation. The Crakers' wholehearted 
acceptance of this ‘new’ social mode is signalled when, near 
the end of the novel, they construct an effigy of Snowman 
and chant his name: 'We made a picture of you, to help us 
send out our voices for you' (Oryx and Crake 361). The 
Crakers, at the conclusion of the text, are unwittingly 
sublating the being of Snowman, preserving only his trace in 
the Symbolic figure which now represents him for each of 
them. This moment enacts the transubstantiation of the 
obscene primal (father) figure into the Symbolic figure of the 
law. Jouissance is cut from the Crakers as subjects, because 
they are now founding a register in opposition to the 
biological cycle of generation and corruption. They learn the 
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power of Symbolic law: 'We knew we could call you, and you 
would hear us and come back' (Oryx and Crake  361).70
These amount to preparatory remarks. The importance of 
Snowman's 'transgression' against Crake (ironically, in the 
foundation of a Symbolic law in Crake’s name) is that it 
demonstrates Snowman's constitution as a subject fraught 
with the anxiety and frustration which accompanies the 
screening of desire. We must return to the 'pre-apocalypse' 
of Snowman's youth in order to track the appearance of the 
screen. It is in the relationship between Oryx, Crake and 
Jimmy that we witness most clearly the 'circulation' of desire 
which marks its own impossible satisfaction. Indeed, the 
crucial point for us is the realisation that the text explores the 
subjective experience of a life lived staring at the screen of 
fantasy. The work of the screen is interrogated by the text 
overwhelmingly in the figure of Oryx, who appears both as an 
evanescent figure, the 'core' of whose being is unavailable to 
Jimmy, and as something which is too present, which cannot 
be depicted precisely because it is impossible to do so. In 
this sense she is a function of Jimmy's fantasy — learned by 
screen interaction — and is also something other than this. 
She appears, in other words, as screen, as figure of screen, 
and as that which cannot be screened. 
 A final point can be made on the connection of the development of this Symbolic law and the 70
text's examination of subjectivity, thinking of Marc Bosco's claim of the connection between being 
and symbol: 'The novel suggests that rather than the philosopher's definition of the human being 
as animal rationale, it is more accurate to say animal symbolicum — that is, symbol-making being 
— to convey the centrality of symbols and metaphors to our humanity, which first find expression in 
questions about our origins and our end.' (Mark Bosco, S.J., 'The Apocalyptic Imagination in Oryx 
and Crake in Margaret Atwood: The Robber Bride, The Blind Assassin, Oryx and Crake, ed. J. 
Brooks Bouson (London: Continuum, 2010), 156-71 (163-4.)) A precise clarification should be 
made here: symbol-making does not make us human, does not explain the core centrality of our 
being; rather, in Lacan, it takes us further away from the experience of self-presence. It deprives us 
of that exact experience of our 'true' nature. This fact is crucial to our understanding of a 
subjectivity split before itself, and indeed the relationship of the screen to this Subject.
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Oryx humours Jimmy's desire to 'construct' her: 'Sometimes 
he suspected her of improvising, just to humour him; 
sometimes he felt that her entire past — everything she'd told 
him — was his own invention' (Oryx and Crake 316). Jimmy's 
intent is to render Oryx as a comprehensible, graspable 
object, becoming attainable through the narration of her life 
story. The text repeatedly signals the instability of Oryx's 
presence (which is why it is odd that this fact is so rarely 
acknowledged in critical analyses of the novel). 'Her name 
wasn't Oryx, she didn't have a name' (Oryx and Crake 90):
[...] now he's come to the crux in his head, to 
the place in the tragic play where it would say: 
Enter Oryx. Fatal moment. But which fatal 
moment? Enter Oryx as a young girl on a 
kiddie-porn site, flowers in her hair, whipped 
cream on her chin; or, Enter Oryx as a 
teenage news item, sprung from a pervert's 
garage; or, Enter Oryx, stark naked and 
pedagogical in the Crakers' inner sanctum; or, 
Enter Oryx, towel around her hair, emerging 
from the shower; or, Enter Oryx, in a pewter-
grey silk pantsuit and demure half-high heels, 
carrying a briefcase, the image of a 
professional Compound saleswoman? Which 
of these will it be, and how can he ever be 
sure there's a line connecting the first to the 
last? Was there only one Oryx, or was she 
legion?
(Oryx and Crake 308)
This passage, I propose, does not simply produce Oryx as 
another materialisation of the trope of the 'mysterious 
woman', as elusive and mystical presence whose essential 
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being Jimmy fails to comprehend (the fallacy of which Lacan 
reveals in his analysis of the phenomenon of courtly love); 
instead, what we encounter is a carousel of image, the very 
model of fantasy which distorts a lack — not in 'Oryx', but in 
the Other. Oryx, in other words, is depicted in the text as a 
character already distorted by Jimmy's fantasy. The strange 
fact of this reading, however, is that it does not simply reduce 
Oryx to a fiction of Jimmy's fantasy. In other words, it does 
not simply restate Oryx's 'central mystery as woman’ from 
another angle; instead, it demonstrates the constitutive fiction 
of fantasy itself, reveals the very frame which traces a screen 
upon which Jimmy projects his own desire. The text does not 
produce Oryx as a mysterious women, flitting in and out of 
Jimmy's life; rather, it produces an obvious fantasy, Jimmy's 
fantasy of 'Oryx', as a double of the subjective 'presence' of 
Oryx which we must attempt to differentiate in our close 
reading. The impossibility, for Jimmy, of answering the 
question of whether 'there was only one Oryx' makes this 
perfectly apparent. It is obvious to us, as readers, that there 
is only one Oryx; we meet her, in the text, in the Paradice 
dome (she is viewed through the screen of a window), 
working for Crake. The other characters, the young girl on 
the pornographic website and the teenager on the news 
report, are not the same person, nor are either of them Oryx, 
as Jimmy supposes in his fantasy. ‘Oryx’, for Jimmy, is 
fantasy. She herself cannot answer Jimmy's questions, 
cannot confirm that she is 'herself' as Jimmy constructs her, 
not because she contains a central mystery, but because 
Jimmy situates that central 'mystery' within her. Oryx 
demonstrates the circulation of objet a as the ungraspable 
target of desire, her appearance in the text subject to 
Jimmy's overwhelming impulse to pursue her and to have 
revealed to him, by her capture, the 'essential' thing:
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He could never get used to her, she was fresh 
every time, she was a casketful of secrets. 
Any moment now she would open herself up, 
reveal to him the essential thing, the hidden 
thing at the core of life, or of her life, or of his 
life — the thing he was longing to know. The 
thing he'd always wanted. What would it be?
(Oryx and Crake 314)
This possibility of the revelation of 'an essential thing' 
tantalises Jimmy ever since he first encounters 'Oryx' (in 
other words, Oryx when 'she didn't have a name'). As the 
teenaged Jimmy and Crake watch child pornography 
together on an illegal website called HottTotts, Jimmy 
experiences the irruption of the gaze itself, gaze as object 
qua desire and lack, as he sits enraptured by the screen:
None of those little girls had ever seemed real 
to Jimmy — they'd always struck him as digital 
clones — but for some reason Oryx was 
three-dimensional from the start. [...]
The giggles must have been recorded, 
because they weren't coming from the three 
girls: they all looked frightened, and one of 
them was crying.
Jimmy knew the drill. They were supposed to 
look like that, he thought; if they stopped the 
action, a walking stick would come in from 
offside and prod them. This was a feature of 
the site. There were at least three layers of 
contradictory make-believe, one on top of the 
other. I want to, I want to not, I want to.
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Oryx paused in her activities. She smiled a 
hard little smile that made her appear much 
older, and wiped the whipped cream from her 
mouth. Then she looked over her shoulder 
and right into the eyes of the viewer — right 
into Jimmy's eyes, into the secret person 
inside him. I see you, that look said. I see you 
watching. I know you. I know what you want.
(Oryx and Crake  90-1)
When reading this passage, we should bear in mind one of 
Žižek's more gnomic descriptions of the gaze: 'the 
anamorphotic distortion of reality is the way the gaze is 
inscribed into the object's surface'.  At first glance, it seems 71
as though that anamorphotic distortion which signals the 
presence of the gaze is undetectable here. After all, Jimmy's 
vision is unaffected and he encounters no hinderance, no 
distortion of the image of Oryx. In order to account for this 
apparent discrepancy, we must remember to emphasise the 
objective nature of the gaze: the gaze is that which deprives 
the subject of the apparent mastery of the field of vision, that 
which pierces the screen of fantasy and, in doing so, revokes 
the immediate self-presence of subjectivity. Bearing in mind 
this fact, can we not see, therefore, that the anamorphotic 
distortion which signals the gaze's inscription upon the object 
is represented by that uncanny experience of a 'complete' 
presence — of a third dimension which appears in addition to 
the flat surface of the screen upon which Jimmy views the 
two-dimensional image of Oryx? This fact, I suggest, 
exemplifies Jimmy's status as a child raised — in the 
absence of father and mother — by the screen-object itself. 
 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Grimaces of the Real, or When the Phallus Appears’, October, 58 — Rendering 71
the Real (Autumn, 1991), 44-68 (47). 
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That object, until this point in the text, does not stand for the 
screen of fantasy itself, that screen upon which my fantasy 
obscures and defines the 'lack' that appears to cause desire, 
but instead is the screen which depicts the fulfilment of 
hallucinatory fantasy: in other words, fantasy understood in 
the common sense of the word, as opposed to the particular 
Lacanian sense. The pornographic scenarios which are 
displayed upon the screen involve the satisfaction of 
repulsive, obscene wishes: 
[...] they'd roll a few joints and smoke them 
while watching the executions and the porn — 
the body parts moving around the screen in 
slow motion, an underwater ballet of flesh and 
blood under stress, hard and soft joining and 
separating, groans and screams, close-ups of 
clenched eyes and clenched teeth, spurts of 
this or that. If you switched back and forth 
fast, it all came to look like the same event. 
Sometimes they'd have both things on at 
once, each on a different screen.
(Oryx and Crake 86)
In this passage, in comparison with the previous example, 
Jimmy and Crake are disassociated from the images upon 
the screen. The images blur and interleave with one another, 
become indistinguishable, and do not trouble the 'frame' of 
the screen itself; nothing overflows the image. There is no 
interjection of subject. The image does not directly affect 
Jimmy. There is no moment in this passage comparable to 
Oryx's sublime appeal to his 'secret inner person'. After 
watching the pornography and executions, Jimmy feels a 
sense of personal violation, but it is characterised by a lack 
of substance:
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Jimmy [...]  would wobble homewards [...] 
feeling as if he'd been to an orgy, one at which 
he'd had no control at all over what had 
happened to him. What had been done to him. 
He also felt very light, as if he were made of 
air; thin, dizzying air, at the top of some 
garbage-strewn Mount Everest. Back at home 
base, his parental units — supposing they 
were there, and downstairs — never seemed 
to notice a thing.
(Oryx and Crake 86-7) 
It is this 'thin-air' which distinguishes fantasy in the common 
sense from fantasy in the Lacanian sense. The clue, of 
course, is to be found in the improperly situated 'absent 
presence' of his parents. By this point, Jimmy's mother has 
left her family, and Jimmy's 'parental units' are comprised of 
an uninterested father and his father's girlfriend. Those 'units' 
fail to fulfil their own function — are not units at all, but 
perhaps more aptly described as fractions. Because they fail 
to notice Jimmy, he himself desires to be noticed by the 
Other, to have his 'essential meaning' disclosed in the 
revelation of the Other. The gaze which irrupts in the screen, 
which is marked by the 'three-dimensional' presence of the 
figure of Oryx, by her acknowledgement of his look which 
distorts the screen-object itself, is to be conceived in 
opposition to the indistinguishable parade of gore and 
pornography which precedes its appearance. In contrast to 
his 'homewards wobble' following the earlier dual-screen 
viewing orgy of sex and death, Jimmy's response to Oryx's 
gaze becomes unrepresentable in the text. Crake prints a 
screenshot of the moment of Oryx's look towards the camera 
and offers it to Jimmy:
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"This a keeper?" Crake said. "You want it?"
"Yeah," said Jimmy. He could barely get the 
word out. He hoped he sounded normal.
(Oryx and Crake 91)
The passage ends with this exchange, which we could say 
forms a response to Oryx's assertion that she knows what 
Jimmy wants. Crake poses the question, and Jimmy can 
hardly speak. It is at this point that it becomes clear for us 
that 'Oryx' can only be viewed through the focalising lens of 
Jimmy's fantasy; her presence in the text must always 
remain doubled by Jimmy's allocation of that additional 
surplus of the Real within her, objet a.72
It is therefore up to us to read Oryx. But how might we read 
her, when there is no Oryx? Stein, who relegates the 
discussion of Oryx to a footnote in her essay 'Problematic 
Paradice in Oryx and Crake' (by no means the most 
dismissive treatment of the character among scholarly 
criticism of the novel), sums up the most common error in the 
 In this sense, Oryx is doomed to repeat the 'three layers of contradictory make-believe' that the 72
abused children on the HottTotts site are forced to endure. For the girls, this 'I want to, I want not 
to, I want to' is rendered, on the first layer, as a formal, Symbolic agreement, enforced by the threat 
of offscreen violence ('I want to be here, because I am forced to want to be here'); on the second 
layer is the Imaginary protest against their molestation, in other words, the way their acquiescence 
is characterised by the notional, but futile objection raised by their outward distress, which they are 
encouraged to perform by their masters because it is the 'feature of the site' — 'They were 
supposed to look like that' (Oryx and Crake 90); on the third layer, at the level of the Real, is the 
inescapable fact that they are there and have, given the minimal choices available to them, opted 
to remain there. In the case of Oryx's textual presence, we might read this stratification of 'make-
believe' thus: on the Imaginary layer, the layer of fantasy, is 'Oryx', the image formed for Jimmy by 
a conjunction of the absent presences of his mother, his parents, the various girls that he attaches 
to the signifier 'Oryx', and the woman who appears in the text as Oryx with whom he becomes 
involved in a relationship; on the Symbolic level, the point de capiton 'Oryx', the signifier which 
organises the 'meaning' of this presence itself, in opposition to the 'empty' images which work as 
screen or lure; finally, on the level of the Real, the subject herself, each individual subject against 
whom Jimmy performs a violence by reducing her to objet a, overflowing at certain points the 
fantasy screen of the focalising point of the narrative: Jimmy himself.
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'identification' of the character: 'Oryx [...] embodies the 
whore/Madonna dichotomy. She is a victim [...] She becomes 
a medium of exchange between Jimmy and Crake. [...] 
However, her story is beyond the scope of this 
essay’ (‘Problematic Paradice in Oryx and Crake' n178-9). 
Stein, at least, mentions Oryx — many gloss over her 
'presence' in the novel entirely. Nevertheless, even 
accounting for the fact that the thrust of Stein's essay does 
not warrant more than a cursory mention of Oryx, the fact is 
that the essay itself performs a quite standard dismissal of 
Oryx's character as 'a victim' 'beyond the scope' of criticism. 
It's a telling turn of phrase, for Oryx literally is beyond the 
scope of criticism, as such — precisely because she is not a 
single character. From whichever angle we approach her, 
Oryx is designed by Atwood to elude our grasp. As we have 
seen, the status of her name is repeatedly problematised by 
the text: '"Oryx," he says. "I know you're there." He repeats 
the name. It's not even her real name, which he'd never 
known anyway; it's only a word. It's a mantra.' (Oryx and 
Crake 110). None of the people that Jimmy associates with 
the name itself are named Oryx. But Oryx is only the 
example par excellence of the text's repeated meditation on 
the difficulty of 'pinning down' subjectivity under the auspices 
of the signifier, a problem also signalled by the 'duality' of 
Jimmy and Snowman, Glenn and Crake: 
The Crake side of him must have been there 
from the beginning, thinks Snowman: there 
was never any real Glenn, Glenn was only a 
disguise. So in Snowman's reruns of the story, 
Crake is never Glenn, and never Glenn-alias-
Crake or Crake/Glenn, or Glenn, later Crake. 
He is always just Crake, pure and simple.
(Oryx and Crake 71)
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Snowman's language here reveals the impossibility of 
making of the subject anything more than a signifier. Crake 
the Subject is defined, not by the exclusion of what 'Glenn is', 
or what 'Glenn, later Crake is', but by the differential 
exclusion of the signifier which relates to Crake in series. 
When Snowman says that 'there was never any real Glenn', 
he refers not to the questionable ontological presence of 
Glenn, but to the impossibility of making Crake anything 
more than an object, the supposed inner being of whom is 
radically withheld not only from Jimmy, but from Crake 
himself. 'Glenn', therefore, is not a disguise. Glenn is, rather, 
a mark of Jimmy/Snowman's own dim awareness of 'the bar' 
of subjectivity, the fact that 'being born with the signifier, the 
subject is born divided. The subject is this emergence which, 
just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, having 
scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier' (The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 199). Jimmy 
recognises, in his unhappy childhood, the nascent suspicion 
that something in his own subjectivity is divided by itself: 
'There had been something willed about it though, his 
ignorance. Or not willed, exactly: structured. He'd grown up 
in walled spaces, and then he had become one. He had shut 
things out' (Oryx and Crake 184). Jimmy's growth, in and as 
'walled space', represents a sensitivity towards what Lacan 
calls the 'defiles' of the signifier, or in other words, the 
process by which those biological instincts of the body are 
alienated in their symbolic expression by the subject, by the 
expression of demand towards the Other. Jimmy searches 
for access to the interiority of being throughout the text, but 
not to the interiority of his own being: instead, to the 
interiority of the Other. He recognises that the experience of 
'Crake', Crake's being as such, is foreclosed, when he 
reduces Glenn to a mere disguise. The signifier 'Glenn' 
represents the subject only for another signifier, not for 
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another subject: there is an essential bar blocking Crake 
from view, just as much as there is Glenn.
Conversely, however, Jimmy remains the subject of a screen. 
In other words, he remains caught in the network of desire 
which structures his fantasy. His demand to Oryx is the 
repeated demand for some interior information, but this 
demand is always rejected; as in his dream, Jimmy cannot 
truly ask for what he wants, because he is unable to express 
it, to form the demand as such: '"No, wait," Snowman calls, 
or wants to call. His mouth won't move. "Don't go yet! Tell 
me..."' (Oryx and Crake 336). He cannot complete the 
sentence. Rather, what he desires is not to ask. Jimmy wants 
to be presented with that interiority of the object of desire 
without asking, without needing to form his demand, and 
instead to find it projected for him upon the screen. In other 
words, he wants to find, in the series of women which 
stretches, for him, from his mother to Oryx, an interiority for 
which he is not required to work to uncover, with the kind of 
emotionally-manipulative 'technique' he regularly employs in 
order to seduce women: '[...] he'd preferred sad women, 
delicate and breakable [...] He'd liked to comfort them, stroke 
them gently at first, reassure them. Make them happier, if 
only for a moment. Himself too, of course; that was the 
payoff' (Oryx and Crake 100). The correlative of his dream 
('Don't go yet! Tell me...') is in the vision he repeatedly 
experiences before sleep:
At the edge of sleep a procession would 
appear behind his eyes, moving out of the 
shadows to the left, crossing his field of vision.
[...] The girls were calm, they were grave and 
ceremonious. They'd look at him, they'd look 
into him, they would recognize and accept 
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him, accept his darkness. Then they would 
smile.
Oh honey, I know you. I see you. I know what 
you want.
(Oryx and Crake 261)
His fantasy, which locates his desire in 'Oryx', is one which 
consists in the action of revealing and encountering her 
'interior truth’, which already knows what he wants. Jimmy 
remains blinded by the pursuit of his desire, in spite of the 
work of the text, which consistently problematises Oryx's 
presence and her representation. Not only is Oryx present, 
for Jimmy, in the guise of three different people, but her 
presence as disembodied voice is related to that specifically 
phantasmic entity which, as Snowman, he can occasionally 
sense 'drifting towards him on her soft feathery wings' (Oryx 
and Crake 238), and which he repeatedly attempts to conjure 
forth: 'At first she's pale and shadowy, but if he can say her 
name over and over, then maybe she'll glide into his body 
and be present with him in his flesh [...] But she's always 
evasive, you can never pin her down' (Oryx and Crake 110). 
This central absence reappears throughout the text, as 
Jimmy encounters the unravelling fantasy. In another dream, 
he encounters his mother's absence: 'he never dreams about 
his mother, only about her absence. [...] On a hook her 
dressing gown is hanging, magenta, empty, frightening' (Oryx 
and Crake 277). This absence itself is the true source of 
Jimmy's fear, a fear which is ironically materialised as he 
becomes the Last Man on Earth. The dressing gown itself 
signifies that irruptive void of the Real. It delineates the 
contours of the object to which the Real attaches, without 
which that lack could not become apparent. The magenta 
dressing gown later reappears in another dream, but this 
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time the image of his mother has returned with it. As he seals 
himself alone inside the Paradice complex as the apocalypse 
occurs, Jimmy witnesses a vision which materialises the 
circulation of the object-cause of desire behind the screen of 
fantasy:
Then he'd [...] sit in front of the empty screen. 
All the women he'd ever known would pass in 
front of his eyes in the semi-darkness. His 
mother too, in her magenta dressing gown, 
young again. Oryx came last, carrying white 
flowers. She looked at him, then walked 
slowly out of his field of vision, into the 
shadows where Crake was waiting. 
(Oryx and Crake 345) 
The repeated appearance of a central absence is contrasted 
with this figure of 'the procession'. Is there any clearer 
representation of those two positions of the experience of 
jouissance than in this passage?  The lures of objet a pass 73
before Jimmy's eyes, upon or before a (blank) screen, 
beginning with his missing mother and ending with the 
ungraspable object of Oryx herself (the failure of the phallus 
itself: Jimmy 'misses' every single one of them, in all senses). 
Oryx is displayed simultaneously in the fullness of her 
subjectivity, passing beyond the screen of Jimmy's fantasy 
and into the 'shadows' of a relationship that cannot be 
 Here Jimmy's position as focaliser of the narrative is thrown into sharp relief as Oryx's position 73
as what Lacan calls that unsayable signifier, 'woman', is made apparent: Oryx exemplifies this 
position, demonstrating that what Lacan is saying is not that there is an essential prescription of 
'woman', in other words the biological female, as 'mysterious and unknowable' but rather that there 
is a method of being, a jouissance associated with the position of woman which is available to any 
subject 'identifying' with that position, whether they are biologically male or female. The point is that 
that this Other jouissance available to women is unsayable, because, unlike phallic jouissance, it 
cannot 'miss its mark', it is not subject to that phallic 'bar' of language itself. It cannot be 
symbolised, and since it cannot be symbolised, it cannot be said to exist; this does not mean that it 
does not exist, only that it cannot be said to exist.
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formulated in language, cannot be represented in the text: 
Oryx, for herself, is not an object. In opposition to Gina 
Wisker's claim that 'she remains a mysterious figure existing 
behind the screen onto which male fantasies are projected',  74
we can instead say that Oryx is depicted in a Lacanian 
sense, in other words as experiencing that phallic jouissance 
and the Other jouissance, an experience which is available to 
her alone as woman. In other words, she exists behind and 
before the screen. She manifests something which cannot be 
contained within the screen of fantasy, walking towards 
Crake, who himself is a cruel, godlike, impassive, mechanical 
feature of the text. Oryx for Jimmy is the reduction of the 
Other to its excremental object, objet a; Crake, for Jimmy, is 
the Other in its indefatigable, terrifying guise as das Ding, the 
Thing. Oryx's relationship with Crake persists beyond the 
torrid and torturous sexual relationship which she enjoys with 
Jimmy, where neither of them can relate to one another, 
where something of herself is fully concealed from him, 
inaccessible to him; her relationship with Crake, such as it is, 
is something beyond sex, something mechanically 
satisfactory — 'Crake's sexual needs were direct and simple, 
according to Oryx; not intriguing, like sex with Jimmy. Not 
fun, just work' (Oryx and Crake 314) — but not simply 
exploitative, as Elliott suggests, because it is underpinned by 
a maniacal dedication and belief by Oryx in Crake's power. 
Theirs is a relationship which seems unrepresentable in the 
text: 
"I believe in Crake, I believe in his" — she 
groped for the word — "his vision. He wants to 
make the world a better place. This is what 
he's always telling me. [...] He has found the 
 Gina Wisker, Margaret Atwood: An Introduction to Critical Views of Her Fiction (Basingstoke: 74
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 157.
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problems, I think he is right. [...] Crake is a 
very smart man!"
Jimmy should have known better than to bad-
mouth Crake. Crake was her hero, in a way. In 
an important way. As he, Jimmy, was not. 
(Oryx and Crake 322).  
Locating her 'position' in the novel becomes the key to 
answering the question of who Oryx 'is', because her 
'mystery' for Jimmy is not only a barrier erected by Jimmy to 
mask the impossibility of the consummation of their love: 
rather, Oryx retains this mystery precisely because she is 
exposed to Jimmy. The apparent 'core' of her being is 
presented, and yet it remains unfathomable for him in its 
unspeakable essence; all he can do is relate to his own 
fantasy of her. Jimmy never talks to 'her':
Someone to talk to was nice, Oryx used to tell 
him. "You should try it sometime, Jimmy," 
she'd say, kissing him on the ear. 
"But I talk to you," he'd protest. 
Another kiss. "Do you?" 
(Oryx and Crake 49) 
There is a 'dislocated' voice of Oryx which only grows more 
potent upon its separation from her body. When Snowman 
leaves Paradice near the conclusion of the novel, stepping 
past Oryx and Crake's remains, the voice returns to jarringly 
renounce the body: 
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He picks up his sticks and heads out through 
the airlock doorway, avoiding Crake's gaze, 
Crake's grin; and Oryx, in her silk butterfly 
shroud. 
Oh Jimmy. That's not me!
(Oryx and Crake 357) 
While the voice disavows its connection to the body, it also 
suggests, by the same token, that it itself cannot ever have 
been in a position to authenticate its own claim. This is the 
voix acousmatique,  the voice as partial object separated 75
from the body, experienced without body, in opposition to the 
body. The voice does not belong to the body of Oryx, but 
instead is the irruptive objet a which 'exists', as such, only for 
Jimmy/Snowman. In other words, it is detached from the 
other itself, purely 'interred' for Snowman in a way which 
manifests the lack in the Other; it materialises quite clearly 
the phantasmatic status of 'Oryx', 'filling in' for this lack itself. 
The voice returns throughout the text to demonstrate, with 
dramatic irony, the network of fantasy in which Jimmy is 
caught. As Howells notes, the epigraphs of the novel (from 
Gulliver's Travels and To the Lighthouse) demonstrate 'male 
and female voices [...] in counterpoint' (Margaret Atwood 
172), dramatising the text's interrogation of the cultural and 
gendered associations of scientific and artistic imagination. 
But they also demonstrate the role of the voice, I suggest, 
after cultural association, after gendered association, as 
something cut from the subject: the voice in its mysterious 
objective state, as that which may 'inform and not amuse', as 
Gulliver intends, while it simultaneously manifests 
equivocation and indeterminacy, as Lily Briscoe speculates. 
 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the voix acousmatique as object of the Real in greater detail.75
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Howells, by contrast, suggests that the voice provides a 
marker of authenticity in the text, a kernel of unmediated 
reality 'in a high-tech world of artificially constructed reality': 
This raises questions about a politics of 
representation where everything is mediated 
and rescripted so that nothing is verifiable. 
How, for example, can Jimmy make sense of 
the video of his mother's execution which the 
Compound guards show him when he knows 
how easily it could have been digitally faked? 
The answer comes when he hears his 
mother's voice speaking directly to him from 
the screen: 'Goodbye. Remember Killer. I love 
you. Don't let me down.' 
(Margaret Atwood 175) 
According to Howells, Baudrillard is the model for reading 
this triumph of 'simulation' over 'reality' — but she also notes, 
following Baudrillard, that reality can always reappear when 
social law and convention breaks down. In this sense we can 
view the cause and effect of Crake's plan. Crake 'never stops 
playing computer games' (Margaret Atwood 176); he follows 
Extinctathon (one of the numerous video games based on 
global destruction which he and Jimmy regularly play 
together) through to its conclusion, and Jimmy is left to 
encounter the real consequences of Crake's act: 
As sole survivor, Jimmy/Snowman is riddled 
with guilt at his own moral stupidity in 
confusing 'not real' with 'real' as he realises he 
has been duped as much by his own wilful 
ignorance as by Crake's treachery [...] He 
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carries the mark of his moral myopia with him 
into the post-human world, for his sunglasses 
are missing one lens, and what are we to 
make of his exchange for a pair of 'new two-
eyed sunglasses', which he finds on his return 
to the RejoovenEsense Compound at the end 
of the novel? 
(Margaret Atwood 176) 
We can see, noting the distinction between the Baudrillardian 
'real' and the Lacanian register of the same name, that there 
is another possible reading of the voice and status of the real 
which runs contrary to Howells' analysis.  Howells suggests 76
that it is the 'authentic voice' of Jimmy's mother which allows 
him to distinguish between the video of her death and a 
faked simulation of such, in other words that this is the point 
at which the simulation is revealed, left adrift by the return of 
referential reality, which appeals directly to Jimmy's 'real' 
experience. But when we read the text closely, it becomes 
apparent that the outcome of this episode is not simply that 
Jimmy is able to verify that this video is 'real' (in other words, 
a genuine recording of his mother's death); instead it is that 
he is experiencing the failure of the frame of fantasy. For our 
analysis, this distinction is crucial, because what we locate 
here is the text engaging directly with the production of the 
screen itself: 
 For Lacan, the Real does not refer to any level of conscious subjective experience, as it does for 76
Baudrillard. Instead it is an irruptive dimension which reminds us that our subjective constitution in 
language bars from ourselves the very experience of our 'internal core', which must be lost forever 
as such: that indefinable quantity which, though we propose it as an addition to our lived, mundane 
experience of reality, is also paradoxically figured by the subject as a pure, authentic experience 
itself.
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[...] Why did she have to drag Killer into it? So 
he'd know it was really her, that's why. So he'd 
believe her. [...]
What if the whole thing was fake? It could 
even have been digital, at least the shots, the 
spurts of blood, the falling down. Maybe his 
mother was still alive, maybe she was even 
still at large. If so, what had he given away?
(Oryx and Crake 259)
It is clear that the introduction of his mother's voice in the 
video does not persuade Jimmy that the recording is 
authentic: instead, what Jimmy experiences while watching 
the video is the level of Real trauma. He struggles to orient 
his fantasy — the fantasy of his still-absent mother who will 
remain 'at large' and remain absent — in light of the video, 
which destroys the fantasy as such. Jimmy's mother can only 
remain absent as long as she eludes capture by the 
CorpSeCorps. In other words, his proposal, that the video 
might be 'fake', is actually a fantasy of authenticity. Jimmy, as 
a child of the screen, expects the video to confirm to him the 
truth by corresponding to the fantasy which locates his 
desire. The video frustrates him, however, precisely because 
it introduces the voice of his mother: 'Then the sound came 
suddenly up. Goodbye. Remember Killer. I love you. Don't let 
me down.' (Oryx and Crake 258). When his mother's voice 
suddenly corresponds with her image, Jimmy is forced to 
contend with that contingent element of the Lacanian Real 
itself. He experiences this first as gaze, which irrupts beyond 
the frame of the video-picture — 'Pan to close-up: the woman 
was looking right at him, right out of the frame: a blue-eyed 
look, direct, defiant, patient, wounded.' (Oryx and Crake 258) 
— and then as voice. It is not without reason that Lacan also 
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calls the drive, at the level of the voice, the 'invocatory drive’; 
that call ('Don't let me down') is the call of the Other, Jimmy's 
experience of the voice presented in an oddly dissimulated 
manner in which it is not quite clear whether the voice is ‘real' 
(in a Baudrillardian sense), is attached to his mother, or 
whether it jarringly overflows the scene itself, escaping the 
frame in the same manner as her gaze, as object of the Real 
itself, objet a. This is event is so disturbing for Jimmy — 'The 
next few weeks were the worst he could remember' (Oryx 
and Crake 259) — not only because it reveals the death of 
his mother, but because it forces him to contend with a 
complex moment at which the screen itself breaks down and 
signals the failure of fantasy. Jimmy, a child raised by 
television and computer screens saturated with base 
fantasies — fantasy understood in the common sense, wish-
fulfilment fantasies of violence and pornography — struggles 
to comprehend this experience of the sudden disunity of 
screen and fantasy .77
The central question here, therefore, is the inscription of the 
'authentic' presence experienced by the subject. As we see, 
 This question of the unity of screen and fantasy is connected to Howells' suggestion that 77
Snowman's acquisition of his new sunglasses, which have two lenses rather than one, is a symbol 
of his newly-enlightened outlook: 'he goes back to the Crakers in a different frame of mind and 
wearing his new 'two-eyed sunglasses [...] Jimmy/Snowman is seeing differently, not because his 
physical space has changed but because his perspective has changed, with the prospect of 
entering again into human relationships' (Margaret Atwood 182-3). What do these new sunglasses 
really stand for? Is it not the case that, rather than symbolising a 'new' perspective on the post-
apocalyptic world (an emotional catharsis, the prospect of new fulfilling relationships, an end to the 
despair of Crake's legacy), they instead denote the renewed perspective which looks squarely 
upon the fantasy screen itself — the fantasy screen which only appears when 'social relation' is 
established, which can only function as a 'subjective' response to the creation of the subject itself, 
'in' the community of the signifier? It seems clear that Snowman, as the Last Man, comes closest, 
closer than anyone can ever come, to escaping his fantasy and confronting the trauma of the Real 
itself, in a world in which he is apparently doomed to never again encounter another human being. 
His goal, in response to this situation, is to attempt community, to teach desire, by inculcating in the 
Crakers the rudiments of symbolic language, contrary to Crake's wishes. As he leaves Paradice for 
the second time, near the conclusion of the narrative, Snowman is 'seeing differently' because he 
is encountering the renewal of his fantasy screen itself, the fantasy screen that he has so often 
witnessed broken down. In other words, he is not 'seeing things as they truly are', has not made a 
'positive' step as such: instead, he has reaffirmed the fantasy itself.
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the representation of the screen in the novel at once 
produces and problematises the presence of an apparent 
authenticity of 'meaning' and experience. For Jane Elliott, the 
text is a sign of the break in North American literature from 
'traditional' postmodern strategies of representation, which 
obscure the presence of any supposed ultimate referent.  78
For Elliott, Oryx and Crake embodies the repudiation of this 
postmodern strategy because in the text 'the reader is privy 
to the narrowing of a gap that is both physical and 
representational: from over there to over here, from image or 
fiction to something closer to reality, from dead sign to living 
presence.' ('The Return of the Referent' 350). Her thesis is a 
version of that popular reading of contemporary fiction as a 
'return to realism' in response to postmodernism, but in my 
view it is based on a misreading of Oryx and Crake. This is 
not to say that I disagree with her broader point; it is for 
certain that Oryx and Crake does something different in the 
way it represents 'representation' itself: what I would argue, 
however, is that the innovative feature of Oryx and Crake, in 
this regard, is to be located in the manner in which the text 
figures representation according to the presence of screens. 
These are screens as the form of object which reveals, rather 
the truth of representation, the fantasy of our own perception 
of it as such; more than this, it reveals, following Lacan, the 
constitution of our own subjectivity as we open ourselves to 
the fact of perception. 
When Elliot says that 'Oryx seems to materialize into [the 
text], gradually replacing her pixelated image with her fleshy, 
immediate presence' ('The Return of the Referent’ 350) she 
mistakes the 'physical presence' of Oryx for that of her 
'subjective' appearance in the text. The name 'Oryx' 
 Jane Elliott, 'The Return of the Referent in Recent North American Fiction: Neoliberalism and 78
Narratives of Extreme Oppression’, NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction, 42: 2 — Theories of the Novel 
Now, Part I (Summer 2009), 349-354 (349).
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structures the appearance of the figures materialising in the 
text under that name. Jimmy’s phantasmatic screen narrative 
'reconstructs' the materialisation of these discrete figures 
around a signifier — a point de capiton which pins down the 
meaning, for Jimmy, of the signifier 'Oryx', and creates a 
node around which he might structure his fantasy (which, as 
we have seen, stretches not just from the abused child and 
young woman, but all the way back to his mother). 
But this does not mean that we are simply reframing the 
novel in a 'classic' postmodern context, and reaffirming the 
presence of Oryx as something which 'disappears' from the 
text as a result of the direct impossibility or morally-
problematic fact of her ‘immediate’ representation as such. In 
order to demonstrate this, we should consider two apparently 
contradictory statements by Žižek on Lacan’s ‘postmodernist’ 
strategies: 
For those used to dismissing Lacan as just 
another 'postmodern' relativist, this may come 
as a surprise: Lacan is resolutely anti-
postmodern, opposed to any notion of science 
as just another story we are telling ourselves 
about ourselves, a narrative whose apparent 
supremacy over other — mythic, artistic — 
narratives is grounded only in the historically 
contingent Western 'regime of truth' (to use a 
term rendered popular by Michel Foucault) 
(How to Read Lacan 64) 
'It is only with Lacan that the 'postmodernist' 
break occurs, in so far as he thematizes a 
certain real, traumatic kernel whose status 
remains deeply ambiguous' 
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(Looking Awry 143)
This apparent tension, in which Lacan is described as both 
postmodernist and anti-postmodernist, is, I would suggest, a 
dialectical strategy by Žižek, designed to highlight the 
manner in which Lacan maintains a necessary ambiguity in 
his rendering of the register of the Real. It is the status of the 
Real itself which is at stake in Žižek's two 'versions' of Lacan: 
in the 'postmodernist' Lacan, the Real identifies a field 
beyond symbolisation which occurs at the 'point' of 
symbolisation itself, rendering the 'traditional' postmodernist 
project, which consists in uncovering the lack of a universal 
meaning or logic with the differential play of signifying 
systems, as 'a modernist procedure par excellence' (Looking 
Awry 142); Lacan identifies a Real kernel which refuses to 
submit to this uncovering process because of its own 
ambiguous state, in which it is revealed by and closed off 
from the system of signification which creates meaning. It 
represents an insistent traumatic shard in the very 
experience of 'meaning' itself. By the opposite token, the 
'anti-postmodernist' Lacan, according to Žižek, distinguishes 
between the 'relative' meaning produced by alternative 
narrative codes and an 'absolute' kind of meaning which is 
expressed most notably in science itself; here there is a 
character of the Real, savoir dans le reel, or knowledge in 
the Real, which, if we know Lacan, is precisely the place 
where knowledge, as he defines it, cannot exist. It is because 
the Real is not a trans-historic core, but instead the effect of 
the gaps in meaning created by the Symbolic process itself 
that, conversely, there must be a 'thing' before the Thing — 'a 
knowledge of the laws of nature directly inscribed into the 
Real of natural objects and processes' (How to Read Lacan 
74-5). But this thing can never be stated as such, and in fact 
 109
cannot even impinge upon the Real which we recognise only 
through the gaps and inaccuracies of the Symbolic field. 
What we notice here, curiously, is that the 'postmodernist' 
and the 'anti-postmodernist' Lacan seem, in effect, to fulfil the 
requirements of their obverse positions. The postmodern 
Lacan appears modernist in his assertion of a 'missing' thing, 
while the anti-postmodern Lacan appears exactly 
postmodern in his refusal to account for that thing beyond the 
Thing — in other words, the thing which exists 'two steps 
removed' from language and meaning. Herein we witness 
what Žižek has called the 'parallax' (Living in the End Times 
244) of the dialectical process: the dialectic does not reveal a 
'new' third position which reduces thesis and antithesis to 
functions of one or the other; instead it demonstrates that the 
third position is really the gap between the previous two, and 
that the space which maintains this gap is what creates the 
possibility of a change in perspective itself. In other words, 
the 'two Lacans' here enact this perspectival flip in order to 
demonstrate the radical effect of the Real as that which 
becomes possible for us to detect only as it is properly 
impossible. 
Returning to Elliott's reading of Oryx and Crake, we can see 
that what, according to her, defines its status as a break from 
postmodernist strategies of defamiliarisation of the referent 
is, appropriately, the narrowing of the gap between referent 
and text. The referent itself returns to view as opposed to 
disappearing after the stresses of différance: 
I suggest that contemporary North American 
fiction is marked by such dramas of 
immediacy, as I term these and other similar 
moments. Despite what might at first seem the 
obvious connections, I argue that this shift in 
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representational politics owes less to an 
increased sense of the reality or threat of 
third-world suffering than it does to 
transformations internal to North American 
culture itself, specifically those related to 
neoliberalism. As a result, there is something 
paradoxically and disturbingly allegorical 
about these texts; ultimately they deploy 
extreme instances of oppression to say 
something about representational politics 
rather than the other way around.
('The Return of the Referent' 350) 
What Elliott actually suggests, however, as we can see if we 
read this passage closely, is that the referent is no closer to 
making its return. The reality of the kind of narrative of which 
Oryx is an example — of an exploited, marginalised 
individual, the telling of whose story itself might constitute a 
violence if it were deployed in terms of the social and cultural 
apparatus which oppresses her in the first place — is in fact 
no closer to becoming a sensible reality of that cultural 
apparatus. In effect, this guarantees that the textual 
'appearance' of the referent itself does not constitute a 
further marginalisation of the oppressed figure: but it also 
demonstrates the fact that the appearance of Oryx is simply 
that. It is appearance itself, or a further layer of abstraction 
which obscures the fact that the referent truly does not 
approach the level of the text. What Elliott proposes, in fact, 
is that not only does the text not recover an anti-
instrumentalist field of representation, it also does not offer a 
response to that tradition; instead it merely surveys that field, 
performing a further mediation: 'the formulaic quality of the 
novel makes sense if we read it not simply as an anti-
instrumentalist text but rather as a text about a tradition of 
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anti-instrumentalism that has become outdated and 
inadequate' ('The Return of the Referent’ 352). 
By contrast, when we read Oryx and Crake, thinking after 
Lacan, we see that it is precisely the 'gap' between referent 
and text in which the dialectical movement of the Real 
becomes 'visible' — visible, as parallax. There we see how 
Oryx appears as the subject of a signifier — not only as the 
foreign woman sold into sex slavery but also as the little girl 
on the screen, and as the young woman on the tv newscast 
— the being evacuated from self-present subjectivity, and 
also simultaneously for Jimmy, the endlessly cycling object of 
desire. As such, Oryx cannot be confined to this reductive 
appearance as 'complete' or whole referent: the text makes it 
completely clear that even as Jimmy makes of her a signifier, 
a point de capiton, her 'meaning', her being, escapes him; 
because, as Lacan shows, her being escapes herself. It is 
through a screen that we must fantasise that our being is not 
alien as such. That absolute alterity of the irruptive Real is us 
behind ourselves. It is us 'behind' our own screen, and our 
subjectivity displayed upon it, for ourselves. 
What this means is that Lacan maintains the tension 
between the modernist and postmodernist strategies of the 
production and analysis of meaning and representation by 
both performing and criticising each in turn. This is the 
reason that Žižek does not make the claim to a ‘post-
postmodernism'. The bind in which Elliott is caught is the 
emblematic quandary of this very proclamation. For example, 
Elliott notes that: 
Oryx materializes in the novel, I believe, not 
so much because the oppressed other has 
become more connected to the West through 
the machinations of capital but because a 
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nonreferential approach to such others was 
the watchword for a whole generation of anti-
instrumentalist thinkers. Given this tradition, 
nothing dramatizes the end of anti-
instrumentalism quite like the representational 
immediacy of the oppressed other.
('The Return of the Referent' 353) 
Yet at the same moment she emphasises Oryx's 
disappearance from the novel, reduced to a mere symbolic 
prize of the main actors, Jimmy and Crake: 
At the heart of the novel is the contest 
between Jimmy's and Crake's diametrically 
opposed approaches to instrumentality as a 
whole, and Oryx is situated as the grand prize 
in this contest. Given Oryx's symbolic status, 
the immediacy of the oppressed other in Oryx 
and Crake seems to function more as a sign 
of the eradication of anti-instrumentalism that 
is its cause. 
('The Return of the Referent' 353) 
Elliott cannot reconcile the demand for Oryx's materialisation 
as referent with her simultaneously elusive representation in 
the novel. The reason for this is that there is no reconciliation 
possible, other than as barred subject, as subject which 
ultimately lacks self-presence and appears only through a 
screen. There can be no coincidence in the fact that Oryx 
appears before Jimmy upon a screen on each occasion of 
her 'materialisation'. The advance of reading after Lacan is 
that we do not offer an alternative to a postmodern reading 
by producing a further layer of obscurity to our reading. 
Rather than proposing Oryx as an example of the 're-
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materialisation' of the referent (but only insofar as she is still 
masked by the cultural 'representational strategy' which the 
text itself criticises), we should instead say that 'Oryx' does 
not appear in the first place, there is no 'Oryx', no unity of 
being and subject under the signifier 'Oryx' to begin with, but 
there is not no Oryx. Her appearance as such is only 'visible' 
once it is represented upon a screen, but this reveals the 
very presence of being which is barred by language and can 
be located according to the irruptive Real. This is precisely 
what the text describes already. The advance of Oryx and 
Crake is therefore in the manner that it is attuned to the 
presence of the screen upon which the fantasy of Oryx 
appears. Through this screen, it is revealed that 'Oryx' 
contains no substantive truth-value or meaning, is only 
created by her referential status for Jimmy, even as her own 
subjectivity revolts against the image; Oryx maintains her 
own 'covert' kernel of Real jouissance which is unavailable to 
Jimmy, and will not submit to his 'hand-wringing over the 
truth-status of Oryx's life narrative' which 'is simply beside the 
point' ('The Return of the Referent’ 352). Ultimately, for Elliott, 
the 'ethical', poststructuralist response to the marginalised 
other involves raising that other to the level of a sign which 
organises referentiality around its own non-referential status:
When poststructuralist theory attempts to 
avoid representing the other, I would argue, it 
[creates] the image of an other whose alterity 
may be left intact provided we avoid sullying it 
through the controlling powers of signification. 
Thus the downtrodden symbolize both the 
lost, primal unity of word and thing and the 
assumption that, now that such unity is lost, 
any attempt to recover it will simply result in 
the erasure of the thing by the word. 
Ultimately, poststructuralism's approach to the 
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other arises from an attempt to treat that other 
with the utmost in ethical anti-referentiality, but 
this attempt is founded on a highly referential 
act, which positions that oppressed other as 
the sign and locus of the Left's own reverential 
anti-instrumentality. 
('The Return of the Referent’ 353-4) 
What Lacan shows us, however, is that the ultimate alterity of 
the other is already 'intact' in spite of the controlling powers 
of signification': because that process is the very thing that 
alerts us to the Real that cannot be 'captured' by that system. 
In Lacan, the 'ethical' approach is not 'anti-referentiality', nor 
indeed is it the 'return' of it as such. The ethical approach is 
instead to act according to our 'condition' (The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis 22), our condition as subjects 'split' by 
subjectivity. In this case, 'anti-referentiality' cannot be 
considered an ethical treatment of the other, because there is 
something of the other that can only consist in referentiality. 
Equally, there is something that only consists beyond 
referentiality; Lacan's work is the attempt to elucidate this 
fact, and make of that 'reverential anti-referentiality' 
something more than only the obverse of whichever 
discourse of mastery defines the oppressive, instrumental 
work of 'referentiality'. (Elliott mentions Orientalism and 
Capitalism in this regard.) I would argue, therefore, that the 
text treats Oryx according to an absolute ethical 
circumspection.
This level of circumspect ethical consideration within the text 
is implicitly connected to the function of the screen of fantasy. 
We can find this exemplified no more clearly than in the 
failure of Crake's ultimate plan. Before the Crakers are able 
to inherit the Earth, the apocalypse must be rendered via a 
 115
simple pill: 'The Pill would put a stop to haphazard 
reproduction, the Project would replace it with a superior 
method. They were two stages of a single plan, you might 
say' (Oryx and Crake 304). I would suggest that the 
BlyssPluss Pill is the more horrifying half of Crake's plan, 
because it attacks the notion of desire itself: 
The aim was to produce a single pill, that at 
one and the same time: 
a) would protect the user against all 
known sexually transmitted diseases, 
fatal, inconvenient, or merely unsightly; 
b) would provide an unlimited supply of 
libido and sexual prowess, coupled 
with a generalized sense of well-being, 
thus reducing the frustration and 
blocked testosterone that led to 
jealousy and violence, and eliminating 
feelings of low self-worth; 
c) would prolong youth. 
These three capabilities would be the selling 
points, said Crake; but there would be a 
fourth, which would not be advertised. The 
BlyssPluss Pill would also act as a sure-fire 
one-time-does-it-all birth-control pill, for male 
and female alike, thus automatically lowering 
the population level. 
(Oryx and Crake 294) 
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The language and form of this passage, in which the bulleted 
list of effects is followed by an advertising lingo-inflected 
prose paragraph detailing the 'fourth effect', bears the 
hallmarks of Crake's antipathy towards language and the 
subject itself. The truly important effect of the pill, the one 
which condemns the user to sterility, inflicting violence in total 
secrecy, is the one that will not be listed; and yet its 
description (by Crake, filtered through Jimmy/Snowman) 
'pops' with hyphenated buzzwords, 'sure-fire one-time-does-
it-all'. Crake's 'discursive strategy', as such, his intoned 
scientific discourse and argument, is repeated here; the list 
itself enumerates the potential physical consequences of 
desire — STIs — the potential fantasy catalyst of desire — 
the image of youth — and the unconscious fuel of desire — 
libido — and details the 'solution': forced sterilisation. Perry 
suggests that Atwood is commenting only upon the 
repression of anxiety caused by ageing through the cultural 
obsession with youth: 
Atwood’s polemic centres upon the notion that 
we become immortal not necessarily when 
medicine and technology can defer or cure us 
of the death of the susceptible body, but when 
its promises of reversibility and correctability 
lessen the fear of death, and when the 
cosmetic illusions of youth, health and vitality 
help repress awareness of the ageing 
process. [...] Immortality is a state which falls 
into banality with this view of perpetual youth 
as not the emancipation from an implacable 
reality but the simple repression of it.
('Intimations of Immortality' 176) 
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What we might see instead, however, is that Atwood is not 
focused on the 'simple repression' of mortality-anxiety, but 
instead upon the horror, according to Crake, of rampant 
desire — desire, in other words, which overflows the screen 
of fantasy: 
Needless to say, Crake continued, the thing 
would become a huge money-spinner. It 
would be the must-have pill, in every country, 
in every society in the world. Of course the 
crank religions wouldn't like it, in view of the 
fact that their raison d'etre was based on 
misery, indefinitely deferred gratification, and 
sexual frustration, but they wouldn't be able to 
hold out long. The tide of human desire, the 
desire for more and better, would overwhelm 
them. It would take control and drive events, 
as it had in every large change throughout 
history. 
(Oryx and Crake 295-6) 
There is an added level of irony to the fact that Crake 
chooses this pill, that which destroys desire, to destroy the 
world. But the attempt to model a human society based 
around that of the bonobo (Oryx and Crake 293), saturated 
with libido, polyamorously directed in order to avoid 
'intraspecific aggression' (Oryx and Crake 294), is also the 
literal destruction of desire, without which the subject, and 
therefore society, cannot be constituted. The destruction of 
desire, indeed, as Atwood suggests with the blackest irony, 
would be fuelled by desire itself: Crake is certain that the 'tide 
of human desire' would ensure the total success of the pill. 
What Crake proposes, in Lacanian terms, is a society 
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constituted around the immediate 'realisation' of jouissance 
— in other words, a contradiction in terms.
The architect of the apocalypse, therefore, exemplifies the 
failure of the screen of fantasy. Unlike Austerlitz, who, as we 
will see in Chapter 5, experiences the breakdown of the 
screen of fantasy, Crake aims at the Real: in other words, 
what Lacan calls ‘a subjective destitution’,  a Symbolic 79
death, is his goal. In Crake we encounter another example of 
a character whose 'core being' is rendered unavailable to 
Jimmy (and to us); in contrast with Oryx, however, Crake is 
depicted as a character whose 'inner life' is unknowable 
precisely because it threatens to present, frankly, the full 
horror of the Other in its guise as the unfathomable Thing 
'lurking beneath' the face of the other. Crake, the prized 
student, the leading scientist, 'the alpha wolf, the silverback 
gorilla, the head lion' (Oryx and Crake 300), the very model 
of success in the society depicted by the novel, is also the 
one who is capable of perpetrating the greatest act of horror. 
He is akin to what Rilke describes as the 'neighbour', the 
violent presence lurking beneath the face of my double:
There exists a creature, perfectly harmless 
when you see it; you scarcely notice it and 
forget it again immediately. But as soon as it 
manages somehow to get unseen into your 
ears, it develops there; it hatches, as it were, 
and cases have been known where it has 
penetrated into the brain and has thriven 
devastatingly, like those pneumococci in dogs 
that gain entrance through the nose. 
 For more on the concept of subjective destitution, see Chapter 5 also.79
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This being is one's neighbour.80
In other words, Crake materialises the ultimate outcome of 
the 'unmasked' neighbour; without the imposition of Symbolic 
structure which regulates our intersubjective relations, which 
pacifies the threat which accompanies 'immediate' contact 
between beings before the level of subject and other, the 
'core' of one's being, exposed to light, may reveal the most 
horrifying level of traumatic experience. The target of Crake's 
desire, as we come to realise, is not simply the death of 
humanity: on the contrary, indeed, it is its very survival. The 
true horror of his action is that he must not only die with 
everyone else in order to accomplish this survival, but indeed 
achieve the object of his death drive, in other words, achieve 
a Symbolic death; he must become separated from society, 
adrift from all other subjects. This Symbolic death is one 
which can only be achieved by properly removing himself 
from society, by renouncing his social ties, his position, his 
'value' as a subject. In this sense, we should say that Crake 
experiences two deaths in the text, following Lacan's claim of 
the subject 'between two deaths': one death in which he 
biologically ceases to exist, and one death in which he does 
so symbolically. 
Crake sees an end to desire as the only means of ensuring 
the survival of the planet and of humanity itself. In Lacanian 
terms, he wants to remove the bar of subjectivity by refusing 
the entry into symbolic law which splits the subject. In other 
words, in Crake's society, there will be no phallus, no 
circulation of desire; no having, when there is no phallic 
prohibition anyway. But what drives Crake towards this goal? 
Stein provides a teasing gesture towards the answer when 
she notes that 
 Rainer Maria Rilke, The Notebook of Malte Laurids Brigge, trans. John Linton (Oxford: Oxford 80
University Press, 1984), 159.
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When we learn about Crake's childhood and 
adolescence, we discover the cultural origins 
of his obsession with death and destruction, 
as Atwood openly satirizes our culture's 
glamorization of violence, its exploitative 
sexuality, and its disregard for the natural 
environment.
('Problematic Paradice in Oryx and Crake' 
149) 
The suggestion here, of course, is to locate Crake's 
obsession with death and destruction within 'culture'. From 
where does that 'cultural' fascination arise? Here we must 
consider the death drive in two distinctive, yet related senses 
elucidated by Žižek: 
For Freud, the death drive is not merely a 
decadent reactive formation [...] but rather the 
innermost radical possibility of a human being. 
[...] What death drive strives to annihilate is 
not the biological cycle of generation and 
corruption, but rather the symbolic order, the 
order of the symbolic pact that regulates 
social exchange and sustains debts, honours, 
obligations.81
[...] death drive does not designate the 
positive content one should directly refer to in 
order to explain some event ("people kill each 
other in wars because of the death drive"), but 
the empty frame within which the game of 
 Slavoj Žižek, 'There is No Sexual Relationship: Wagner as a Lacanian’, New German Critique, 81
69 — Richard Wagner (Autumn, 1996), 7-35 (25).
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historicization is taking place: it maintains 
open the minimal gap, the delay, between an 
event and the modes of its historicization, of 
its symbolic inscription [...]  82
What Žižek describes here is the very possibility of the death 
of being, elucidated in the symbolic framework which acts 
against death itself. The death drive does not, itself, compel 
me to murder and kill my neighbour; instead, it forces me to 
contemplate the return to the immortality of the Real, or, in 
other words, that level of immortal being which is denied to 
the subject upon its birth. It is for this reason that Lacan 
refers to Antigone 'between two deaths’ in The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis. There is biological death and Symbolic 
death: the Symbolic death is the goal of the death drive, 
because it is the only possible way of recuperating that 
original wholeness which is left behind by the subject. As 
Maire Jaanus says, Lacan, 'by reversing normal ideas about 
life and death, shows sexed life up as a loss of immortal life 
so that sex becomes, paradoxically, the death of immortality, 
while death, on the other hand, becomes a desire for 
immortal life'.  It seems clear that this is the death that 83
Crake aims for, not only in the death of humanity (which is 
replaced by a creature, the post-human Children of Crake, 
which he proposes shall escape this Symbolic deadlock) but 
for his own death, which is a subject glossed over in critical 
accounts of the novel. 
Considering this possible account for Crake's ultimate aim, 
does it therefore also become possible for us to speculate 
 Slavoj Žižek and F.W.J. von Schelling, The Abyss of Freedom/Ages of the World, trans. Judith 82
Norman (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 38.
 Marie Jaanus, 'The Demontage of the Drive' in Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental 83
Concepts of Psychoanalysis ed. Richard Feldstein et al. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 119-36 
(131).
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with regard to the reason for which Crake murders Oryx? 
Stephen Dunning's winding account of the logic of this act is 
suggestive of the mystery surrounding the question: 
We know that Crake loves Oryx, and that he is 
aware of her relationship with Jimmy. Jealousy 
and revenge may suggest themselves […] But 
we have seen no previous evidence of sexual 
possessiveness, which Crake, in any case, 
would likely disdain as atavistic egoism; 
moreover, he appears genuinely fond of his 
friend. In the end, Crake simply cannot explain 
himself, which is inevitable given those vital 
human qualities that slip through his net of 
numbers.84
We should return to this passage in the text itself:
Crake's beige tropicals were splattered with 
redbrown. In his right hand was an ordinary 
storeroom jackknife, the kind with the two 
blades and the nail file and the corkscrew and 
the little scissors. He had his other arm 
around Oryx, who seemed to be asleep; her 
face was against Crake's chest, her long pink-
ribboned braid hung down her back.
As Jimmy watched, frozen with disbelief, 
Crake let Oryx fall backwards, over his left 
arm. He looked at Jimmy, a direct look, 
unsmiling.
 Stephen Dunning, 'Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake: The Terror of the Therapeutic’, Canadian 84
Literature, 186 (Autumn 2005), 86-101 (96).
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"I'm counting on you," he said. Then he slit her 
throat.
Jimmy shot him.
(Oryx and Crake 329)
Is it not the case that Crake here seeks to assume, as Žižek 
has described it, 'the "excremental" position of a saint, of 
objet petit a, which precludes any intersubjective relationship 
of empathy'?  Crake does not simply want to destroy 85
humanity, as we have seen: rather, he wants to rescue it from 
what he sees are its essential failings. But in order to perform 
this monstrous act, he must remove himself from the network 
of symbolic exchange and debt. His name must not be 
allowed to persist after his death, for that would frustrate the 
entire purpose of the act itself; it would allow the Crakers to 
make of him a symbol of their own creation.  By 86
accomplishing his own Symbolic death, by obeying the death 
drive, Crake can guarantee his own exclusion from the 
Crakers' future.
 Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment (London: Verso, 1994), 93.85
 And we must remember, of course, that this symbolic death would preclude the circulation of that 86
signifier which marks the very name of the Crakers themselves; by removing his self from the 
symbolic network of exchange, Crake removes the possibility of a debt owed by the Crakers to 
their master.
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The extraordinary fact of the text is that Jimmy keeps Crake's 
memory alive, in spite of Crake's private and public crimes.  87
Why? Because Jimmy implicitly recognises that Crake's is a 
failed state: without the prohibitive law of the father, desire 
does not exist. Jimmy/Snowman keeps the signifier 'Crake' in 
circulation because he recognises that it functions according 
to the process by which Symbolic power is manifest as the 
negation of being: 
In the dawn light he punched in the door code 
for the last time and opened up the bubble, 
and led the Crakers out of Paradice. They 
noticed the remains of Crake lying on the 
ground, but as they had never seen Crake 
when alive, they believed Snowman when he 
told them this was a thing of no importance — 
only a sort of husk, only a sort of pod. It would 
have been a shock to them to have witnessed 
their creator in his present state.
(Oryx and Crake 351)
Crake becomes aufheben in his name, the dead Symbolic 
father whose rule of law functions precisely because his 
 But why leave Jimmy alive? We should read Crake's final act as a desperate psychotic attempt 87
to strike against the screen of fantasy itself. Crake understands, once the Crakers begin to 
question their origin, that he cannot extricate himself from the symbolic position of creator. Instead, 
he enlists Jimmy to accomplish this for him. Crake attempts to guarantee the dissolution of his 
relationship with Jimmy by 'hystericising' him. In clinical terms, for Lacan the hysteric is one who 
refuses the relationship with the Other. By murdering Oryx, by expressing his culpability to Jimmy 
for the apocalypse, Crake objectivises Jimmy, compels Jimmy to 'act out' against his own reduction 
from subject to object of the Other, from actor to a mere cog in Crake’s machination. We can see a 
similar situation in Žižek's reading of P.D. James' A Taste for Death: 'Sir Paul's attitude [...] of 
indifferent provocation [...] objectivized the murderer, reducing him to an instrument of the Other's 
will, and so left him with no choice. In short, what compelled the murderer to act was the 
experience of having his desire coincide with the victim's death drive' (The Metastases of 
Enjoyment 93). Thus the meaning of Crake's final words to Jimmy are clear. He is counting on 
Jimmy, not only to watch after the Crakers, but to kill Crake in both senses: to end Crake's life, and 
leave his name, as the author of the unconscionable and obscene act of destruction of humanity 
and Jimmy's love, unsaid.
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being is negated by its own sublation. The symbol of 'Crake' 
overflows the 'husk' of the being which lies on the floor of the 
Paradice bubble. The creator of the Crakers has never been 
'alive' for them. Raising Crake to the level of pure symbol in 
contradistinction to the man's own wishes is Jimmy's 
'revenge', as such, but it is an entirely ethical act. Jimmy/
Snowman transubstantiates Crake, in death, as the very 
symbol of that which he attempts to destroy.
Here Jimmy/Snowman embodies the spirit of that subject 
which we discussed at the outset: faced with the one who 
controls the fate of mankind, can't we see that das Ding, the 
Thing, is next to the subject? In other words, the Thing, that 
inhuman, sublime presence, is the very thing that one hopes, 
one supposes according to their desire, will 'stay the hand' of 
the one with their finger on the button: this hope is the very 
basis of the screen of fantasy, the screen according to which 
Jimmy has been born as subject, and survived the very 
apocalypse. As Snowman ponders a course of action in the 
final pages of the novel — entreat the newly-discovered 
group of survivors he has encountered, kill them, or be killed 
— he reduces the moment to a single question; not 'should I 
kill them?', nor 'should I talk to them?', but 'what do you want 
me to do?'; or, as Lacan says, Che vuoi? The question is the 
appeal to the Other, to the Other in that monstrous guise of 
das Ding, the Other in its Real dimension which is impossible 
to comprehend or to scrutinise. By posing this question, 
however, Snowman commits the final ethical act which 
guarantees the screen of fantasy in the brave new world. He 
ensures that the gap of subjectivity remains open in the text, 
by posing the question to the Other, by asking what is the 
Other's desire. This very act signals to us that he will not 
follow Crake, that he will continue to believe in the other 
which 'will understand something of himself'; it signals to us 
that the text, in ending with the words 'Time to go’ (Oryx and 
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Crake 374), is enacting the ceaseless movement of desire. It 
is calling forth the screen of fantasy. 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Not a Mirror: 
The Return of Narcissism, and What 
Happens When You Don't See a Vampire in 
China Miéville’s The Tain
It is [...] clear why vampires are invisible in the mirror — 
they have read Lacan, and, consequently, know how to 
behave [...]88
China Miéville's novella The Tain is marked by what I suggest 
we call a 'return of narcissism'. By this I mean that, in 
depicting a fantastic London overrun by monstrous mirror 
creatures, the text explores the implications of the 
psychoanalytic dictum that love and desire are marked with a 
primarily narcissistic character. What is at stake in this 
reading is the realisation that the text performs a 
counterintuitive manoeuvre. In spite of its depiction of 
fantastical events, it serves to demonstrate the most minimal 
level of subjective fantasy, in the Lacanian sense; in other 
words, it analyses the character of fantasy as that which 
appears to provoke desire itself. The weird deformations 
which are visited upon the city and its reflections in the text 
conversely help us to define the basic character of 
narcissistic desire in (and) the terms of a screen. The level of 
fantasy, in Lacan, is akin to what is commonly understood as 
the level of a basic reality. It defines the interaction of the 
subject with the external 'social' structure, and is always 
conceptualised by Lacan as a form of screen which not only 
intervenes in the subject's perception, but indeed produces 
 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Grimaces of the Real, or When the Phallus Appears’ October, 58 — Rendering the 88
Real (Autumn, 1991), 44-68 (55). 
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the subject's ability to perceive. What this means is that the 
structure of desire which is articulated by Lacan does not 
only reveal to us the level of fantasy which constitutes the 
speaking being, the subject, but also the cultural production 
of the screen. It furnishes us with a logic of the screen's 
cultural standing by emphasising the central function of the 
screen for the desiring subject. The appearance of the 
screen is therefore of theoretical concern, but it intersects 
with the study of 'cultural product' at every step. 
In The Tain, I suggest, we discover a text which treats 
narcissism with absolute circumspection. Narcissism is not 
simply depicted as the symbol of a disordered culture, but 
instead becomes a marker of the resounding form of 
subjective desire. Within the experience of desire is 
implicated the form and function of the screen, and I claim 
that this fact compels us to analyse the text in terms of its 
representation of the screen. In The Tain, we find a repeated 
depiction of one type of screen: the mirror. The episodes of 
fantasy and horror which appear throughout the text are 
connected to this material object, the striking feature of 
which, in The Tain, is that it has ceased to function; but the 
value of the novella lies in the manner that it couches the 
analysis of the subjective level of fantasy in the tale of a post-
cataclysmic London. Society breaks down, it seems to say, 
when we can no longer safely situate the products of our 
fantasy. The episodes of horror (which consist in the 
depiction of deformed reflections appearing to spring to life 
and murder their subjective counterparts) are therefore far 
less terrifying than the revelation of the breakdown of the 
screen which actually prevents this, in a metaphorical sense, 
from occurring. The screen works to guarantee subjective 
stability, to orient fantasy and prevent the destabilising 
revelation of the impossibility of desire (in other words, the 
impossibility of attaining the object of desire) from 
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threatening the subject's consistency. The Tain depicts, 
therefore, the catastrophic outcome which accompanies the 
dissolution of fantasy. In this sense, we can reframe the 
description of the novella provided by M. John Harrison in his 
introduction from the first, limited print run of the text: 'This is 
a history of mirrors. A history of narcissism. A history of 
culture through the history of the tain, the silver of the 
mirror.'  What I suggest is that, rather than presenting a 89
history, simply, of flawed narcissistic Western culture, a kind 
of notional morality tale in which we are warned against the 
danger of narcissistic delusion at the expense of more 
'virtuous' social involvement (neatly summed up in the text by 
the image of a distorted mirror which no longer obeys the 
whims of its self-obsessed master, which refuses reflection 
and instead responds with violence), The Tain engages with 
the fact that narcissism is directly implicated in our ability to 
desire, and to pursue our desire in a socially productive way. 
In other words, in presenting a Weird horror tale which is 
apparently divorced from social reality, Miéville ranges far 
closer to the 'heart' of that social reality, as such, than he 
would had he produced a generically 'opposing' work of 
realism. To restate, therefore, in more formal terms: rather 
than simply presenting the explanandum, in this case the 
mysterious and unexplained fiction of a horror fantasy, we 
find that the text already reveals the explanans itself, the 
subjective fantasy which structures the experience of culture 
in a manner which calls for its very explanandum.
In studying the text, therefore, we must bear in mind the 
manner in which the subject 'interacts' with culture in Lacan. 
This interaction is really the experience of a stratified series 
of screens, screens which repeat the dialectic of occlusion 
 China Miéville, The Tain (Harrogate: PS Publishing, 2002), 4. (Excluding one further reference to 89
this edition — signalled by The Tain (2002) — all other references to the text in this chapter are 
from the reprint in Looking For Jake and Other Stories.
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and representation, of screening space in order to perform 
the negotiation between 'present' and 'beyond' which makes 
the constitution of the subject itself possible. For Lacan, who 
introduces the Borromean knot precisely in order to 
conceptualise the interdependence of the registers of 
subjectivity, the subject's experience always implies the 
intersectionality of culture. Culture is 'marbled' with 
subjectivity, and must be read as such. In other words, in 
fantasy, we find the unconscious, and therefore we also 
'locate' the unconscious in culture. As Lacan states in 
Encore: 
There is, according to analytic discourse, an 
animal that happens to be endowed with the 
ability to speak and who, because he inhabits 
the signifier, is thus a subject of it. Henceforth, 
everything is played out for him at the level of 
fantasy, but at the level of a fantasy that can 
be perfectly disarticulated in a way that 
accounts for the following — that he knows a 
lot more about things than he thinks when he 
acts.
(Encore 88)
Catherine Belsey comments on this passage in her Culture 
and the Real, suggesting that Lacan here defines the 'three 
distinct levels of human existence: first, the animal, the 
human organism in the real; second, the world of fantasy, of 
conscious social and cultural reality, that language invites us 
to inhabit; and third, the un-conscious, the element 
subtracted from consciousness that knows, none the less, 
more than we think' ; the important fact of this explanation, 90
 Catherine Belsey, Culture in the Real (New York: Routledge, 2005), 39.90
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however, is to be found in the manner in which it emphasises 
both the constitution of the subject in the extimate field 
beyond his or her design, and the corresponding 
materialisation of this field itself. This is not to simply state 
that 'we create culture'. Rather it is to suggest that the 
production of the screen as a particular and ubiquitous 
cultural form represents a perpetuation of the very structural 
element which permits the subject his or her entry 'into' 
culture. The subject 'knows more than he thinks' precisely 
because the coordinates of his or her desire are already 
pointed towards the Other, by the Other. We only reproduce 
the possibility of a relationship with the Other thanks to the 
Other. It is for this reason, I suggest, that we must interrogate 
the imbrication of the screen as cultural form. Therefore, if we 
ever wonder why it is utterly necessary to theorise the screen 
following Lacan, we can answer with something along the 
lines of Žižek's explanation of the Lacanian principle of the 
'eccentric' nature of the unconscious:
When, a couple of years ago, the disclosure of 
Michael Jackson's alleged 'immoral' private 
behaviour (his sexual games with boys under 
age) dealt a blow to his innocent Peter Pan 
image [...], some perspicacious commentators 
asked the obvious question: what's all the fuss 
about? Wasn't this so-called dark side of 
Michael Jackson all the time here for all of us 
to see, in the video spots that accompanied 
his musical releases and that were saturated 
with ritualized violence and obscene sexual 
gestures [...]? This paradox illustrates 
perfectly Lacan's thesis according to which 
'the unconscious is outside', not hidden in any 
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unfathomable depths — or, to quote The X 
Files motto: 'The truth is out there.'91
If, as Lacan suggests, the unconscious is located 'outside', 
then the 'truth' of our subjective constitution is indeed 'out 
there’; it is there for us to trace according to materialisations 
of 'itself' which are ceaselessly manifested in cultural 
productions. By the same token, when we recall Lacan's 
precise formulation of this concept, we can see that it is this 
very structure upon which we must rely in order to articulate 
anything of it in the very first instance. As he notes, 'The 
unconscious is the sum of the effects of speech on a subject, 
at the level at which the subject constitutes himself out of the 
effects of the signifier’ (The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 126): as soon as the subject can become 
constituted at the level of language, the effects of the very 
possibility of this constitution itself are circumscribed as the 
unconscious. It is for this reason that fantasy in Lacan must 
be conceived at the level of what we commonly call reality. 
While Lacan suggests that the subject has always 
experienced this screen which focuses fantasy and renders 
reality 'marginal' — it must certainly be the case if, as Lacan 
suggests, 'the unconscious has always been present, it 
existed and acted before Freud' (The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis 126) — it is not the same thing 
at all to say that the subject has always known it. Forty years 
after Lacan, perhaps we are catching up; The Tain, first 
published in 2002, is, I suggest, evidence of this fact: 
evidence that we can read the subjective interaction with the 
screen in the products of culture.
This chapter will be split into three sections. In the first, I 
explore the presentation of narcissism in The Tain, 
 Slavoj Žižek, 'Fantasy as a Political Category: A Lacanian Approach’, Journal for the 91
Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, 1:2 (Fall 1996), 77-85 (77).
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suggesting that the text contends with the question of 
whether narcissism is simply a 'socially disruptive' turn 
towards self-interest and interiority. I read the text as 
unexpectedly challenging this notion, instead situating 
narcissism along the lines of Lacan's assertion that 
narcissism performs a vital function in 'properly' situating the 
desire of the subject. In the second section I continue this 
analysis by focusing on the figure of the 'vampire' in the text, 
arguing that The Tain constitutes a 'reformulation' of this 
figure compared to the 'traditional' Gothic and Romantic 
vampire. This is because, in psychoanalytic terms, the text 
relocates the 'core' of the figure's horrific presence from the 
oral drive to the scopic drive. The reason for this shift is 
related to the 'visual' materialisation of the screen in culture, 
which increases the opportunities for problems of vision as 
an effect of the proliferation of screens. The final section 
concludes by suggesting that The Tain must be read as a text 
depicting the subjective 'catastrophe' which follows the 
breakdown of the screen of fantasy. Only by 'reaffirming' the 
desire of the Other, by returning to narcissism, which for 
Lacan is connected to the ideality of the Other, can the world 
of The Tain be saved. Indeed, I suggest, there would be no 
possible ending otherwise. Likewise, the text informs us: 
without a proper understanding of desire, the proliferation of 
the screen invites the danger of becoming caught, not in the 
image like Narcissus himself, but by the excess which 
eternally threatens to overflow the image itself.
In psychoanalytic terms, narcissism defines a fantasy field by 
which objects are marked with a sort of mysterious and 
unique character which entices the subject, and appears to 
provoke desire and promise the fulfilment of love. In Freud, 
this is expressed in two senses: primary narcissism, which is 
a 'libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-
preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed 
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to every living creature'  and is expressed in becoming 92
subject; and secondary narcissism, which describes the 
object choice of the desiring subject, in other words the 
subject already constituted as such. Thus there are two 
narcissisms: the primary form which is common to all 
subjects, because it marks a period in which the infant is 
focused entirely on the satisfaction of bodily needs, and 
persists into adulthood, and the secondary form which arises 
only pathologically and denotes a 'disordered' relationship 
with the self and other objects. We can see how these two 
forms describe the process by which the subject constructs a 
fantasy which promises the gratification of an imaginary 
wholeness: they identify not only the classical self-love of 
Narcissus, but indeed a fundamental step in the process by 
which the desiring subject learns to experience love. The 
outcome is therefore that, as Lacan says, 'the field of love [...] 
[is] the framework of narcissism' (The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis 193). Narcissism, and by 
extension love, in this sense, does not consist in finding 
satisfaction in an image; rather, it locates that satisfaction in 
something that is supposed to exist beyond the image, an 
excess in which we fail to recognise the work of our own 
desire, or that which promises something beyond the self. 
Joan Copjec summarises the subjective outcome of this 
reading of narcissism: 
What one loves in one's image is something 
more than the image ("in you more than you"). 
Thus is narcissism the source of the 
malevolence with which the subject regards its 
 Sigmund Freud, 'On Narcissism: An Introduction' in The Standard Edition of the Complete 92
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the Psycho-
Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works ed. James Strachey (London: 
Vintage, 2001), 67-102 (73-74).
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image, the aggressivity it unleashes on all its 
own representations.
(Read My Desire 37)
In The Tain, we find a strangely literal example of this 
aggressivity of the self toward its representation. Its intertext 
is Borges' 'The Fauna of Mirrors’, the central conceit of which 
The Tain loosely adapts. In both texts there exist malevolent 
beings trapped in mirrors — our reflections, which are in fact 
autonomous entities, enslaved by our image and forced to 
represent us in the tain of the mirror. The narrative of The 
Tain concerns the aftermath of a war between humanity and 
these reflections, which are referred to as 'imagos'. We follow 
the protagonist, a man named Scholl, on a sort of picaresque 
across a bombed-out post-apocalyptic London, on his way to 
meet the 'Fish of the Mirror', a character established in the 
Borges story as leader of the imagos. Meanwhile, a 
secondary narrative intercuts, following the tale from the 
point of view of an imago with whom Scholl comes into 
contact. 
What is interesting about the novella is the way in which it 
depicts this aggressivity of the self and its representations. 
The antagonistic relationship between the self and the 
fantasy of representative image is rendered quite literally via 
the depiction of a city and populace which have become 
estranged from their own reflections (and disfigured by their 
lack thereof). Sholl explains that some inexplicable shift in 
physics linked to the presence of the imagos has rendered 
reflection impossible: 
'There is something called the Phong model, 
Sholl said. [...] It's a model to show how light 
moves. [...] The model used to describe how 
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light bounced off concrete and paper and 
metal and glass [...] But something happened, 
and now Phong describes a turning key. It 
used to be a sliding scale. [...] It's become a 
threshold.'93
This produces an elementary kind of denaturation of the city: 
'The streets were wet again. It was like a warning. London 
was never so alien as after the rain, its tarmac and slate 
turned into what would once have been mirrors' (The Tain 
253). The city in this sense becomes an externalisation of the 
processes which govern the subjective relationship with the 
image. The text confounds us, of course, by presenting this 
alien city which refuses to meet our expectations; indeed, the 
setting is quickly established in the text with the 
representation of a conjunction of geographical and 
architectural landmarks which appear to be marked by an 
odd relationship with light. We are introduced to Sholl, lying 
on the ground somewhere in the South Bank:
The puddle was directly below his face, and it 
was blank, as he had known it would be. 
He looked closer, until he could see faint 
patterns. A veil, the ghosts of colours and 
shapes moved across the thin skin of water: 
incomprehensible but not random, according 
to strange vagaries. 
The man stood and walked away. Behind him 
the sunlight hit the Thames. It did not scatter: 
it did not refract on the moving river into little 
stabs of light. It did other things.
 China Miéville, The Tain in Looking For Jake And Other Stories (London: Pan McMillan, 2005), 93
225-301 (246).
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(The Tain 228)
Then:
The man crossed the river. He stopped below 
the Grosvenor Bridge, and clambered up its 
girded underside. Where it should have been 
a curve of shadows, the bridge was 
punctured, broken by thick rays of light.
(The Tain 228)
What we encounter here is a kind of mystery regarding the 
interaction of light and object. It becomes apparent over the 
course of the novella that London has been destroyed, and 
Miéville delights in dreaming up new ways to present this 
destruction, from an immolated Kentish Town which 
perpetually smoulders in a 'transmirror pyrosis' (The Tain 
277) to 'the structure that now dwarfed the Brixton Prison. 
Jebb Ave. filled with something like cuckoo-spit. Funnel-tower 
still rising — threads snagging chimneys. Something inside 
moving' (The Tain 235), as Sholl's personal notes eerily 
announce. But this initial glimpse of Grosvenor Bridge and 
the Thames is enough to suggest to us that there is a 
disturbing discontinuity between object and vision in the text, 
that something else seems to interpose between the subject 
and object. The light does 'other things', and the Bridge, 
though we understand it has been wrecked by battle, 
appears to be destroyed in the moment at which we 
encounter it, pierced by the rays of light themselves.
In Lacanian terms, this mystery of light and object is 
expressed as the gaze, which locates this interposing object 
in the subjective experience of an externality of the gaze 
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itself. One of Lacan's key ideas is to situate the gaze on the 
side of the object rather than the side of the subject. The 
effect of this is to deprive us, as subjects, of a self-presumed 
mastery of our own grasping gaze, emphasising the fact that 
there is always a point in any picture from which we are first 
gazed upon, always a point (which Lacan described as a 
spot or stain) which disturbs our ability to observe the object 
from a safe, detached position. In other words: the gaze 
beholds us, we do not 'hold' the gaze. The odd status of light 
in the descriptions of the Thames and the Grosvenor Bridge 
above hint towards this kind of deprivation of scopic mastery 
in the sense that it depicts light as an object of unpredictable 
agency. The interesting thing about The Tain, therefore, is 
that London is presented as an alien, visually disturbing 
scene, not simply because there is something 'wrong' with 
the city itself, but because, prior to this, there is an 
interpolation which disturbs the subject's ability to 
comprehend that scene from a position of mastery. When 
Sholl and his group recount their stories of the point at which 
they first became aware of the mirror revolt, the 'moment the 
reflections went wrong' (The Tain 278), the common feature 
among their recollections is the disruption of the image. One 
man describes how 'I was all covered in shaving foam, and I 
look down to rinse it, and when I look up again my reflection 
was waiting for me. It hadn't looked down at all' (The Tain 
278), while another 
[...] had stood in front of the mirror in his 
morning nudity, and had seen aghast that 
where he was detumesced, his reflection was 
erect. [...] One woman told in a voice still 
hollow at the memory how she had spent long 
disbelieving minutes at breakfast looking at 
the mirror beside her husband and back at 
him, watching his reflection meet her eye — 
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not the eye of her reflection but her own eye 
— and mouth obscenities at her, calling her 
cunt cunt cunt while her husband read his 
paper, and now and then glanced up and 
smiled.
(The Tain 278)
The source of the horror of these moments stems from an 
uncanny sense of a kind of discontinuity between, on the one 
hand, the subject's position of phantasmatic mastery — in 
other words, the position through which everything I 'see' is 
mediated by that narcissistic (mirrored) screen of fantasy 
which defines the scope of my desire, and situates my gaze 
— and, on the other, the eruption of an uncontainable excess 
which marks the limits of that fantasy, which indeed reveals it 
as fantasy. If anxiety is, as Lacan suggests, the subject's 
reaction to the overproximity of that point of excess, in other 
words, is caused by the revelation of the Imaginary nature of 
the fantasy itself, then what we see here are the products of 
that fantasy becoming revealed as gaze. In each case, the 
subject performs an act of narcissistic intent. As the first man 
grooms himself, he looks up to find that his reflection already 
gazes upon him in the moment of the act itself (the Other 
already looks at us, we already perform such an action in the 
name of another anyway); the second man, in a reversal of 
the first, already gazes at himself, his reflection cannot look 
at him 'preemptively', but what he encounters in this moment 
of complete exposure and naked vulnerability is an obscene 
display of sexual arousal, the image permeated with 
excessive libidinal investment; the woman, in a further twist, 
gazes not at her own reflection but at that of her husband — 
the disturbing fact in this case is not that the reflection insults 
her, but that it insults her in his image, that it expresses an 
image which disturbs her fantasy of a loving, caring husband. 
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In each situation, we can see that the true source of the 
horror is not the supernatural nature of the incident itself, but 
instead is something closer to Žižek's humorous example of 
the gaze as object:
We all know the uncanny moments in our 
everyday lives when we catch sight of our own 
image and this image is not looking back at 
us. I myself remember once trying to inspect a 
strange growth on the side of my head using a 
double mirror, when, all of a sudden, I caught 
a glimpse of my face in profile. The image 
replicated all my gestures, but in a weird 
uncoordinated way.94
The reflection does not always act as we would expect it to, 
and the curious fact of The Tain is that the image is looking 
back at the subject, looking back in a 'weird uncoordinated' 
way which should not be possible according to narcissistic 
fantasy. 
This fantasy extends to the city, when we consider the rain-
slick surfaces of London: this film which coats the city 
disturbs us not because it is essentially alien in its non-
reflective state, but because it leaves no space for us to 
locate ourselves in the environment; that lack of space is the 
source of this experience of an 'alien' environment. In other 
words, the city is itself being structured by the fantasy screen 
of the subject. In this case, the London of The Tain should be 
properly described as an Other London: a London in which 
the bizarre horrors which appear all over the city are not 
transgressions, but actually the expression of a battle to 
maintain the central narcissistic fantasy of the subject. 'Other' 
 Slavoj Žižek, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Lacan (But Were Afraid to Ask 94
Hitchcock) (London: Verso, 2010), xi.
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in this sense refers precisely to Lacan's big Other, the 
symbolic third term imposed by language, the one that 
always intervenes in ‘communication’ between subject and 
other. The Other is the one to whom I address myself, the 
agent which imposes the law of social interaction. By Other 
London, therefore, we refer to the city not as a minimally 
distinct term, but conversely as a space which is inherently 
familiar, precisely because of the narcissistic bonds of 
fantasy which structure subjectivity. That is how the return of 
narcissism marks the space of this Other London: by 
producing a version of London which initially appears as 
fantasy (in the most generic sense of the word), The Tain 
actually depicts a city space which is a fantasy in the most 
precisely psychoanalytic sense. It reveals those basic 
coordinates which structure desire, those narcissistic 
impulses which form part of the answer to the question 'what 
am I for another?' In this case, the city is opaque screen, like 
the non-reflective mirror which coats its surface in the text, 
upon which narcissistic desire is projected.
The 'objects' of reflection, the imagos, assume three 
seemingly opposed, and yet interlinked forms in the text. On 
the one hand they exist as disembodied features (floating 
hands, eyes, lips, and so forth — the Freudian 'partial object' 
rendered par excellence); on the other hand, they are 
'vampires [...] the most comprehensible of the imagos' (The 
Tain 247), which are degraded reflections of human figures 
which paradoxically cast no reflection in the mirror; and 
finally, they 'appear' as amorphous 'things' which flit beyond 
vision: 'Something moved away from him, up the wall, in a 
lizard motion not quite like anything Sholl had ever seen. [...] 
This close to Hamsptead's heart, the fauna of mirrors were 
playing' (The Tain 253). This bizarre taxonomy in effect 
materialises the Lacanian triad of Imaginary, Symbolic, and 
Real. The disembodied partial objects are Imaginary, they 
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materialise the image devoid of substance, other than it 
appears as such for the subject: 'For centuries they had been 
spawned in thousands, little resonances of reflection, shed 
by passion in makeup compacts, dresser mirror triptychs, 
glazed gym walls' (The Tain 254). They are the image of the 
object which has been 'decoupled' from the body, 'existing' as 
such irrespective of the Symbolic semblance of order. The 
'vampires', meanwhile, exist as pure Symbolic terms; they 
appear as 'total' objects, or, in other words, they 'objectivise' 
the reflection of the subject, existing without the 'bar' of 
subjectivity: 'Each vampire concentrated, moving in its own 
shuffling path, tracing repeating patterns with autistic 
precision, ignoring its siblings completely. The vampires 
muttered to themselves.' (The Tain 255). The vampires 
appear human, but, as we shall expand upon shortly, contain 
an 'excess' of subjectivity owing to their apparent lack of lack. 
They 'miss' the very thing which is missing in us, because 
they appear to contain the object itself, appear to be 
complete and 'recoupled' with that object. It is for this reason 
that they appear doomed to trace their own path according to 
an incomprehensible pattern in the passage above, and why 
they mutter only to themselves: they appear as pure symbol, 
beyond intersubjective relation. Finally, the amorphous 
'things' represent the irruption of the Real, the not-quite-
containable excess which threatens the stability of the other 
terms and appears to arise because of the very fact of their 
existence: 'Way overhead, just below cloud, a sudden point 
of focus came into clarity and was gone. An imago, a full 
imago, in its own barely perceivable form' (The Tain 255). 
The interrelationship between all three registers is 
characterised very well by the text in the sense that each 
object manifests the 'comprehensibility' of that register. While 
the partial objects are 'instinctual' creatures with no apparent 
subjectivity (the sky is filled with 'doves', for example: 'They 
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were not birds. The flock did not move in avian curves, but 
spastically, changing speed and direction more suddenly 
than birds could ever manage. [...] They were animals, 
scavengers. [...] Each dove was a pair of crossed human 
hands, linked by thumbs' (The Tain 229-30)), the vampires 
are 'trapped' in the form of the subject, 'trapped in their prison 
uniforms' (The Tain 282) and unable to escape: they 
emphasise the crux of the subject, which only becomes 
subject by 'trapping' itself in, or rather becoming trapped by 
language. 'Beyond' this, however, is the insistent dimension 
of the Real, 'in its own barely perceivable form', which 
assumes no form other than that which is not Imaginary or 
Symbolic. It might be said to be that which 'surmounts' those 
terms if it were at all possible to articulate itself without them. 
We also understand the sense in which each term relies on 
its relationship with the other in order to constitute itself, and 
the way that each term disrupts the boundaries of the other 
in this relationship precisely in order to maintain those 
boundaries. The figure of the vampire, for example, 
demonstrates the disintegration of the subject in the pure fact 
of its Symbolic constitution: the only way to constitute the 
subject thus is to account for the impossibility of a total 
symbol, or in other words to admit the destabilisation of the 
Symbolic by Real; thus, by 'adding' the object of the Real to 
its being, the vampire becomes that which can only ever 
escape the subject. It becomes the very thing that the subject 
is not, in constituting itself as subject, by positing the 
'recoupling' of the subject and the imaginary lost object. It is 
this very point of 'recoupling' which the screen of fantasy, 
which the lure of narcissism, protects the subject against. 
Why? Because that recoupling can never occur: it can only 
reveal the traumatic 'lack', the irruptive point of the Real 
which allows the subject to constitute itself in the 'first place'. 
The 'vampires' of The Tain, therefore, warrant further 
investigation.
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When Sholl decides to attack a swarm of vampires in 
Hampstead Underground Station in order to gain information 
concerning the location of the Fish of the Mirror, their 
unprecedented proximity presents him with the opportunity to 
experience at first hand the disturbing fact of the deformation 
of the image: 
In the frozen moment of light Sholl saw the 
faces of the crowd. They loomed over him and 
his dazed attacker. So far as he could read 
emotion in those faces, faces that wore 
human features without facility or empathy, 
they looked stricken. Discomposed and 
desperate.
(The Tain 263)
The vampire imagos (which are also referred to in the text as 
'patchogues') materialise the very notion of the third term to 
which, as Žižek says, we are repeatedly referred by popular 
culture:
The mention of the 'living dead' is by no 
means accidental here: in our ordinary 
language, we resort to indefinite judgements 
precisely when we endeavour to comprehend 
those borderline phenomena that undermine 
established differences such as that between 
living and being dead. In the texts of popular 
culture, the uncanny creatures that are neither 
alive nor dead, the 'living dead' (vampires, 
etc.), are referred to as 'the undead': although 
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they are not dead, they are clearly not alive 
like us ordinary mortals.  95
This formal 'third' is a position which reappears throughout 
Lacan, as the term which disturbs the Imaginary coherence 
of a stable, 'wholesome' duality: we find it reformulated in the 
discourse of the Other, objet a, language, and the Real, 
among other figures (and of course it is canonised in 
psychoanalytic theory with the Oedipal triangle). This third 
term in Lacan is something which exists for the subject 
beyond or prior to the intersubjective relation. The source of 
its radical alterity stems from the fact that it must already 
escape that duality in order to introduce disruption. 
What is interesting about the 'vampires' of The Tain is that 
they are so named purely because of their relationship to 
image. The text implicitly suggests that the popular idea of 
the fictional vampire originates with the patchogue, and this 
modification of the figure of the vampire is indicative of the 
text's representation of the subjective experience of the 
screen:
Mirrors betray us. When we came through, we 
murdered those whose bodies had bound us, 
and there was no one among our tormented 
comrades left behind in our place, no one 
forced to mimic us from beyond the glass, as 
we had mimicked you. There was nothing in 
the tain made to take our shapes: we were 
invisible in the mirror, we had no reflections. 
When you saw that, you screamed, and called 
 Slavoj Žižek, 'A Hair of the Dog That Bit You' in Lacan's Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure 95
and Society, ed. Mark Bracher et al (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 46-73 (62). 
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us things. We are the patchogues: that is our 
name. But you called us vampires.
(The Tain 251) 
Sholl's experience of the 'faces that wore human features 
without facility' can therefore be read as the experience of 
the collapse or disintegration of the screen of fantasy in the 
face of the irruption of the Real. Something monstrous 
appears to 'animate' this excess in the image, bursting 
literally out of the screen: it is akin to the 'life instinct' which 
Lacan designates with the name 'lamella', which we will 
return to shortly. Sholl is unable to project his narcissistic 
fantasy upon the object itself, unable to screen the traumatic 
alterity which marks the vampires from the humans, from 'us 
ordinary mortals' caught up in the consensual fantasy in 
which our common terms are the representation of life and 
death. The vampires are the images of the dead; the 
condition of their 'birth' is that they murder and supplant the 
living 'original' of their image. This process is described by 
the imago as 'murder, a coming through. You would not 
withstand us, [...] staring up dumb as your own faces came 
for you, your own arms crooked and pushing through the 
mirror' (The Tain 249). Interestingly, therefore, the disturbing 
fact of the vampiric figure consists in the manner in which the 
text modifies that classic representation of the oral drive, and 
relocates the figure under the vicissitudes of the scopic drive. 
As Lacan says:
Let us turn to the oral drive. What is it? One 
speaks of phantasies of devouring, of being 
gobbled up. [...] Since we refer to the infant 
and the breast, and since suckling is sucking, 
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let us say that the oral drive is getting sucked, 
it is the vampire.
Indeed, this throws some light on that singular 
object — which I am trying to unstick in your 
minds from the food metaphor — the breast. 
The breast is also something superimposed 
[...] Thus we see clearly enough, at this level, 
the nature of the subject's claim to something 
that is separated from him, but belongs to him 
and which he needs to complete himself.
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 195)
The 'vampires' of The Tain do not produce horror for us at the 
level of the oral drive. To be sure, there appears to be 
something of 'a sucking' occurring in the text, in the sense 
that the vampires seem to draw from the 'life-essence' of 
those they murder in order to constitute themselves. The 
connection between the dead body and its own murderous 
image is made in the 'arms crooked and pushing through the 
mirror', a bizarre vanishing-point in which the body meets 
and is swallowed by its reflection. The vampires 'devour' their 
prey, but in a highly figurative manner; there is no visceral 
feast of blood. Instead it is a feasting of the image upon 
body. The vampires therefore more clearly seem to disturb at 
the level of the scopic drive, introducing a disturbing excess 
to the image themselves, not because of their additional 
'presence' animating the image, in other words as being 
where they should not, but precisely because they add 
nothing other than that which escapes representation. The 
moment at which the subject is caught 'staring up dumb' as 
its own face lunges toward it is the moment of gaze at its 
most formally distinct. It is the point at which I am put into the 
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picture, the point at which the picture-frame defines my own 
position prior to the moment that I can master it with my own 
grasping vision; as such, it deprives me of my position of 
subjective mastery. In The Tain, this deprivation is total: the 
vampires reify the experience of the objective gaze in a 
manner which appears to circumvent the transfer of blood, 
the obscene version of the sucking action of the oral drive. 
The gaze as object appears, for the subject staring dumbly at 
his or her own reflection, on the side of the vampire, with the 
vampire — in the vampire. The screen of fantasy breaks 
down at that moment; the mirror literally shatters as the 
vampire 'leaves' the tain, murdering the subject:
Coming through the mirror was a one-way trip: 
we broke the glass as we passed. We 
showered those whose forms were our 
prisons with jagged splinters as we arrived, so 
that they were bleeding and crying out before 
we touched them.
(The Tain 283-4)
The vampires, therefore, are terrifying prior to their objective 
effects. In other words, that which is in them which produces 
the effect of horror does so already, before the vampire 
becomes the object of the drive. The explanation for this is to 
be found in the partial object, the object which we figure as 
'decoupled' from ourselves, the return of which to our body 
we suppose will satisfy our desire, will figure us as 'whole 
again'. As Copjec says, reading Lacan, the vampire occupies 
a position in relation to this object, objet a, in which it 
functions as an objectivisation of the very lack of objectivity. It 
is the lack of a lack, which in itself suddenly closes the 
presumed 'distance' between subject and object. There is no 
simple 'proximity' to this object; instead, it is its overproximity 
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which provokes the subject's anxiety and calls forth the 
experience of an insistent trauma : 96
The danger that anxiety signals is the 
overproximity of this object a, this object so 
inalienable that like Dracula and all the other 
vampires of Gothic and Romantic fiction it 
cannot even be cast as a shadow or reflected 
as a mirror image, and yet so insubstantial 
that like Murnau's Nosferatu it can appear in a 
puff of smoke.
(Read My Desire 119)
As we can see, thinking of the vampire-as-object's relation to 
the oral and scopic drive, The Tain's advance on the 
'traditional' vampire of Gothic and Romantic fiction is that it 
abrogates the 'role' of the oral drive in the textual production 
of horror in order to directly materialise the vampire as a 
figure whose 'power' is manifested in the disturbance of the 
scopic drive. It describes this inability, the inability to be 
exchanged as object of gaze, as the source of the vampire's 
uncanniness. This seems to represent a particularly novel 
twist to the formula when we consider that Copjec's reading 
of the partial object and the vampire oddly neglects to 
consider precisely those examples mentioned above, in 
which Dracula, Nosferatu, and others embody the disturbing 
appearance of the gaze itself, the gaze-as-object, in favour of 
analysing the primal object of the oral relation: the breast. 
She notes that vampirism constitutes a troubling disruption to 
the comforting image of the child suckling at the breast, and 
continues:
 See chapter 5 for a discussion of the ‘insistent level’ of trauma in Lacan.96
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[...] it is not the child who is the vampire. The 
image of the child at the mother's breast is not 
one that elicits anxiety. Vampirism is located 
beyond this point where the child maintains 
itself in relation to a partial object, an object of 
desire. It is only at the point where the fantasy 
enabling this relation to the partial object no 
longer holds that the anxiety-ridden 
phenomenon of vampirism takes over, 
signalling, then, the drying up of the breast as 
object-cause of desire, the disappearance of 
the fantasy support of desire. The drying up of 
desire is the danger against which vampirism 
warns us [...]
(Read My Desire 128)
The vampire thus confronts us, at a point of discomfiting 
overproximity, with the end of our fantasy relation to the 
partial object. It demonstrates the disappearance of that 
object in our approach toward it, and the consequence of the 
failure of its metonymical displacement onto another suitable 
object. If we are 'stuck' without another object of desire, in 
other words unable to transubstantiate the successive object 
of desire, what do we find when we confront that which 
appears to contain the object itself? In this case, the vampire 
demonstrates the consequence of the possession of the 
partial object: it contains the partial object 'within' itself, 
placing the object in a position whereby it retains 'access' to 
the object, and doubles the subject in desiring the object 
itself. The 'traditional' vampire therefore retains an oral 
jouissance; it alone experiences the possibility of a total 
relation to the breast (as it draws blood from the victim, as it 
sucks). It also, as Copjec says, noting the episode of Dracula 
in which Mina Harker drinks blood from Dracula's breast, 
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offers the possibility of a return to oral jouissance to the 
subject: 'Desire, society itself, is endangered by Mina's 
intimacy with this extimate object' (Read My Desire 129).
What I take Copjec to mean by this (that 'society itself is 
endangered by Mina's intimacy with objet a) is that, as I have 
suggested, the bonds of fantasy must be understood as the 
form of a superstructure within which the subject experiences 
'reality'. Fantasy is unique for each subject, and yet the 
experience of fantasy is consensual. To be confronted with 
the overproximity of the object-cause of desire, objet a, can 
only produce a destabilising effect for the subject: we 
experience anxiety, suffer trauma, and, if we are unable to 
'return' the object to its 'rightful' position,  we reach the point 97
of subjective dissolution. The 'proper' function of society itself 
depends upon the locus of desire, because it is the locus of 
desire which determines the coordinates of our fantasy. To 
threaten the consistency of our desire is to threaten the 
consensual experience of fantasy; and, without the screen to 
function as a kind of master signifier of the negotiation 
between the social fantasy and the destitute subject, no 
consistency of social relation is possible.  98
Thinking of The Tain, we can see why the 'revision' to the 
figure of the vampire in the text (that is, the reorientation of 
the vampire around scopic rather than oral relation and the 
consequent re-theorisation of the precise source of horror) is 
so important: it gestures toward the fact that the text is 
dealing with the manifold expression of the screen in culture, 
and the overwhelming experience of the screen as a visual 
 This 'rightful' position is, paradoxically, the position that is as far removed from ourselves as it 97
takes to convince us that the object occupies, once again, the position towards which we must 
move.
 It must be noted that the organisational role of this master signifier is dependent upon the screen 98
actually existing in the form which makes it possible to understand this negotiating role, which is 
why, I suggest, the screen precisely becomes more nakedly visible as an 'important' object now.
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artefact or concern. In the same way that Dracula 
problematises the oral relation to the partial object in the 
figure of the vampire (and Copjec is very shrewd in her 
reading of Dracula in light of the eighteenth century debate 
over breast-feeding advocacy), The Tain problematises the 
scopic relation to the partial object in the guise of the same 
figure. Near the conclusion of the story, we encounter a twist: 
the imago narrator of the secondary narrative reveals himself 
as human. This twist at first appears to confuse certain 
sections of the story, rather than surprise the reader and 
clarify some preceding mystery of the text in the same 
measure, as a well-deployed twist should. It leaves us with 
questions rather than answers. How exactly can a human 
interact with the imagos? Why didn't the imagos murder him 
or her immediately? How can a human return 'through' the 
tain, as the imago narrator does in the conclusion of that 
section of the novella? There are no answers to these 
questions as such. In the narrative they remain unexplained: 
they constitute part of the explanandum of the text. Where 
this twist does lead us, however, is towards that explanans in 
which the question of the subjective experience of the screen 
really structures the text. The revelatory power of this twist 
lies in the fact that the imago narrator murders his or her own 
reflection:
The glass of the mirror ruptured, tearing apart 
my face, when the patchogue burst out of the 
tain, but I was very quick. I met it, my own 
snarling face. I wasn't subdued or driven out 
of my mind by it. I had never trusted that 
image anyway. That was why it found me 
where it did, in the toilet of a hospital, near my 
ward of melancholics and hysterics.
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(The Tain 293)
This passage renders very clearly the difference between the 
vampire of Gothic and Romantic fiction discussed by Copjec, 
and the vampires depicted in The Tain; this vampire is figured 
as an object of horror because it retains a relationship with 
the object of the scopic drive, the gaze. In this way, however, 
it also indicates that the text is concerned with the cultural 
effects of the screen. The disclosure of the imago's location 
in a hospital ward for sufferers of mental illness, along with 
his or her confession of distrust in the image, suggests that 
the refusal to enter into the narcissistic fantasy places the 
subject at odds both with society and with him- or herself. 
The irony expressed in the text is that the subject's mistrust 
of image is justified, and that the social 'mechanism' which 
places the narrator into the hospital in the first place is 
flawed. A further layer of irony is evident, however, when we 
consider that the fellow patients in the ward are 'melancholics 
and hysterics’. In this case, the suggestion is that the 
narrator is subject to a misdiagnosis owing to a medical 
failure to understand his or her symptom, since these 
obsolete terms refer to a range of disorders which are now 
more precisely diagnosed otherwise. 
The narrator notes that he or she has 'lived a long time':
Maybe it's our imagos that kill us. Even 
trapped in mimicry, maybe their hatred 
reached past the glass and slowly throttled us, 
after our scores of years and ten. Only I killed 
mine, so I kept not dying. I've lived a long 
time, alone. For years, and years, not knowing 
what I was, more afraid of you all than I'd ever 
been before [...]
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(The Tain 293-4)
The mention of 'melancholics and hysterics', therefore, does 
not simply bolster the diegetic reality of the text, in which the 
narrator has supposedly lived beyond a normal human 
lifespan. It also signals that the narrator's psychotic disorder 
identifies, to modify Copjec's phrase, a saturation of the gaze 
as the object-cause of desire. Rather than the disappearance 
of the fantasy-support for desire, the vampire in The Tain 
materialises the failure of the fantasy-support for desire, by 
drawing the obvious parallel between the immaterial screen 
which structures this fantasy-support and the symbolic 
breaking or clouding of the mirror, a screen which fails to 
contain the irruption of the gaze. As Antonio Quintet says, 
'The function of the screen is to erase the gaze from the 
world, from the world's show, from the Other as reality' : 99
For neurotics the gaze as an object has no 
consistency, no substance. It does not appear; 
it cannot be seen. But for psychotics, the gaze 
can sometimes be felt and seen because the 
screen fails [...] In psychosis, there is 
something that shows the subject that the 
object is not lost.
('The Gaze as an Object' 145)
The narrator experiences a saturation of the gaze in the 
object itself: he or she recognises the failure of the screen, in 
which the gaze cannot be 'erased' from the world. The 
narrator finds in the image of the reflection that very excess 
 Antonio Quintet, 'The Gaze as an Object' in Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental 99
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Richard Feldstein et al (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1995), 139-147 
[144].
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marked by the presence of the object-cause of desire, and 
cannot escape its Symbolic appearance. It is for this reason 
that he or she says that 'I wasn't subdued or driven out of my 
mind by it'. The narrator anticipates the debilitating irruption 
of the gaze, and it is this very experience which is 
symbolised by the figure of the vampire in the text. The 
failure of the screen therefore results in what Quintet calls 'a 
disorganisation of the visual field' ('The Gaze as an Object' 
145): The Tain presents the thesis that the locus of fantasy 
constructs a social relation involving the denial of a non-
narcissistic mode of subjectivity. Only by obeying that 
narcissistic impulse, by trusting that image anyway, in 
contrast to the imago-narrator, can we hope to escape the 
irruption of the gaze, which is symbolised in the text by the 
literal eruption of the object marked by the excess contained 
within itself more than itself. In this sense the vampire 
embodies the peril of the 'decoupled' object with respect to 
the cultural proliferation of the screen. In other words, the 
more we encounter the screen, the more the object threatens 
to burst forth.
We must therefore conceive of the role of narcissism in a 
'constructive' sense. This is in opposition to M. John 
Harrison's suggestion, however, that the shattered mirror in 
The Tain disrupts this experience of this constitutive 
narcissism:
The mirror has always been a maximum 
venue for artistic outrages, aimed like 
weapons at the everyday. Look at The Picture 
of Dorian Gray which is so clearly not a 
painting but the denied or unconsulted mirror 
(or at Will Self, his very name a component of 
the mirror duality, recycling Dorian in the 
contemporary attempt to squeeze out some 
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further uncanny truth). Look at Egon Schiele, 
chained to his own image, sly, gesturing, full of 
sex or something other than sex. Who’s that 
glinting at the corner of his eye? Some twist of 
light, something that lives in the mirror? The 
act of electing something else to be opposite 
to you, so that you can claim to be self to its 
other, is central to the human way of doing 
business. What if, in its most familiar moment, 
this idea was shattered? 
(The Tain (2002) 4) 
Is it not the case that the text functions, in fact, in the 
opposite manner? In other words, by interrogating the 
apparent stability of the imaginary duality which sustains this 
fantasy of 'equal' opposition between self and other, does the 
text not alert us even further to the constitutive interplay 
between the levels of Imaginary ideality and Real irruption 
which forever intrude upon the subjective experience of the 
Symbolic realm? The text does not expose a disjunction 
between a 'pure' subject and a narcissistic, compromised 
one. Instead it situates the subject at the intersection of that 
narcissistic process of screen-relation — a relationship which 
already straddles the subject. As Mark Bould notes, the text 
implicitly draws a connection between the rise of a culture in 
which screen-engagement proliferates, and the production of 
that torturous fact of subjective disruption, the encounter with 
the stain of the Real: 
[…] their tortured distortions have escalated 
with the rise of commerce and capitalism 
since the Renaissance as mirrors, and 
mirrored surfaces became increasingly 
common. [The Tain models] a world driven by 
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forces beyond control or comprehension, and 
figure[s] paranoia as the mode of subjectivity 
under capital.  100
The question of control (or the lack of it) is, as Bould 
suggests, a major question posed by the text. The answer to 
this question is the possibility of properly engaging with the 
screen, or, in other words, the proper construction of the 
screen of fantasy. Fredric Jameson, in The Geopolitical 
Aesthetic, astutely defines the relationship between the 
subject, screen, and the cultural 'mode': ‘The social totality 
can be sensed, as it were, from the outside, like a skin at 
which the Other somehow looks, but which we ourselves will 
never see.’  Jameson’s invocation of the Other draws our 101
attention to the impossibility of any attempt to reconstruct a 
liminal version of ‘social totality’. The interesting thing, 
however, is the way in which Jameson’s metaphor of organic 
interaction (literally: the processual and cognitive interaction 
between the organs of the skin and the eye) traces the action 
of the ‘embodiment’ of space in these screens. ‘Interaction’ is 
the correct way to characterise this relationship because the 
metaphor implicates the skin itself as an active participant in 
the process. The ability to ‘sense’ this skin of the social 
totality only becomes available, is only possible when it is 
viewed by the Other and thus, in Lacanian terms, is 
designated as an object, is itself 'objectivised'. The cognitive 
force binding these senses, of object and subject, constructs 
the relation without physical sensation. The subject 
experiences the social totality via the screen at the level of 
the Real.
 Mark Bould, 'Mind the Gap: The Impertinent Predicates (and Subjects) of King Rat and100
Looking for Jake and Other Stories' Extrapolation, 50: 2 (2009), 307–25 (312).
 Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System 101
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana UP, 1992) 114.
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The work of idealisation is therefore to be conceived in strict 
relation to a narcissistic desire, and this relationship defines 
the position of the screen for the subject.  In Lacan, the 102
thought of this process of narcissistic idealisation appears 
most famously in his seminar on the ethics of 
psychoanalysis, in which he discusses courtly love poetry. In 
the seminar, Lacan overturns the classical notion of the Lady 
as sublime object, emphasising that her character as 
depicted by the poet is the result of a narcissistic projection 
which is exactly intended to obscure her radical Otherness: 
'In this poetic field the feminine object is emptied of all real 
substance’ (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 184). This 
formulation goes some way towards enabling us to pick 
 What role does narcissism play in the formation of the screen of fantasy? Per Julia Kristeva: 'It 102
might seem excessive to grant Narcissus such a crucial part in the history of western subjectivity, 
hypostatizing the function of reflection and, on the basis of its narcissistic failure, setting in motion 
the internalization of reflection in order to transform Platonic ideality into speculative internality. [...] 
Narcissus, however, appeals to us, and he is essential as a source of western subjectivism [...] In 
short, there is infantilism and perversion on the brim of western internality.' (Julia Kristeva, Tales of 
Love trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia UP, 1987), 115.) What Kristeva does here is not 
simply to hypostatise the function of reflection in the Narcissus myth, but indeed to hypostatise the 
Freudian model of narcissism in a historicist reading of Narcissus. The 'narcissistic failure' of 
reflection describes, in Freud, the end of the developmental state in which libido and ego exist 
before separation, interrupted by the onset of oedipal anxiety; in other words, it is the point at 
which the subject learns that the sense of ontogenetic wholeness which arises from the 
conjunction of the satisfaction of drives and the apparent satisfaction of the mother's desire (in the 
body of the infant, in the infant's needs) is only imaginary. The transformation of ideality into 
'speculative internality' marks the repression of 'primary' narcissism, the very process by which 
narcissism can become divided into a 'primary' and therefore also ‘secondary' mode in the first 
place, by the formation of an ego founded upon, as Kristeva says, the 'not I' (Tales of Love 41) of 
the Other: if I am not what the Other wants, then perhaps I may yet become so. It is this turn to the 
Other which allows 'infantilism and perversion' to persist at the outset of subjectivity. The point is 
clear, nevertheless: narcissism 'protects emptiness, causes it to exist, and thus, as a lining of that 
emptiness, insures an elementary separation' (Tales of Love 24); Kristeva calls narcissism 'a 
screen for emptiness' (Tales of Love 21) but warns against understanding it simply 'as 
undecomposable, unanalyzable screen', for this would crystallise narcissism as an explanatory 
pre-egotic stage, produce 'a narcissism that thus finds itself recognised and renewed' (Tales of 
Love 44) rather than reveal it to be a radical process which works to structure the ego ideal of the 
subject. What Kristeva contends, therefore, is that this narcissistic process initially occludes the 
formative subject's experience of emptiness, before it must project that emptiness as part of the 
movement towards an object-oriented desire. Narcissism, therefore, performs precisely the work of 
the screen, and this screen is far from 'undecomposable' as Kristeva warns against. For Kristeva, 
the 'positive' mark of the unary trait cannot account for the narcissistic 'process', stripping from it 
the field of desire. But in characterising the unary trait as a 'captifying and unifying feature' (Tales of 
Love 37), Kristeva appears to neglect the intrinsic division which marks it already in Lacan. For 
more, see The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (141).
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through the threads which tie the subject to 'culture' and 
which we find at play in The Tain, especially when Lacan 
adds that, 'By means of a form of sublimation specific to art, 
poetic creation consists in positing an object I can only 
describe as terrifying, an inhuman partner.' (The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis 185). The terrifying, inhuman partner which 
we may call the Other (in the guise of das Ding) is terrifying 
precisely because we are tied to it, tethered by something 
which emphasises at every point our own estrangement from 
ourselves: language, which must always transform the need 
of the subject into need addressed to another. To be at the 
mercy of another (the Other) that I cannot know, whose 
requests are alien to me, whose demands appear cruel and 
unfathomable, I must always resort to the narcissistic screen 
which will protect me from the full disclosure of that fact. The 
traumatic dimension of the Lady here is the dimension of the 
Freudian 'Thing', das Ding. Žižek calls it 'the hard kernel that 
resists symbolization',  but such terms fail to emphasise the 103
fact that the Real does not already exist in a form which 
prevents symbolisation, but rather is detectable only as we 
encounter the gaps in the Symbolic system which alert us to 
it. In this sense, the Thing appears in The Tain in each object 
which appears to demand something of Sholl in the act of 
viewing it; but the logic of the 'hard kernel of the real' is most 
clearly represented by the imago 'thing', the 'pure imago' 
which sheds the fetters of reflective logic:
Twice they saw imagos: once a thing that 
momentarily took a form reminiscent of a flock 
of birds; the other a glowering point of 
precision on the ground. The birds-thing 
watched them, unafraid but uninterested, from 
the end of a long crescent, before stalking 
 Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment (London: Verso, 1994), 90.103
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away with childish, clumsy steps. The other 
circled them (they scouring the ground 
frantically to watch it, trying to track the spot 
where they could see too clearly), coming 
closer in a predatory motion.
(The Tain 278) 
Here the imagos materialise, as patterns of light, the basic 
divide which marks subject and object, the divide which itself 
marks the barred subject; the Thing is traumatic precisely 
because, in its pure objectivity, it is too complete.  It is too 104
much 'itself', completely self-present, and unknowable 
because of that. It is raised to a level of 'dignity' purely 
because it can never be ‘touched’. The disinterest of the 
 According to Žižek there is a 'cold, neutral' screen which appears to precede the Thing at the 104
level of any surface of narcissistic projection and subjective production: ‘[...] where does that empty 
surface come from, that cold, neutral screen which opens up the space for possible projections? 
That is to say, if men are to project on to the mirror their narcissistic ideal, the mute mirror surface 
must already be there. This surface functions as a kind of 'black hole' in reality, as a limit whose 
Beyond is inaccessible’ (The Metastases of Enjoyment 152). Žižek’s suggestion that the surface 
functions as a 'black hole' in reality indicates that what he is describing is the irruption of the Real: 
the Lady as Thing occupies the place of the impossible object of desire, the missing term which the 
symbolic system must produce in order to become organised for the subject. Therefore the screen 
which precedes her is produced by that same real space, and is only another point of deferral 
structuring the possibility of the subject's own constitution. In other words, by maintaining the 
delusion of the necessity of pursuing this object, we maintain our subjective stability. This does not 
answer Žižek's question, however, because it does not explain the appearance of the screen itself. 
As such, we can read the question in two ways: in one sense, the sense which Žižek answers, we 
can say that the 'empty surface' proceeds from the irruption of the Real, the experience of which is 
an irreducible fact of subjective constitution. In another sense, however, we can say that the 'empty 
surface', the form of the empty surface itself, as in its appearance as screen, appears only 
mysteriously. In other words, nothing suggests that the neutral screen need appear to us as such, 
and yet it does. Why? Because it is for that very reason that we reserve an understanding of the 
screen function. It is theorised in Lacan already as the ‘limit’ (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 186), 
as that which mobilises the experience of a limit against which the subject defines the very 
possibility of exclusion and representation of space. But it organises this experience by producing 
the space for, as Žižek says, a 'Beyond which is inaccessible'. This does not mean, of course, that 
there is no 'behind' the screen: just that there is nothing beyond it. After all, the process of 
exclusion is as intrinsic to this function of the 'cold, neutral screen' as the narcissistic projection 
which masks the inaccessible Beyond. Without both functions occurring simultaneously, there is no 
possible production of the subject, no orientation of desire towards the occluded space Beyond, no 
development of the ego-ideal, no process of sublimation which succeeds in orienting the subject in 
relation to both the ego-ideal and his or her shadowy desire itself — iterations of the Symbolic and 
the Real respectively, in other words. 
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imagos signals this detachment from the Symbolic law which 
fails to contain them anyway. The text represents this strange 
object in two ways. Firstly, the 'birds-thing' is signified by a 
conjunction of plural and singular noun. The horror of this 
jarring conjunction stems not from the fact that it signifies 
something unimaginable or excessive, but from the fact that 
it 'is' a complete object in spite of our inability to represent it 
as such in language. Its 'childish, clumsy steps' are not the 
fact of mere anthropomorphic horror, therefore, but instead 
the contingent, provisional 'translation' of the object's 
presence in the narcissistic screen of the subject. Because of 
this, the 'step' is only minimally comprehensible to us; we 
understand the act, but cannot comprehend the moment at 
which it occurs. In the second sense, the 'point of precision' 
depicts the point at which the screen breaks down. The Thing 
is so much itself, so totally complete at the point of its own 
irruption in the symbolic system, that to attempt to catch it is 
only an articulation of the failure to do so. It appears, not as a 
point of light, but as a point of 'glowering precision', 
'predatory' in its movement, and yet unintuitable as an object. 
We understand that it is Scholl as the focalising character 
who is describing the object in these terms, that it is his 
desperate projection of an emotional or instinctual intent 
which 'animates' the point, rather than the narrator. The 
narrator cannot attribute this intent to the object without 
access to the narcissistic screen which determines the 
arbitrary 'reason' for the impossibility of interaction between 
subject and object; in other words, it is only once the 
traumatic character can be screened by the subject — in 
other words, collocated with the screen by the subject — that 
it can be presented as such.
Therefore, the 'decoupled' object, that which has 'gone 
missing' in our fantasy, the return of which will signal the 
closing of the 'gap' of subjectivity, is screened by The Tain. It 
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is for this reason that Sholl, in his trip through Hampstead 
Underground Station, encounters a new kind of vermin which 
has replaced rats and pigeons:
Through the shadows Sholl saw that the 
station itself thronged with them, and they split 
into the open air, foraging in the ruins.
[...] Like rats in trenches, they were 
overrunning. For centuries they had been 
spawned in thousands, little resonances of 
reflection, shed by passion in makeup 
compacts, dresser mirror triptychs, glazed 
gym walls. Imago spoor, they had lived 
fleetingly and been destroyed within moments, 
an endless pell-mell life cycle. But when 
reflection became a door they were set free; 
they could live. They could breed. They were 
the detritus of reflection. Vanity's castoffs, the 
snippets of human forms thrown up and 
ignored in the echoes between mirrors.
Human hands clutched and unclutched along 
the gutter. [...] Up the hill, Sholl saw a 
mouldering human corpse. Several of the 
hands picked their way across it with fingertip 
grace, and settled on its flesh, lowering 
themselves and gnawing at it with their nails. 
[...]
(The Tain 254)
The horrifying scene continues as we encounter 'little clouds 
of colour-smeared lips like plump butterflies, that ebbed 
through the air, each motion with the exaggerated kiss-pout 
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of someone applying lipstick. Eyes, human eyes, spasmed 
into existence [...] winking stupidly as they went. There were 
teeth in big horse-grins [...] a biceps clenched and 
unclenched through the centre of the junction [...] hair 
drooled from windowsills, billowing, against the wind' (The 
Tain 255). These disembodied products of narcissistic desire 
gradually consume the city, their 'presence' oddly 
disconnected from Sholl's own. The scene plays out in a 
manner reminiscent of a nature documentary, with Sholl in 
the position of detached observer of 'wildlife'. The power of 
the scene stems from the fact that it would be more proper to 
describe the teeming vermin as wild life, in other words, life 
revealed at its most 'wild', amorphous, unrepresentable point, 
in spite of the fact that it appears directly 'cast off' from the 
human form itself. It is this 'animating factor' which Lacan 
describes with the lamella, this 'pure life instinct', or 'libido as 
organ' which escapes us precisely because it is that part of 
ourselves which must be cast off when we become subject. 
Lacan's description of the 'myth' of the lamella is often 
quoted, but it bears repeating here:
The lamella is something extra-flat, which 
moves like the amoeba. It is just a little more 
complicated. But it goes everywhere. And as it 
is something [...] that is related to what the 
sexed being loses in sexuality, it is, like the 
amoeba in relation to sexed beings, immortal 
— because it survives any scissiparous 
intervention. And it can run around.
Well! That is not very reassuring. But suppose 
it comes and envelopes your face while you 
are quietly asleep...
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(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 197)
The lamella is characterised as a 'myth' because it attempts 
to symbolically describe ‘the cut of the Real’: the asymmetry 
which results when we attempt to symbolise biological 
sexuality as human sexuality. The biological organism 
reproduces sexually, it is limited by the cycle in which death 
follows birth. Life begins and ends. The subject cannot 
escape this destiny; but there is something extra which is 
produced (and simultaneously lost) when we attempt to 
signify the life instinct in symbolic terms. That is the libido, an 
abstraction which denotes an indestructible form of life: life 
which can only be signified as life itself. Paradoxically, 
however, the Symbolic order can only become constituted by 
reference to death, to the death of the thing itself. 
Representation implies the death of the thing because the 
thing can never approach that complete symbol; it is always 
lacking in comparison. 'It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, 
that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressible life. [...] And it is of 
this that all the forms of the objet a that can be enumerated 
are the representatives, the equivalents. The objets a are 
merely its representatives, its figures.' (The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 198). 
Žižek and Marie-Hélène Brousse have both read the lamella 
in light of Ridley Scott's Alien (1979),  thinking of the 105
bizarre life-cycle of the eponymous creature, its metamorphic 
indestructibility, and the terrifying dimension of its 'presence' 
in the film. Perhaps it would be more useful to consider the 
lamella in terms of Miéville's depiction of 'the fauna of mirrors' 
 See Slavoj Žižek, 'A Hair of the Dog That Bit You' in Lacan's Theory of Discourse: Subject, 105
Structure and Society, ed. Mark Bracher et al (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 46-73 (67), and 
Marie-Hélène Brousse, 'The Drive (II)' in Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Richard Feldstein et al (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1995), 109-117 
(113).
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in The Tain, however, since the text directly engages with the 
problems of representing the partial object and the 'excess' 
which characterises the terrifying presence of the lamella 
without the need to introduce an extra layer of abstraction 
with the image of the alien creature itself. Here, instead, we 
see the partial object plainly rendered in spite of the 
'scissiparous intervention', the cut, which in the desiring 
operation has separated it from the body of the subject, 
where it has become lost to image in spite of image: indeed, 
in spite of the subject. The brilliance of this passage is that it 
depicts these subjective 'features' at that point, the point of 
separation, where they become horrific. It renders the 
impossibility of the partial object precisely by demonstrating 
the beauty of the object as a 'human feature' and 
simultaneously as a terrifying 'extra' part once it becomes 
separated from the body. 
In other words, the objects appear to exist at the limit, in 
Kantian terms, at which the beautiful becomes the sublime. 
The hands move with grace, they are depicted with delicacy 
even as they ravenously and impossibly strip a corpse; the 
eyes are unthreatening in their winking stupidity, like the 
teeth in their horse-grins, and yet both are essentially all the 
more disquieting because of that fact; the biceps clenching is 
an image of physical prowess, but the suggestion that this 
clenching motion propels the muscle independent of any 
body introduces an uncanny supernatural element to the 
description. Each object therefore materialises the terrifying 
excessive life-force of the lamella in the purely impossible 
representation of its partiality. The text depicts this excess 
precisely insofar as it does not do so; the excess irrupts in 
the scission which divides the subject at the level of the locus 
of desire. Sholl's 'encounter' with the fauna of mirrors, the 
'vermin' which is ceaselessly produced by the narcissistic 
fantasy, demonstrates not simply the failure of the screen, 
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but point of its very cultural production. It depicts the ubiquity 
of the screen and the centrality of that space of negotiation in 
cultural and social life, and demonstrates the fact that the 
irruption of the Real is the very reason for the form of the 
object itself. It is pure necessity. The question remains: are 
we supposed to be more surprised by the incongruity of the 
presence of the partial objects in this particular location than 
we are by the incongruity, the utter impossibility of their 
presence as supernatural apparitions? The message of the 
text seems clear to me in this regard. Even in the Tube 
Station, a building of pure function, the empire of narcissistic 
fantasy reigns.
The novella concludes with Sholl's encounter with the Fish of 
the Mirror in the British Museum. Sholl's plan, it is revealed, 
has all along been to offer the unconditional surrender of the 
humans to the imagos, a neat reversal of the typical heroic 
'final showdown' we might have expected to find. Why does 
the text conclude thus? Why does Miéville offer no final, 
unexpected victory from the jaws of defeat? As we have 
seen, the text engages with the question of the narcissistic 
constitution of the subject as a method of interrogating the 
cultural proliferation of the screen. The subjective experience 
of culture is mediated with a screen relation. By depicting the 
return of the 'bad' products of a disordered narcissism, the 
text demonstrates the necessity of the formation of socially-
productive narcissistic fantasy. It also raises the possibility 
that the ubiquity of the screen gives rise to the transgression 
of the screen; that, by engaging more frequently with the 
material screen, the cultural condition itself invites those 
moments in which the screen reveals its own fantasy 
constitution, reveals its own limits to the subject. It is at this 
level that we might understand Sholl's final surrender to the 
Fish of the Mirror. The 'surprise' ending is really no surprise 
when we consider that the ultimate encounter with the 
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'screen as limit' is precisely to affirm the subject in relation to 
the Other. In transgressing the screen, the only possible 
resolution is its reconstitution. Otherwise, it would not be 
possible to continue the story; the subject would cease to 
exist. Society would have no meaning without the symbolic 
guarantee of the Other. Having travelled across London, 
through hordes of lethal mirror-creatures, Sholl's only 
intention is to surrender to the Fish of the Mirror. And what is 
that creature?
The massive room was lit by the moon 
through the skylight, but that was not how 
Sholl could see every edge of everything, 
every curlicue of detail in the chamber. It was 
all etched in shadow on shadow, and he could 
see it all, in the black sunlight that poured out 
of the presence hanging in the room's centre, 
like a darkling star, invisible but utterly 
compelling, evading deliberation, not quite 
seen, insinuating its own parameters, 
patrolling the moiling cylindrical space with 
feline, piscine ease. The Tiger. The Fish of the 
Mirror.
Its vast, unsympathetic attention turned slowly 
to Sholl. He felt himself becoming more 
precise as it considered him, more exact.
(The Tain 290)
Here we find materialised the inert, enigmatic presence of 
the Other itself, the Other assuming the transcendent guise 
as cause or deity, as that to which I literally address my 
speech and my actions. This is the Other in the heart of the 
Other London. In the face of the Other one can do nothing 
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other than ask the terrified question: what do you want from 
me? 'This is why the Other's question [la question de l'Autre]
—that comes back to the subject from the place from which 
he expects an oracular reply— which takes some such form 
as "Che vuoi?, " "What do you want?," is the question that 
best leads the subject to the path of his own desire' (Écrits 
690). Sholl feels himself 'becoming more precise' as the Fish 
considers him. This crystallisation of subjectivity under the 
aegis of the Other is the only response to the chaos of the 
broken social order of the text. The question of what Sholl 
wants can only be asked once it is addressed to the Other, 
precisely because it is what the Other wants. What Sholl 
wants and what the Other wants are already the same thing, 
which is why Sholl has always known the outcome of his 
journey — and why it is only revealed to us at the moment 
that it is revealed to the Fish. The Fish cannot be seen and 
yet it allows 'everything' to be seen in its place. To submit to 
the impenetrable heart of our desire, we must situate the lack 
at its heart. This 'lack' characterises the unbearable intensity 
of the Thing. The appearance of the naked object of desire 
(the lack itself, the irruption of the Real; a 'darkling star', 
perhaps) hystericises the subject. Sholl must deliver the 
message to the Other, 'perform' this surrender for its sake in 
order to re-situate the heart of his desire; indeed, his desire 
is the desire of all others (is it any wonder? He is the 'shoal' 
itself. He manifests the desire of every subject). In this way, 
Sholl's self-admonition that 'he had decided that he was 
chosen for something. For this. He granted himself authority 
to speak for his people. To surrender. Judas-Messiah' (The 
Tain 298-9) is really the only proper response to that 
breathtaking 'excess' beyond subjectivity which is revealed in 
the experience of the Other-Thing. Sholl truly is the Judas-
Messiah: he must 'betray' his own freedom, which can only 
exist 'beyond' the possibility of the desire of the Other, 
precisely in order to situate his own desire.
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It is ironic, therefore, that the imago-narrator, speaking for the 
imagos, declares that the humans cannot experience the 
'pain' of reflection:
It is a pain you cannot imagine — very literally, 
in the most precise way, you cannot know how 
it is to feel yourself shoved with a mighty and 
brutal cosmic hand into bloody muscle. The 
agony of our constrained thoughts, 
shoehorned into those skulls you carry, stringy 
tendons tethering our limbs. The excruciation. 
Shackled in your meat vulgarity.
(The Tain 240)
This passage, perhaps more than any other in the text, 
asserts that central problem of the intersection of the subject 
and culture which marks the position of the screen. Contrary 
to the imago-narrator's statement, it describes the very 
formation of the subject, the distortion which results from the 
transition of need into demand: from the drive into desire. In 
short, it describes the impossible torsion which the speaking 
subject must undergo in order to become subject, caught 
between jouissance of body and the structure of the law, 
splitting the subject at the 'moment' of conception. The Fish 
of the Mirror, shining the impossible, negative light of the 
Other upon the riven subject, is the 'lack' about to be situated 
once more behind the screen of fantasy. Sholl imagines a 
future where humanity will 'spread the word that we've lost, 
and we'll live' (The Tain 299); by spreading the word, the 
proper circulation of fantasy can begin again. The screen can 
become reframed: the mirror reformed. So, actually, we can 
know this pain of which the imago speaks; we know it, 
insofar as we must each experience it as a condition of our 
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subjectivity. All that remains to be said is that, beyond the 
screen, this pain will threaten to irrupt once again. The 
message of The Tain is that our narcissism will only return to 
us if we do not return to it, and ensure that the mirror remains 
a screen. 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Screening the Void of History:
Abyssal Experience and the Screen of 
Fantasy in W.G. Sebald's Austerlitz
To him, the painter, this is creation,
image of our insane presence
on the surface of the earth [...]106
In Austerlitz, Jacques Austerlitz — the secret, forgotten, and 
recovered name of a boy known as Dafydd Elias — searches 
for the remains of his history and his self. Transported across 
Europe as very young child in order to escape the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, Austerlitz is raised in Wales by 
foster parents who erase any record of his identity. The novel 
follows the unnamed narrator's various meetings with 
Austerlitz across the span of nearly thirty years, as Austerlitz 
relates his experiences, in which he both avoids and pursues 
the marks of his ancestry. Austerlitz, as many critical 
analyses already demonstrate, is a subject grappling with 
'the return of the repressed’. He embodies both a personal 
and public experience of the Holocaust; his is the traumatic 
response to the paradigmatic horror of the twentieth century. 
His subjectivity is shaped by both an existential and historical 
uncertainty, concerning both his lost origin and, in a 
representative manner 'the tragedy of the Jews in Europe, 
and the unending consequences of the Holocaust both for 
those who escaped death and for the generations after',  as 107
Anne Whitehead notes. Many readings of the novel focus on 
this traumatic heritage as a cipher for a broader cultural 
 W.G. Sebald, After Nature, trans. Michael Hamburger (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2002), 26.106
 Anne Whitehead, Trauma Fiction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2004), 118.107
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condition, whether that condition is located specifically in 
German or European post-war society, or indeed more 
broadly in 'modern' Western culture. As Whitehead also says, 
Sebald 'locates the Holocaust as a symptom of modernity, 
which is characterised for him by the traumas of exile and 
displacement. Even if we are not geographically displaced by 
the circumstances of history and politics, modernity 
nevertheless displaces our relation to time and to the spaces 
we inhabit.' (Trauma Fiction 138). Richard T. Gray describes 
Sebald as 'one of the most eloquent recent spokespeople of 
this modernist sensibility [...] His literary works are not simply 
seismographic records of these human-induced 
catastrophes, but also attempts to fashion new 
representational tools for the purpose of acknowledging and 
coming to terms with the realities of modern human 
history' ; finally, J.J. Long notes that 'Sebald is interested in 108
the ‘archival consciousness’ of the modern subject, and he 
pursues this investigation to its probable extreme in 
Austerlitz'.  109
It is the form of the archive which, in these readings, lends 
structure to the textual representation of the congenital 
cultural form of displacement of which Whitehead speaks. As 
Derrida says 'The archivist produces more archive, and that 
is why the archive is never closed. It opens out of the 
future' : the archive is marked by the structural 110
displacement of knowledge, indefinitely postponing its own 
completion by proposing a goal which can never be attained. 
The archive itself guarantees this impossibility of completion, 
because as long as there remains an archive, there remains 
 Richard T. Gray, 'Writing at the Roche Limit: Order and Entropy in W. G. Sebald's Die Ringe des 108
Saturn’, The German Quarterly, 83: 1 (Winter 2010), 38-57 (38-9). 
 J.J. Long, W.G. Sebald - Image, Archive, Modernity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2007), 149.109
 Jacques Derrida, 'Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression’, Diacritics, 25: 2 (Summer, 1995), 9-63 110
(45).
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an addition to the store which can never be reattained: an 
'original' moment which the archival impulse attempts to 
reconstruct. In this sense, the archive presents itself as a 
useful metaphor for the process of the (lack of) recovery of a 
total memory and a total knowledge which Austerlitz 
undertakes in the text. Austerlitz, as Long suggests, is a 
subject 'figured in the first instance as an archival lack' (W.G. 
Sebald - Image, Archive, Modernity 152), his origins lost 
among acts of archival destruction. While Austerlitz dedicates 
his life to the study of 'the history of architecture and 
civilization' (Austerlitz 170), his intention of producing a final 
work is repeatedly postponed as his inquiries broaden and 
he admits ever more material into his archive. There is a 
seductive reading to be located here, therefore, thinking of 
Austerlitz's admission that 'I had constantly been 
preoccupied by that accumulation of knowledge which I had 
pursued for decades, and which served as a substitute or 
compensatory memory' (Austerlitz 198), which would model 
Austerlitz's fruitless search for origin upon the form of the 
archive itself, as a means of acknowledging the text's 
elliptical encounter with the ultimately untotalisable event of 
the Holocaust, or even with the whole edifice of Western 
cultural Modernity. But this reading, in which Austerlitz is 
conceived as a subject produced at the point of an 
interleaving of memory and knowledge which occludes the 
site of an 'objective' history, risks overdetermining the text's 
figuration of history itself: rather than presenting a conception 
of history awaiting its own reformation in the archive, in other 
words a history which will justify the personal search for a 
term to replace the compensatory memory sought by 
Austerlitz, we might rather say that Austerlitz ultimately seeks 
to present the futility of this search.
Such a hypothesis appears justified when we consider the 
manner in which the text materialises what we will call the 
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abyssal experience of history. What Austerlitz does is present 
the very condition of desire, as figured by Lacan: desire as 
impossibility itself. What this means is that the only strategy 
available to Austerlitz in order to contend with the terrible 
'vortex' of history is the one in which he might screen it from 
view: by doing so, however, he orients his desire obliquely, 
his aim 'askew' as such. As Žižek says, 
The fundamental point of psychoanalysis is 
that desire is not something given in advance, 
but something that has to be constructed — 
and it is precisely the role of fantasy to give 
the coordinates of the subject's desire, to 
specify its object, to locate the position the 
subject assumes in it.
(Looking Awry 6)
Andreas Huyssen, who has remarked that, in Sebald, it is 'as 
if history itself had been bombed into oblivion',  notes in his 111
analysis of The Air War and Literature that Sebald 'gives us 
not so much an analysis as a reinscription of the trauma by 
means of quotation' (Present Pasts 156): Huyssen's 
hypothesis 'is that at its deepest level the German discourse 
of turning points from 1945 on can be read as a symptom of 
[...] multilayered traumatic experiences, which always leave 
something unresolved and in need of further 
articulation' (Present Pasts 146). While Huyssen's argument 
might at first appear to simply reframe a quite standard 
postmodernist trope of irresolution and deferral of the 
'structural encounter', his point about Sebald's treatment of 
history also demonstrates the possibility of reading Sebald as 
an experience of trauma which implicitly proposes the 
 Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Stanford: 111
Stanford UP, 2003), 155.
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inability of a historical 'resolution' of the traumatic cause itself 
— a reading which seems to me particularly appropriate for 
Austerlitz. Moreover, it directs us towards a realisation that 
the traumatic structure itself is not based on an historical 
cause as such. This kind of analysis is not simply ahistorical. 
Amir Eshel hints at this kind of reading of Sebald, too:
In Austerlitz, Sebald's reflexive, rather than 
depressive, melancholy, as this is mirrored in 
his fascination with clocks, diaries, and ruins, 
results in a unique interweaving of time and 
narrative in three varied, yet intertwined ways: 
a multifocal evocation of the recent German 
past, an allegorical-critical account of 
modernity, and, finally, a latent order of 
signification in which not the historical or 
biographical, but the effects of figuration 
themselves constitute the referent.112
For Eshel, Sebald endeavours to produce 'a poetics that 
rather than depicting and commenting on the historical event 
in time, constitutes an event, becomes the writing of a 
different, a literary time' ('Against the Power of Time' 74), and 
while this may signal, once again, the trap of an inescapable 
postmodernist cycle of irresolution, it also points us towards 
the necessity of studying more intently the particular order of 
signification in which Austerlitz is constituted. 
My claim, in this chapter, is that these readings misrepresent 
the very nature of trauma in Austerlitz, owing to a failure to 
understand its structure and its relation to desire. In Lacan 
we find this structure elucidated in the registers of the 
subjective experience: Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. The 
 Amir Eshel, 'Against the Power of Time: The Poetics of Suspension in W. G. Sebald's Austerlitz’, 112
New German Critique, 88 — Contemporary German Literature (Winter, 2003), 71-96 (73).
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subject's relation to these registers is constitutive, and their 
'interplay' defines every point of human experience as such. 
Two basic principles of Lacan's teaching are necessary for us 
to understand in order to approach the reading of Austerlitz 
properly. Firstly, we must understand that the Real is not 
'reality': instead, it is that which we must exclude in order to 
constitute ourselves as subjects. For Lacan, the encounter 
with the Real is the underlying basis for the experience of 
trauma, because it disrupts the Symbolic realm ; 113
simultaneously, the Real is that which sets desire in motion, 
as that 'something beyond' our subjective experience. 
Secondly, it is important to understand that, in Lacan, fantasy 
is not simply to be understood in its most common sense, 
referring to 'a fantastic wish' to be granted something which 
is 'realistically' unattainable. Instead, fantasy is to be 
conceived as the very fabric of what we call 'reality'; our 
fantasy works to screen that black hole of the Real which 
forever threatens our subjective consistency. Considering 
Austerlitz in light of this knowledge will enable us to attempt 
to fill a certain gap present in critical literature surrounding 
the novel. By analysing the method by which the experience 
of trauma constitutes Austerlitz's subjectivity, we can 
demonstrate the fact that trauma in Lacan is an insistent 
dimension which both threatens to disrupt the subject's 
consistency (which we find represented in the novel in the 
many statements by Austerlitz that he cannot conceive of his 
own existence, that he understands no meaning in his 
behaviour) and orients the subject's desire. This orientation is 
possible because Lacan shows us how desire exists 'beyond' 
the subject and achieves consistency according to that 
fantasy which is constructed by each subject.
 In other words: that realm which, it is supposed by the subject, will have eternally foreclosed 113
access to the Real.
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Reframing the terms of the critical literature concerning 
Austerlitz is not the goal of this chapter, however. Instead, 
this focus on desire demonstrates, first of all, the need to 
place the screen at the centre of any possible investigation of 
Austerlitz, because it is the screen as form which allows the 
subject's desire to appear. In Lacan, the screen is that which 
intervenes, as we have seen, before the subject's 
understanding; it is that which allows desire to take form in 
objet a. It is for this reason, I suggest, that the screen as an 
object fascinates Austerlitz, and why he pursues screen-
objects (photographs, pictures, plans) throughout the text: it 
is precisely because these kinds of screens reproduce the 
work of the very screen of fantasy which allows our desire to 
become apparent. For Austerlitz, a subject almost constantly 
on the verge of becoming swallowed by the traumatic 
jouissance of the Real, the battle to maintain the screen of 
fantasy is his primary concern throughout the text. It is this 
screen which allows him to maintain subjective consistency 
in the face of the traumatic Real.
How does this process play out in the text? What we witness 
in Austerlitz is nothing other than the desire of the subject. 
Austerlitz’s desire, I contend, is to search for the remains of 
his past; but it is not to discover those remains. I suggest that 
'history' is conceived in Austerlitz as an abyssal space of 
total jouissance — in other words a space of 'enjoyment' in 
which enjoyment is not simply something minimally 
pleasurable but instead is something overwhelming in its 
intensity. Austerlitz's ultimate drive (which is distinct from 
desire because it is an effect of the Real and not of the 
Symbolic system) is the total 'immersion' of his subject in the 
revelatory 'truth' of history; it is only this impossible demand 
which can reunite him with his lost past, not simply with his 
parents, but with everything which potentially belonged to 
him in a future where he grew up in Czechoslovakia as 
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'Jacques Austerlitz'. It therefore maps the space of a 
potential future, an unrealised life in which he must also 
remain deprived of his true history. But this total immersion 
can only come at the price of his subjective consistency. In 
other words, he will no longer enjoy access to the Symbolic 
terms of meaning which ground social experience. That is 
why it is Austerlitz's desire which allows us to understand the 
trauma of his loss. It is his desire which, rather than 
attempting to fulfil that loss, only screens the fact that it can 
never be satisfied. Austerlitz, therefore, is an exemplary 
subject of contemporary literature: one who understands the 
screen, and demonstrates exactly why, culturally, we pursue 
it in all forms.
This chapter is divided into five main sections. In the first 
section, I will investigate the manner in which Lacan 
conceives the workings of trauma and its effects upon the 
subject and desire ('the desire of the subject'). In these 
workings, we see that the subjective relationship with objet a 
is that which binds the 'proper' experience of the Real to the 
Symbolic and is constituted by (as it simultaneously 
constitutes) the screen of fantasy. A consequence of this 
reading is that we can locate the 'ethical imperative' of the 
text: understanding that trauma in Sebald is Real, and, 
consequently, symbolically unrepresentable, enables us to 
explain the 'non-appearance' of the Holocaust in the text 
itself, which is a point of criticism from writers such as 
Whitehead. 
Following this, in the second part, I will read the appearance 
of objet a as gaze in Austerlitz by paying close attention to 
photographs which appear in the text. I will also demonstrate 
how Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida, his work which is often 
mentioned in readings of photography in Austerlitz, coincides 
with Lacan's theory of the scopic drive in its reading of the 
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subjective effects of photography. The point here is not to 
produce a 'psychoanalytic interpretation of art’ (‘Grimaces of 
the Real’ 51), as Žižek calls it, which overturns 'competing' 
analyses. By reading 'after the screen', so to speak (in other 
words, after we understand the 'position' of the screen at the 
heart of Austerlitz's desire and the workings of his desire) we 
can identify a gap within the present critical literature of the 
novel which invites this reappraisal. 
The third section of the chapter continues this reading of the 
gaze in Austerlitz, and considers its place in Sebald's work 
more generally by reading Sebald's long prose poem After 
Nature alongside the main text. The focus here shifts from 
photographs alone, and begins to consider the generative 
and protective function of the continuum of screen-objects in 
Sebald's work.
The fourth and fifth sections of the chapter comprise an 
extended discussion of the manner in which the text presents 
the effects of Lacanian 'subjective destitution' in the episode 
of Austerlitz's nervous breakdown, which is embodied in an 
important scene set in Liverpool Street Station. I suggest that 
this episode demonstrates the conceptual distinction 
between the 'Real objects' which Lacan describes as 
materialising the modalities of desire. The experience of the 
abyss — that final void which threatens to reduce Austerlitz 
to a minimally consistent subject totally 'adrift' in society — in 
Austerlitz is mitigated by the object of exchange (objet a), the 
screen which materialises the fantasy for Austerlitz of an 
eternal search for meaning, and by contrast is materialised, 
made overbearingly ‘present’, by the Imaginary object (phi) 
which takes the form, for Austerlitz, of the building, the 
building-as-form itself. 
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The goal here is not simply to reappraise the novel in light of 
Lacan; nor indeed is it to illuminate Lacan by 'explaining' him 
with reference to the text; instead, the idea is that both the 
novel and Lacan can be productively read with each other 
because they enable us to engage in the 're-theorisation' of 
the subjective and cultural relationship to the screen. At each 
point in the chapter, we should understand the work of the 
screen for Austerlitz: a negotiation of space before any 
subjective negotiation takes place, it is an object which 
allows desire to circulate.
I. 'Insistent' Trauma in the Archive
Approaching the text with an understanding of the production 
of desire according to Lacan, we can begin to rethink the 
'scene of trauma' as it is figured by certain critical analyses. 
Long reads the passage in which Austerlitz refers to the 
'agency greater than or superior to my own capacity for 
thought' (Austerlitz 60), as an example of the repression of 
trauma in its Freudian sense: 
The passage asks to be read in terms of a 
Freudian pattern of repression and return [...] 
Furthermore, the notion of a power that 
functions inside Austerlitz’s psyche without his 
participation or explicit allegiance bears more 
than a passing resemblance to the Freudian 
censor, which regulates the traffic of psychical 
content between the unconscious and 
conscious. [...] The suggestion that Austerlitz 
is a novel that dramatises the return of the 
repressed, however, implies that the past will 
be brought to light from Austerlitz’s 
unconscious. In other words, traces of the 
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past have been deposited somewhere within 
the psyche and they can, under propitious 
circumstances, be recuperated.
(W.G. Sebald 156)
In Freud, the fantasy of the subject is an expression of a 
repressed wish, the imaginary staging of the fulfilment of an 
unconscious desire. What Long does not mention is that, in 
the case of traumatic neurosis, the return of this object does 
not fulfil the subject's desire, because the intent of that desire 
is instead to repeat the initial loss as the object is sent away, 
to be reclaimed once more. This repetition contravenes the 
pleasure principle. Freud exemplifies this model with his 
explanation of the fort-da game, in which he observed his 
grandson repeatedly throwing and reclaiming a spool 
attached to a string whenever the child’s mother left her son 
alone for a time: the boy would exclaim fort ('gone') and da 
('there') as the spool disappeared and returned. For Freud, 
this game signals the child's renunciation of the drive in order 
to endure the departure of the mother. What it also 
demonstrates is that the 'agency' which functions in 
Austerlitz's psyche, 'directing' his actions, is more accurately 
depicted as a ‘desire', which the superego aims to satisfy in 
the appeal to what Lacan calls the Other, than it is in terms of 
the Freudian censor. Austerlitz explicitly states so in the text, 
in fact, when he calls this agency a ‘compulsion’: 
I have always resisted the power of time out of 
some internal compulsion which I myself have 
never understood, keeping myself apart from 
so-called current events in the hope, as I now 
think, said Austerlitz, that time will not pass 
away, has not passed away, that I can turn 
back and go behind it [...]
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(Austerlitz 144)
So, while Long suggests that: 
The entire enterprise of interpreting dreams, 
Freudian slips, hysterical symptoms and so 
on, was to reconstruct the truth that was 
concealed by the insidious ruses of the censor 
and the conscious mind. [...] The conspicuous 
allusions to both writers [Freud and Proust] in 
Austerlitz, furthermore, seem governed by 
precisely the same desire for the retrieval of 
an authentic self.
(W.G. Sebald 157)
To this suggestion we might counter, thinking of Lacan, that 
Austerlitz seems to express, rather, the desire for the 
uncovering of an inauthentic self; or, in other words, the 
revelation that nothing compensates for the 'lack' which 
constitutes a subject, instead merely screening this lack for 
the subject via the production of fantasy, a fantasy which 
locates the desire of the subject outside of itself and towards 
which it ceaselessly proceeds. It is in this screening fantasy 
that we grasp the importance of the screen as a format, 
because it designates both the Imaginary object pursued by 
Austerlitz himself and the immaterial screen which 'screens 
the face of the Real' from the subject. For Austerlitz, it is the 
very possibility of 'uncovering' which prompts his repetitious 
behaviour. As Žižek notes, objet a is 
[...] a quite ordinary, everyday object that, as 
soon as it is "elevated to the status of the 
Thing," starts to function as a kind of screen, 
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an empty space on which the subject projects 
the fantasies that support his desire, a surplus 
of the real that propels us to narrate again and 
again our first traumatic encounters with 
jouissance. 
(Looking Awry 133)
In Lacan, anxiety is a constitutive dimension of the subject, 
the result of the infant’s non-consensual acceptance of the 
Symbolic realm. The entry into the Symbolic realm produces 
a remainder, objet a, which is the very mark of an irreducible 
lack which cannot ever be filled since it is the mark, or rather, 
the stain, of the very process by which the subject becomes 
a subject. Anxiety, properly defined, is the result of the 
subject’s overproximity to objet a because objet a is that 
which gestures towards the Real: ‘a privileged object, which 
has emerged from some primal separation, from some self-
mutilation induced by the very approach of the real’ (The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 83), it is a 
remainder of the Real, insofar as it reminds us that the Real 
cannot ever be glimpsed, nor grasped, nor returned to. That 
which is lost by the subject is the very thing that was ‘before’ 
the subject: objet a is part of this, part of the Real, and 
therefore part of nothing which can be symbolised, other than 
as something which appears only at the moment in which it is 
lost.
It is the subjective relation to objet a, which provokes the 
experience of anxiety, which explains why the archive figures 
so prominently in the text. The only result of the subject’s 
attempt to re-find objet a is to lose it a little more. In this way, 
the importance of the archive in Austerlitz is revealed: not as 
pertaining to memory, in relation to which the archive 
functions purely as a figure of loss, the loss of something 
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which was there and is now gone, like Austerlitz’s Czech, 
which disappears when he leaves the country and reappears 
once he tracks down his childhood nanny, Vera; nor indeed 
pertaining to history, in relation to which the archive functions 
as a figure of another sort of loss, of something which was 
never there except as concept, in other words a lack, for 
example in the incomplete record which pointedly reappears 
in every archive in the text and is not necessarily a loss of 
information but a failure of the form of the archive as defined 
by Derrida. Instead, the importance of the archive is in the 
way that it provides the outlet by which Austerlitz might enact 
his own desire of re-finding that which he has lost in the act 
of discovering its character of ‘lostness’. In other words, this 
is the loss which only appears as even more so every time 
that it is rediscovered. It is a loss of that which was never 
there, and never not there, and is figured in objet a. This is 
the reason that Austerlitz’s admission of his desire to 
construct a substitutionary memory is so vitally important to 
our understanding of the text. It is because Austerlitz is 
attempting to track down a screen with which to negotiate his 
constant proximity to the object-cause of his desire: that very 
object, which he supposes has been separated from his self, 
is his own lostness, the very concept of such a thing as 
‘lostness’ itself. He has lost that thing which allows him to be 
lost, which allows him to accept (via the screen) the scission 
which marks every subject's moment of constitution. 
Because of this, he cannot fail to experience the anxiety 
which is only induced by proximity to objet a.
Let us consider Lacan's thought on the 'insistent' nature of 
trauma and its connection to the Real:
The function of the tuché, of the real as 
encounter — the encounter in so far as it may 
be missed, in so far as it is essentially the 
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missed encounter — first presented itself in 
the history of psychoanalysis in a form that 
was in itself already enough to arouse our 
attention, that of the trauma. 
Is it not remarkable that [...] the real should 
have presented itself in the form of that which 
is unassimilable in it — in the form of the 
trauma, determining all that follows, and 
imposing on it an apparently accidental origin? 
[...] 
In effect, the trauma is conceived as having 
necessarily been marked by the subjectifying 
homeostasis that orientates the whole 
functioning defined by the pleasure principle. 
Our experience then presents us with a 
problem, which derives from the fact that, at 
the very heart of the primary processes, we 
see preserved the insistence of the trauma in 
making us aware of its existence. The trauma 
reappears, in effect, frequently unveiled. How 
can the dream, the bearer of the subject's 
desire, produce that which makes the trauma 
emerge repeatedly — if not its very face, at 
least the screen that shows us that it is still 
there behind?
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 55)
The question which Lacan poses here is not simply ‘how is it 
that the Real appears to enter our experience as trauma?’ 
Instead what he really asks is 'why does our desire lead us to 
that which we experience as traumatic?' With this passage, I 
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claim that Lacan formulates for us exactly the dimension 
which is missing in other readings of Austerlitz: namely, the 
fact that that which Austerlitz encounters in the text is not 
simply 'the return of the repressed' but instead is nothing 
other than the fantasy constructed to avoid the Real 
character of the trauma itself. It also explains the importance 
of the figure of the screen in the novel, and why we should 
interrogate it: Austerlitz's dedication to archival research, in 
his professional and personal life and, indeed, as a model of 
compensatory memory which defines his self identity, is 
really an encounter with the structural screen of fantasy, that 
which, to paraphrase Lacan, 'screens the face of Real'. This, 
I suggest, leads Austerlitz to seek out and encounter screens 
throughout the text in a repetitious act which appears to 
attempt to fulfil his desire: the desire not simply for 
knowledge of his parents or history, but the desire to continue 
to search for a total personal ‘history’. 
What Austerlitz appears to contend with is the result of this 
desire: a subjectivity which is not ‘whole’, which in Lacanian 
terms is ‘barred’. It is to this apparent 'lack' that Whitehead 
refers when she says that 'modernity displaces our relation to 
time and to the spaces we inhabit', and there is no clearer 
example of the fact that Austerlitz is aware of it than the 
moment in which he declares that 'As far back as I can 
remember [...] I have always felt as if I had no place in reality, 
as if I were not there at all' (Austerlitz 261). Therefore, while 
Long suggests that the conversation between Lemoine and 
Austerlitz 'about the dissolution, in line with the inexorable 
spread of processed data, of our capacity to 
remember' (Austerlitz 398) is 'merely a nostalgic postlude to 
what the text has already demonstrated: the subject of 
modernity is ineluctably dependent on external 
mnemotechnical prostheses' (W.G. Sebald 163), we can 
suggest the revision that the dysfunction of the subject of 
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modernity's memory is indeed, most properly, a function of 
the desire to make present a 'whole' self via the continuous 
negotiation of the material screen, the function of which 
recalls the screen of fantasy itself. As Žižek notes in his 
commentary of the above passage from Lacan (which 
includes a reading by Lacan of the episode of the man 
whose dream is interrupted by the smell of smoke and the 
vision of his recently deceased son, from Freud's 
Interpretation of Dreams) 'it was not the intrusion from 
external reality that awakened the unfortunate father, but the 
unbearably traumatic character of what he encountered in 
the dream’ (How to Read Lacan 58). This is why Lacan says 
that 
The place of the real, which stretches from the 
trauma to the phantasy — in so far as the 
phantasy is never anything more than the 
screen that conceals something quite primary, 
something determinant in the function of 
repetition — this is what we must now 
examine. [...] The real may be represented by 
the accident, the noise, the small element of 
reality, which is evidence that we are not 
dreaming. 
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 60) 
In other words, there is no 'escape' from the fantasy which 
attempts to screen the face of the traumatic Real from our 
view. That which is properly traumatic, which issues forth 
from the Real, can never itself be 'made' Symbolic: it only 
disturbs the subjective experience of the Symbolic and 
Imaginary realms and 'insists' in them in a variety of ways. 
The total experience of the Real, which we witness in 
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Austerlitz's ordeal in Liverpool Street Station, precedes the 
dissolution of the subject, since the subject is constituted by 
the very act of excluding or 'leaving behind' what it was 
'before' it became subject. What this demonstrates is that the 
notion of the return to the present of an unbearable trauma is 
overstated by many readings of Austerlitz. The 
corresponding outcome of this fact is that the notion of a 
subjective trajectory 'beyond' the traumatic experience 
towards an authentic expression of self is also overstated. 
The aim of psychoanalysis, to paraphrase Lacan, is to 
ensure that one does not give ground relative to one's desire: 
the psychoanalyst is the one 'to whom is entrusted the 
process of a radical ethical conversion, the one that 
introduces the subject to the order of desire’ (Lacan 86). The 
notion of approaching a subjective 'truth' as a result of 
analysis is an outcome towards which even Freud remains 
sceptical, and a concept with which he wrestles in 'Analysis 
terminable and interminable'. Lacan is clearer on the subject: 
'The mirage of truth, from which only lies can be expected 
[...], has no other term than the satisfaction that marks the 
end of the analysis. [...] the main aim of analysis is to give 
this urgently needed satisfaction' (The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis viii-ix). The point is that 
Austerlitz actually conducts a far more sophisticated 
exploration of the subject than that of simply the uncovering 
of, and reorientation of the subject towards, 'the authentic 
self'. According to Long, 
The way in which the terms ‘falsche Welt’ and 
‘falsches Leben’ are used in Austerlitz [...] 
ostensibly assumes that the one can find 
one’s way back to a life and a world that are 
not ‘falsch’, that inauthenticity is produced by 
a specific historical or personal caesura 
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which, once identified, can be overcome in a 
return to the status quo ante.
(W.G. Sebald 158)
Whitehead suggests that Sebald does not even approach 
this return to an authentic, instead failing to offer any way for 
the subject to overcome his or her trauma. Both readings fail 
to account for the possibility of Austerlitz's implicit desire: 
what he wants is not to find his parents. Instead, Austerlitz's 
desire is to remain seeking them. It is only in this way that he 
can 'overcome' his trauma: in other words, by properly 
screening it, and orienting its object with the production of his 
fantasy.
This reading, it must be stated, does not minimise the 'ethical 
impact' of the text or indeed mask the severity of the 
Holocaust as event as presented by the text. And it should 
not be taken to suggest that the proper way to approach the 
event of the Holocaust itself is to obviate or occlude it. While 
Mark M. Anderson claims that the novel 'spends much of its 
energy in avoiding direct confrontation with the Holocaust by 
lingering on collateral instances of human folly and cruelty' , 114
it is rather the case that the direct confrontation with the 
Holocaust is itself impossible. The traces of the Real which 
insist in the subject’s experience of the traumatic event can 
never be encountered by the subject as such; for Lacan the 
Real is no substantial thing in itself. Instead, the subject 
‘approaches’ the Real but finds the traumatic event is 
subsumed by the Symbolic network and made 
‘comprehensible' through the disruption of the Symbolic 
mode. While Anderson refers to Richard Eder's phrase, 
 Mark M. Anderson, 'The Edge of Darkness: On W. G. Sebald’, October, 106 (Autumn, 2003), 114
102-121 (105).
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'Holocaust-in-absence' , to suggest an event which is 115
experienced analogically, it is rather that the episodes which 
recall the worst horrors of the Holocaust in the novel (the 
sediment of white powder settling around Gwendolyn's room, 
the 'arsanical horror' (Austerlitz 87) of the chimney in the 
manse, the image of the Israelites' camp in the desert of 
Sinai in which Austerlitz identifies his 'proper place [...] 
among the tiny figures populating the camp' (Austerlitz 77)) 
are themselves reminded to us, made significant and 
comprehensible, by the oversaturated presence of the 
Holocaust itself. It is not facetious to claim that it is the 
Holocaust itself which overbears upon these episodes, nor is 
it intended to minimise the event itself; it is instead crucial to 
our understanding of the anxiety which marks Austerlitz's 
response to his own trauma that we realise that, in the text, 
the Holocaust functions as an analogy for these events 
themselves, the significance of which demonstrates the 
torsive force enacted upon the Symbolic network through the 
trace of the Real. This is not to suggest that any single image 
of horror associated with the Holocaust, for example of 
smoke billowing from smokestacks of concentration camp 
crematoria, can be recalled in order render the banal image 
of smoke emitting from the manse's chimney in Bala more 
comprehensible. Instead what it means is that the terrible 
power of that event is only able to be expressed by Austerlitz 
once he possesses the symbolic 'vocabulary' with which to 
do so. The chimney in the manse does not illuminate a 
hidden or avoided traumatic core; rather the insistent trauma 
itself invests the banal image with a symbolic meaning, 
indicating the threatened dissolution of the subject's 
consistency upon the approach towards the Real object of 
the event. That is why Austerlitz continually experiences 
reality as if he 'were not there at all' (Austerlitz 261): he 
 Richard Eder, ''Austerlitz': Excavating a Life', <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/28/books/115
review/28EDERLT.html> accessed 25/05/15.
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repeatedly finds himself teetering on the edge of a Symbolic 
experience which is 'primed' to resuscitate and raise the 
insistent trauma to a level above his screen of fantasy. We 
should remind ourselves, as Žižek says, that 'anxiety in its 
strict Lacanian sense [is] the effect that registers the 
subject's panic reaction to the over proximity of the object-
cause of desire' ('Grimaces of the Real' 52). This fact, 
therefore, strengthens the claim that the text maintains an 
ethical core, because it explains why the trauma itself cannot 
be represented. Furthermore, it answers Whitehead's 
broader criticism that Sebald's novels 'respond to trauma by 
evoking its disorientation and its symptomatic dimensions at 
a stylistic level, but they do not offer any way of coming to 
terms with the traumatic experiences which they 
represent' (Trauma Fiction 138). What the text really 
demonstrates is the desperate flight of the subject from one 
fantasy to the next, or rather, from the fantasy back to that 
same fantasy: to the fantasy which envelops, as screen, the 
Real which itself envelops the traumatic core of the event, 
and assumes the form of a different object once more. We 
might recall Bruce Fink here: 'Desire is an end in itself: it 
seeks only more desire.'  To paraphrase Žižek, Austerlitz, 116
therefore, is the one who wakes up so that he might continue 
dreaming. Like the father dreaming of his lost son, Austerlitz 
awakens 'into reality in order to avoid the Real' (How to Read 
Lacan 58).
The reappearance of the 'small element of reality' in the 
dream, mentioned above by Lacan, emphasises the method 
by which objet a adjusts to the 'gap' of the subject. It also 
explains why Lacan describes the Real as presenting itself 'in 
the form of that which is unassimilable in it’. The 'form' of 
objet a is determined by the subject, by the gap between the 
 Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and Technique 116
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 26.
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'symbolic subject' — the subject of the signifier — and 
'authentic core' of real existence (an authenticity which is 
only experienced as such by the subject, only after the fact of 
'losing' that authenticity which allows subjectivity to appear: 
in other words, it is not 'authentic' at all). Objet a fits itself into 
this gap for a subject but tends between the Symbolic and 
the Real, vanishing once the subject approaches it. The 
curious fact of the 'appearance' of this object is that (in the 
case of the dream above) the small element of reality is also 
something alien, something alien to the fantasy itself; it 
'stands out', is the thing which we suppose is alien to us, and 
towards which, for that very reason, we are drawn. It is 
important for this reason to remind ourselves that Derrida's 
investigation in 'Archive Fever' analyses Wilhelm Jensen's 
Gradiva, which so fascinated Freud in turn, because it 
demonstrates that the appearance of that 'something which 
stands out' is in fact a common feature of the screens which 
are collected within an archive. Noting the protagonist 
Hanold's desire, Derrida says:
He dreams of bringing back to life. He dreams 
rather of reliving. But of reliving the other. Of 
reliving the singular pressure or impression 
which Gradiva's step [pas], the step itself, the 
step of Gradiva herself, that very day, at that 
time, on that date, in what was inimitable 
about it, must have left in the ashes. He 
dreams this irreplaceable place, the very 
ashes, where the singular imprint, like a 
signature, barely distinguishes itself from the 
impression.
('Archive Fever' 61)
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Hanold is a young archeologist whose desire is awoken by 
the bas-relief of a young woman which he encounters in a 
museum in Rome. He fixates upon what he imagines of her 
presence in the moment of a step, desiring her return, and 
eventually dreaming a meeting between the two of them in 
the ashes of Pompeii. For Derrida this demonstrates the 
archival desire to unite the event and the mark, to return to 
the singularity 'of the pressure and its trace in the unique 
instant where they are not yet distinguished the one from the 
other, forming in an instant a single body of Gradiva's step, of 
her gait, of her pace' ('Archive Fever' 62). We can see that 
there is a correspondence between Hanold and Austerlitz in 
their relationship to the archival object, the screen, and to 
that instigation of desire which is located for each upon (and 
beyond) that surface. (We must remember that desire in the 
scopic field is the gaze, an object beyond the grasp of the 
subject which nonetheless appears to him or her, but 
mediated through the form of the screen.) For Hanold, the 
'something' about Gradiva is found both upon the surface of 
the bas-relief (in the representation of her step) and beyond 
(in the presence which animates the 'original' step); for 
Austerlitz, however, the experience differs. If we take as an 
example the photograph which depicts a man and woman on 
a theatre stage complete with a painted wilderness backdrop, 
mistakenly identified by Vera as Austerlitz's parents, we can 
see that the point to which Austerlitz and Vera's eyes are 
drawn is not apparently located in either of the 'bodies' 
themselves but instead in the suggestion of a disastrous 
avalanche in the mountains 'above', the arrival of which 
threatens to consume those bodies: Vera says that
I sensed in me the moment of terror in which 
the narrow bridge gives way under the 
sleepwalker's foot, and imagined that, high in 
the rocks above, an avalanche was already 
 194
breaking loose, about to sweep the poor folk 
who had lost their way (for what else would 
have brought them to these desolate 
surroundings?) down into the depths the next 
moment.
(Austerlitz 257-8)
Then: 'Minutes went by, said Austerlitz, in which I too thought 
I saw the cloud of snow crashing into the valley, before I 
heard Vera again, speaking of the mysterious quality peculiar 
to such photographs when they surface from 
oblivion' (Austerlitz 258). For Austerlitz (and Vera), therefore, 
the alien thing in this photograph does, in fact, encompass 
the anonymous bodies of his parents' doubles. But it can only 
be glimpsed obliquely. It is the experience of oblivion, located 
beyond the subject but which nevertheless implicates the 
subject itself. Indeed, the terror is initially sensed by Vera 
within herself, even though she does not imagine herself 
succumbing to it at any moment. In other words, while 
Hanold is obsessed with Gradiva's step as desire for reunion 
of body and trace, Austerlitz is magnetically drawn to his 
false parents' 'possession' of that absence which is conveyed 
by their mute endurance of the unknown itself, in which they 
stand apparently engulfed (from the perspective of the 
photograph) by their fate in that terrible wilderness and 
simultaneously adrift on the mere corner of a stage. The 
parenthetical interjection ('for what else would have brought 
them to these desolate surroundings?') does not appear, 
therefore, to originate with Vera, but instead with Austerlitz 
himself, since the question actually invites an answer which 
is at odds with Vera's supposition that the two figures are 
simply lost. The question that he is asking, like Lacan, is 
'what would bring them to this experience of oblivion in spite 
of themselves?' The answer, for Austerlitz, lies in the very 
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form of the object which 'surfaces' from oblivion itself. The 
photograph screens for him the traces of that Real oblivion 
which is too unbearable to contemplate, even at the moment 
that it appears to present the full traumatic impact of the 
event itself. The two figures, like Austerlitz himself, are 
anything but lost: rather, they remain caught in the full pursuit 
of desire.
II. Nostalgic Gazes: Photographic and Archival 
Screens in Austerlitz
That avalanche, forming unseen, high in unreal mountains, 
and above false parents, anonymous subjects, in a sense 
exemplifies Sebald's much-discussed use of photographs in 
his novels, because it demonstrates the way which the 
eruptive gaze is repeatedly screened in the interaction 
between the text and the archival, photographic 'remnant'. 
Stefanie Harris says that Sebald invites us 
to look beyond the simple reading of these 
photographs as merely enhancing the non-
fictional elements of the text and to ask how 
they might function with and against the 
language of the text itself in order to 
communicate a particular relationship to the 
past.  117
Harris, along with Caroline Duttlinger in 'Traumatic 
Photographs: Remembrance and the Technical Media in W. 
G. Sebald's Austerlitz', suggests a Barthesian reading of 
these photographs, noting that their inclusion in the 
 Stefanie Harris, 'The Return of the Dead: Memory and Photography in W.G. Sebald's Die 117
Ausgewanderten’, The German Quarterly, 74:4 — Sites of Memory (Autumn, 2001), 379-391 
(380).
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intermedial text of the novel enacts, precisely because of 
their particularity, the simultaneous absence and appearance 
of the subjects themselves; the photographs as visual texts 
therefore work alongside the written text in order to enact the 
traumatic loss of memory and history which inflicts the 
subject. Anne Fuchs follows Harris and Duttlinger in 
suggesting that more nuanced critical readings of Sebald’s 
use of photography in his novels must demonstrate ‘that 
Sebald employs the text-image relationship to disturb the 
binary opposition between life and death, remembering and 
forgetting, authenticity and fiction, or absence and 
presence’,  but notes that the theorisation of photography 118
and fine art in Sebald should not conflated: for Fuchs, 
reproductions of fine art in Sebald's early work function in 
opposition to photographs in his later work. Nevertheless, in 
the case of Austerlitz, at least, Harris and Duttlinger's 
readings echo certain portions of Siegfried Kracauer and 
Roland Barthes' theories of photography, in the sense that 
they explore the relationship of the photographic object to its 
'objective' and historical referent. 
Kracauer notes in 'Photography' that 
the photographic image [...] conjures up anew 
a disintegrated unity. This ghostlike reality is 
unredeemed. It consists of elements in space 
whose configuration is so far from necessary 
that one could just as well imagine a different 
organization of these elements. Those things 
once clung to us like our skin [...] We are 
 Anne Fuchs, 'W. G. Sebald's Painters: The Function of Fine Art in His Prose Works’, The 118
Modern Language Review, 101: 1 (Jan., 2006), 167-183 (168).
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contained in nothing and photography 
assembles fragments around a nothing.119
For Kracauer, photography interrupts the experience of 
memory and history by presenting a 'spatial 
continuum' ('Photography' 425) with no substantive value. In 
other words, it makes apparent the image by extricating it 
from the event, preserving the spatial rendering of the 
moment itself. Barthes, meanwhile, appears to argue the 
opposite position. In Camera Lucida, the photograph makes 
present, for the subject, some portion of the referent itself: 'I 
perceive the referent (here, the photograph really transcends 
itself: is this not the sole proof of its art? To annihilate itself as 
medium, to be no longer a sign but the thing itself?)'.  As 120
Jennifer Friedlander has noted, however, Barthes' goal is not 
simply ‘to signal the "realist" concern with the possibility of a 
direct, unmediated relationship with things in the world'  but 121
instead to contend with, in Freudian terms, the 'psychical 
reality' which issues from the image. Barthes, in his 
development of the concepts of the studium and punctum, 
actually seeks to explore something akin to the Lacanian 
gaze, in the sense that he introduces an element (punctum) 
which erupts from the unary field (studium) of the 
photograph, disrupting its consistency for the subject. 
Barthes, in fact, is very clear in linking his punctum with the 
external object of the Lacanian gaze: 
In the Photograph, the event is never 
transcended for the sake of something else: 
the Photograph always leads the corpus I 
 Siegfried Kracauer, ‘Photography', trans. Thomas Y. Levin, Critical Inquiry, 19: 3 (Spring, 1993), 119
421-436 (431).
 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (London: Fontana, 1984), 45.120
 Jennifer Friedlander, Feminine Look: Sexuation, Spectatorship, Subversion (New York: SUNY 121
Press, 2009), 11.
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need back to the body I see; it is the absolute 
Particular, the sovereign Contingency, matte 
and somehow stupid, the This (this 
photograph, and not Photography), in short, 
what Lacan calls the Tuchè, the Occasion, the 
Encounter, the Real, in its indefatigable 
expression.
(Camera Lucida 4)
The subject encounters that which it must, that which it 
desires, in the act of viewing the photograph. In this way, 
Barthes is very clearly linking the play of desire in the scopic 
field, which Lacan illustrates in his analysis of the painting, to 
the photograph. ‘Very often the Punctum is a “detail,” i.e., a 
partial object. Hence, to give examples of punctum is, in a 
certain fashion, to give myself up’ (Camera Lucida 43). In 
other words, Barthes understands that describing the 
punctum is to describe the approach towards (or more 
properly, the approach of) his very desire. This fact is 
illustrated quite clearly when we consider that Camera 
Lucida's purpose, for Barthes, is to both conceive 'a History 
of Looking' (Camera Lucida 12), and to contend with the 
trauma of his mother's death. 'Punctum,' as Luiza Nader and 
others have noted, shares a common etymological root with 
'trauma'.  122
Both Kracauer and Barthes emphasise, in separate senses, 
the 'excess' experienced by the subject while viewing the 
photographic representation itself: in other words, the 
'something which stands out' which marks the subjective 
engagement with the form of the screen. The problem for 
 Luiza Nader, 'Migratory subjects: Memory work in Krzysztof Wodiczko's projections and 122
instruments' in Memory and Migration: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Memory Studies, eds. Julia 
Creet and Andreas Kitzmann (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 249-63 (254).
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both is how to define an excess which appears to ‘exist’ in 
opposition to the 'moment' itself. Both settle upon highlighting 
the connection of the photograph to a ‘pastness’ or 
ghostliness which expresses something which is not simply 
referential. For Kracauer this ghostliness is the result of a 
disjunction of the forms of photography and memory: while 
photography presents the spatial continuum, it does not 
register the value of its ‘contents’. As the spatial continuum 
described by the photograph becomes less contemporary, 
recedes further into the past from the point of view (and the 
point of apparent ‘presence’) of the subject, ‘its semiotic 
value decreases’. This, of course, is a value which can only 
be determined subjectively, in terms of the photograph’s 
relevance for any one subject, for any particular time. As 
Kracauer says 
The old photograph has been emptied of the 
life whose physical presence overlay its 
merely spatial configuration. In inverse 
proportion to photographs, memory-images 
enlarge themselves into monograms of the 
remembered life. The photograph is the 
sediment that has settled from the monogram, 
and from year to year its semiotic value 
decreases. The truth content of the original is 
left behind in its history; the photograph 
captures only the residuum that history has 
discharged.
(‘Photography’ 429)
Meanwhile, Barthes contends that 
[...] the person or thing photographed is the 
target, the referent, a kind of little simulacrum, 
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any eidolon emitted by the object, which I 
should like to call the Spectrum of the 
Photograph, because the word retains, 
through its root, a relation to "spectacle" and 
adds to it that rather terrible thing which is 
there in every photograph: the return of the 
dead.
(Camera Lucida 9)
The 'return of the dead' is literally 'played out' in the 
photograph, in the same way that, according to Barthes, the 
earliest forms of theatre represented otherness: 
[...] the first actors separated themselves from 
the community by playing the role of the 
Dead: to make oneself up was to designate 
oneself as a body simultaneously living and 
dead [...] Now it is this same relation which I 
find in the Photograph; however "lifelike" we 
strive to make it [...], Photography is a kind of 
primitive theater, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a 
figuration of the motionless and made-up face 
beneath which we see the dead.
(Camera Lucida 32)
To render each of these in strictly Lacanian terms: Kracauer 
is describing the Symbolic field of the photograph, while what 
Barthes here contends with is the effect of the Real. While 
the photograph in Kracauer remains an enigmatic signifier 
deprived of meaningful content once it loses the power of 
contemporaneity, like the dead body which shrinks away and 
presents only a mark in comparison to the apparent 
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presence of the 'living figure',  Barthes conceives of a 123
fissure in its symbolic field. In this case, there is no 
experience of death, as such, in the photograph: instead the 
very return of the dead is 'played out' in the identification of 
subject with the gaze itself. This why Friedlander defends 
Barthes from the criticism that Camera Lucida merely posits 
a regressive fantasy of photographic realism. Barthes is not 
suggesting that the dead cannot help but return to us as we 
view the photograph which makes them present (which 
would occur automatically as the photograph somehow 
'removed itself' from the mediating position in between the 
subject and lost object); instead, as Friedlander suggests, 
Barthes expresses a Žižekian nostalgia which is not 
fascinated with 'the displayed scene but the gaze of the naive 
"other" absorbed, enchanted by it’ (Looking Awry 114). What 
Friedlander fails to mention, however, is that Žižek conceives 
of this nostalgic element of the gaze in his reading of cinema, 
while, for Barthes, photography and cinema are theoretically 
distinct media, irreducible with one another. While there is 
undoubtedly (if we assume that Barthes is describing the 
effects of the gaze) a Real aspect of the cinema as there is of 
the photograph, it is not that the punctum 'appears' for the 
subject 'on' the cinema screen as it does on the photograph: 
Last thing about the punctum: whether or not 
it is triggered, it is an addition: it is what I add 
to the photograph and what is nonetheless 
already there. [...] Do I add to the images in 
movies? I don't think so; I don't have time: in 
front of the screen, I am not free to shut my 
eyes; otherwise, opening them again, I would 
not discover the same image [...] 
  'The body of a deceased person appears smaller than the living figure. An old photograph also 123
presents itself as the reduction of a contemporaneous one' ('Photography' 429).
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Yet the cinema has a power which at first 
glance the Photograph does not have: the 
screen (as Bazin has remarked) is not a frame 
but a hideout; the man or woman who 
emerges from it continues living: a "blind field" 
constantly doubles our partial vision. Now, 
confronting millions of photographs, including 
those which have a good studium, I sense no 
blind field: everything which happens within 
the frame dies absolutely once this frame is 
passed beyond. [...] Yet once there is a 
punctum, a blind field is created (is divined) 
[...]
(Camera Lucida 56-7)
Barthes, at first glance, appears to confuse the issue here. 
While the punctum is discernible only in the photograph, it is 
what is responsible for the appearance of the so-called 'blind 
field' for the subject viewing the photograph; meanwhile, the 
blind field exists for the subject viewing the cinema screen 
too, since the blind field is what appears for Barthes, in 
Lacanian terms, to 'hold the gaze', but the blind field is not an 
effect of the punctum in that case. What this demonstrates 
for us, in my opinion, is that Barthes understands the 
necessity of maintaining the irreducibility of the photograph 
and the cinema as forms of media, while also signalling the 
material form of the screen which is common to both. In other 
words, the punctum is the thing which precludes a reductive 
reading of the forms of visual art, while at the same time it is 
that which issues forth from the gaze, objet a in the scopic 
field, signalling the structure of the screen which performs 
this negotiation of the Real in order to maintain the subject's 
Symbolic consistency. So the work of the gaze which is 
described by Lacan as applicable to the analysis of the 
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painting is also applicable to the photograph, and to the 
cinema, precisely because these media are irreducible to 
one another and yet are also based, in the first instance, on 
the form of the screen, which already intervenes in the 
subject’s perception of them. The implication of the screen in 
Lacan is therefore of paramount importance in a sense which 
has not yet been fully understood. Joan Copjec gestures 
towards this in Read My Desire when she says that film 
theory, 'believing itself to be following Lacan, conceives the 
screen as mirror; in doing so, however, it operates in 
ignorance of, and at the expense of, Lacan's more radical 
insight, whereby the mirror is conceived as screen’ (Read My 
Desire 16). But even she does not acknowledge the 
dialectical function of the screen which allows us to 
understand Lacan's revelation in the context of the screen as 
a format; not as a synonym for the cinema, not just 'the big 
screen,' but instead the format which precedes the artistic 
forms structured around it. It is this screen which is collected 
in the archives of Austerlitz and, indeed, of Sebald.
No episode in Austerlitz better exemplifies this primacy of the 
screen, the sense of which has remained unaccounted for 
amongst all analyses of the text, than Austerlitz's arrival at 
Number Twelve Šporkova, the scene of his reunion with 
Vera:
Once I stood for a considerable time outside 
the vaulted entrance to a building, said 
Austerlitz, looking up at a half-relief set in the 
smooth plaster above the keystone of the 
arch. The cast was no more than a square 
foot in size, and showed, set against a 
spangled sea-green background, a blue dog 
carrying a small branch in its mouth, which I 
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could tell, by the prickling of my scalp, it had 
brought back out of my past.
(Austerlitz 213)
The relief, at first, appears important precisely because it is 
signalled 'affectively' as such. For Austerlitz, it is the 'prickling 
of the scalp', an autonomic reaction, which seems to alert 
him to the object's connection to his own past. But the 
production of affect here is immediately, already, invested 
with meaning: the prickling of the scalp merely confirms the 
fact that the object is already part of the ceaseless 
movement of Austerlitz's desire. In other words, it only 
produces this physical effect because it already 
accomplishes the dompte-regarde which marks out this 
pacification of the eye. It affects Austerlitz because it is a 
screen which leads him further away from the unstable 
vortex of history by appearing to bring him closer to it, like 
our original subject-in-negotiation with the sculptural relief, 
Hanold, in accordance with his desire. Therefore we can say 
that this 'prickling of the scalp' is not a true expression of 
affect. It is interesting to consider this sculptural form of the 
screen, which, even more than the painting or photograph, 
enacts the irruption of desire via the simultaneous eruption of 
the raised feature (upon and beyond the screen) which 
ensnares the subject in the act of looking.  The materiality 124
of the object itself appears to enact the tension in which it is 
caught; the smoothness of the plaster of the relief combines 
with its form, which is caught between the more apparently 
sculptural form of the high relief and much shallower low 
relief. Out of the smooth surface bursts a dog carrying a 
 The relief effect (in a stone sculpture, not a plaster one like Austerlitz encounters) is created, of 124
course, by an illusion of its production: the 'raised' portions of the sculpture are created by 
removing the surrounding material, so that figure which appears to burst forth from the sculpted 
scene is really only the remaining distraction atop a lowered plane. The parallels with both Lacan 
and Barthes' theories of looking at the art object seem numerous and useful.
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branch, and it is straight out of Austerlitz' past. But it is also, 
this branch, an alien feature which is never 'past', and 
instead only finds a new object in the act of desiring. This 
explains why there is no madeleine moment for Austerlitz 
here: Austerlitz says that he 'could recognize nothing for 
certain' (Austerlitz 213). Instead he is enraptured by these 
'signs and characters from the type-case of forgotten 
things' (Austerlitz 214) without being granted the referent of 
the sign itself, which exists, presumably, in his own past. The 
dog 'trots' forward, an effect produced by the form of the 
object, but it is the branch itself, that thing which is nothing in 
particular, carried along in the movement from one subjective 
position to the other, which embodies the 'return' of memory, 
trauma, and 'the repressed' in Austerlitz. 
This is why it is necessary for us not to simply 'apply' Lacan 
to the text, to avoid the 'psychoanalytic interpretation of art', 
against which Žižek has been so careful to warn us, but to 
use this opportunity to read Lacan alongside Austerlitz, 
where each succeeds in illuminating the position and work of 
the screen in the other. We can witness the necessity of 
performing a reappraisal of Sebald's work from a critical 
standpoint with one final example, from Harris's reading of 
the conclusion of another of Sebald's novels, The Emigrants:
The end of Sebald's text describes three 
young women as they sit at a loom, and 
although their eyes are veiled to the viewer by 
the lighting in the room, the narrator senses 
that they gaze directly at the viewer, who now 
takes the place of the photographer. [...] They 
present a loss that cannot be transcended and 
thus put to rest, will not stay buried, but will 
remain a haunting that gazes relentlessly into 
the future, that returns again and again, that 
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can not be cleaned up or swept away. A past 
that must be passed on or else be consigned 
to oblivion, but that is threatened in the very 
act of its communication. 
('The Return of the Dead: Memory and 
Photography in W.G. Sebald's Die 
Ausgewanderten' 389-90)
The photograph that the narrator describes is one of a series 
which were discovered in a suitcase in a second-hand book 
store in Vienna — in other words, another archive — 
documenting the Litzmannstadt Ghetto, in Łódź. The 
discovery of the photographs was no work of fiction: they 
exist, the product of ghetto council member Walter 
Genewein's amateur love of photography, which he turned 
particularly towards the daily work of the ghetto. Genewein 
was the head accountant for the ghetto, a Nazi. So the 
narrator's conflation of himself with the photographer at first 
seems troubling in a sense which Harris ignores, even as it 
enacts a familiarly 'Sebaldian' interplay of memory and 
history, text and intertext, fiction and fact:
Behind the perpendicular frame of a loom sit 
three young women, perhaps aged twenty. [...] 
Who the young women are I do not know. The 
light falls on them from the window in the 
background, so I cannot make out their eyes 
clearly, but I sense that all three of them are 
looking across at me, since I am standing on 
the very spot where Genewein the accountant 
stood with his camera.125
 W.G. Sebald, The Emigrants, trans. Michael Hulse (New York: New Directions, 1997), 237.125
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The text reveals that the viewer of the photograph does not, 
in fact, as Harris suggests, 'take the place of the 
photographer’. The only reason that the narrator 'senses' the 
gaze of the three women is because he now occupies the 
spot where the photograph was originally taken. He thus 
experiences a kind of simultaneity which belies what 
Kracauer might describe as the recession of the spatial 
continuum of photograph itself: that estrangement which 
serves to render the symbolic field, if we put it in Lacanian 
terms, a little more 'formal', more purely Symbolic. We can 
understand this in the way that the narrator intuits his sense 
of the gazes of the women. This is not the gaze of the Other, 
it is not the punctum in Barthes, but the manifold action of the 
'actors' of the photograph. As the narrator continues, we see 
how his relationship with the object itself begins to transcend 
this momentary simultaneity with the scene:
The young woman in the middle is blonde and 
has the air of a bride about her. The weaver to 
the left has inclined her head a little to one 
side, whilst the woman on the right is looking 
at me with so steady and relentless a gaze 
that I cannot meet it for long.
(The Emigrants 237)
Now the gaze erupts from the photograph, finally, the 
punctum piercing the narrator's field of vision by 
distinguishing itself from the studium for him in the act of 
viewing. What this demonstrates is that the women do not 
only present a figure of the 'traumatic past', as Harris 
contends; we must go further and understand that they form 
part of the screen which enables the negotiation itself with 
this traumatic past. That piercing gaze, that stain of the Real 
which is also that which institutes the Symbolic order for the 
 208
subject, is a point which both threatens to pierce the subject 
(witness the narrator's obeisant submission) and also forms 
the very point at which the subject itself is guaranteed. The 
narrator's subjectivity is guaranteed by his negotiation with 
the object, object-as-screen, which also performs a 
negotiation before any other. The horror of the scene will not 
be transcended, as Harris notes, but it is not because it 
cannot be 'cleaned up or swept away': it is because it need 
not be so, because that 'cleaning up' would miss the point. 
For the subject in Sebald, the screen invites — not a closure, 
but a negotiation.
III. Searching For Screens: After Nature and 
Austerlitz
It seems clear that there is an element of Žižekian subjective-
nostalgic identification with the gaze in the characterisation of 
Austerlitz; what is more, this element reappears throughout 
Sebald's work. I would like to investigate the appearance of 
the gaze in Sebald's work in order to think about the way in 
which we find desire functioning therein. Susan Sontag 
signals, in her essay 'A Mind in Mourning', the consistent 
reappearance of this subjective-nostalgic gaze in Sebald 
when she mentions the recurrent themes of Sebald's work: 
In W. G. Sebald's books, a narrator who, as 
we are reminded occasionally, bears the name 
W. G. Sebald, travels about registering 
evidence of the mortality of nature, recoiling 
from the ravages of modernity, musing over 
the secrets of obscure lives.126
 Susan Sontag, Where the Stress Falls (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 41.126
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This triumvirate, especially in Austerlitz, defines the relation 
of the narrator to the uncovering of an unapproachable and 
inhospitable world. An interesting comparison can be made 
between the first section of Sebald's 1988 debut, the long-
form prose poem After Nature, and the episode of Austerlitz 
in which Austerlitz confronts a photograph, which his 
childhood nanny Vera discovers, of himself as a young boy; 
this comparison demonstrates the manner in which Sebald 
depicts the repeated evacuation of subjectivity experienced 
by the one who views another in the act of viewing. 
In After Nature, we are introduced to a form of relationship 
structured around the obscure(d) subject and the 
biographical evidence of his life: Sebald focuses upon the 
uncannily doubled subjectivity of the Renaissance artist 
Mattheus Grünewald, the master who painted the Isenheim 
altarpiece, and the question of Grünewald's relationship with 
the hydraulic engineer Mathis Nithart. Were they the same 
person, were they lovers, were they collaborators, master 
and student, or was their relationship something else 
entirely? As Dorothea von Mücke has noted,
[...] the poem engages directly in the 
productive reception of Grünewald by 
meditating on the identity of the painter from 
the position of a late twentieth-century 
observer. [...] in doing so the poem re-writes 
or undoes the accepted art historical narrative 
and engages with the painter and his oeuvre 
in order to pursue questions about the 
relationship between artist and work of art and 
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about the relationship between the work of art 
and history.127
What is important to note, for our purposes, is the manner in 
which Sebald explicitly constructs the position of the narrator 
of the poem as a twentieth century observer of both the 
biographical figure of Grünewald and the altarpiece itself. 
The narrator cannot observe the historical traces of the work 
without first contending with the material object itself. As von 
Mücke notes, the poem opens by placing emphasis upon the 
materiality of the altarpiece:
Whoever closes the wings
of the altar in the Lindenhardt
parish church and locks up
the carved figures in their casing
on the lefthand panel
will be met by St. George.
(After Nature 5)
The painting is thus immediately rendered in the poem as a 
series of screens which must be understood in their material 
context. The observer of the work must confront this material, 
'objective' dimension of the object before considering the 
figures depicted upon it: 
This approach treats the altarpiece stripped of 
its religious and devotional function and thus 
entirely like a work of art. [...] By emphasizing 
the three dimensional nature of the altar that 
resembles the format of a bound volume, the 
 Dorothea von Mücke, 'History and the Work of Art in Sebald’s After Nature’, nonsite.org issue 1, 127
<http://nonsite.org/issues/issue-1/sebalds-after-nature-authorship-at-the-threshold-of-
representation>, accessed 8/6/15.
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fact that its wings need to be closed and 
opened in order to be seen in its entirety, the 
poem begins with an emphasis on the unique 
physical object. 
('History and the Work of Art in Sebald's After 
Nature') 
In Austerlitz, Austerlitz experiences the photograph of himself 
as a young boy as a material artefact before he can derive 
anything other than a purely Symbolic sense from its 
representative field. Vera tells him that 'On the back it says 
Jacquot Austerlitz, páže ružové královny, in your 
grandfather's handwriting', a fact which initially occupies 
Austerlitz's attention far more than the photographic image 
itself:
The picture lay before me, said Austerlitz, but I 
dared not touch it. The words páže ružové 
královny, páže ružové královny went round 
and round in my head, until their meaning 
came to me from far away, and once again I 
saw the live tableau with the Rose Queen and 
the little boy carrying her train at her side. Yet 
hard as I tried both that evening and later, I 
could not recollect myself in the part.
(Austerlitz 259)
Austerlitz contemplates the form of the object itself, turning 
the words written on the reverse of the photograph around in 
his head. Vera explains the context of the photograph: young 
Austerlitz accompanied his mother, Agata, to a masquerade. 
The words on the reverse therefore merely describe the 
image depicted upon the face of the photograph: Jacques 
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Austerlitz, the Rose Queen's pageboy. The object itself, 
which it seems should produce a revelatory effect, does 
nothing other than describe itself. Like After Nature, the 
object is initially apprehended in its material form, resisting 
meaning other than as a self-referential point of signification. 
In other words, the picture of young Austerlitz, dressed in a 
snow white costume, not his own clothes, and standing in the 
middle of a 'bare, level field' with a 'blurred, dark area above 
the horizon' (Austerlitz 259) reveals nothing other than a 
shallow, insensible field. The object does not lead towards an 
authentic self presence: it leads away from it.
In After Nature, we realise that the narrator is viewing 
Grünewald in the act of viewing himself, or Nithart; or, 
indeed, both:
An x-ray photograph of the Sebastian panel
reveals beneath the elegiac
portrait of the saint
that same face again, the half-
profile only turned a tiny bit further
in the definitive over-painting.
Here two painters in one body,
whose hurt flesh belonged to both,
to the end pursued the study
of their own nature. At first
Nithart fashioned his self-portrait
from a mirror image, and Grünewald,
with great love, precision and patience
and an interest in the skin
and hair of his companion extending
to the blue shadow of the beard,
then over-painted it.
(After Nature 18-9)
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Grünewald seems to be, in a sense, doubled, in layers of 
both paint and history. Though the model in the portrait, 
according to the narrator, is supposedly Nithart, the artist 
'himself' is difficult to 'pin down': the Saint Sebastian panel of 
the Isenheim altarpiece is attributed to Grünewald, but, as 
the narrator notes, the historian W.K. Zülch theorised that 
Grünewald and Nithart were the same person; meanwhile, 
current historical opinion suggests that they were in fact 
lovers, with Nithart a 'contributor' to Grünewald's work. In the 
poem, both painters 'belong' to the same body, that of Saint 
Sebastian, as certain 'features' of Nithart become subject, 
indeed, to Grünewald's desire, which locates in Nithart only 
what Grünewald wishes to see. The intensity of Grünewald's 
dedication to the representation of Nithart's skin and hair 
enacts the eccentric moment of the gaze as we have already 
defined it. 'When, in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly 
unsatisfying and always missing is that — You never look at 
me from the place from which I see you. [...] Conversely, 
what I look at is never what I wish to see' (The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 103). Beneath the 
surface layer of the painting, Nithart's original self-portrait 
expresses the solicitation of the look: here is the place that I 
am looked at, here is what you may see but I may not. In the 
level of the overpainting, however, Grünewald adds this 
converse: what I am looking at is not what I wish to see, 
therefore I will show you what you are for me. Grünewald 
literally applies, as paint, the correlative of the screen of 
fantasy in the upper layer of this overpainting. As we can 
see, Grünewald is not only doubled in the image of his lover 
(and they may already be one and the same); he is, as 
Lacan makes clear, doubled already in the image of himself: 
doubled because of the very fact that the 'lover' whom he 
attempts to represent is only glimpsed through the screen of 
his own fantasy, is only that which he already locates, 
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supposes to exist, in the body of his partner. Approaching the 
double, in the case of After Nature, results in the revelation 
not of the imaginary mirror, but of that which is, as Lacan 
says, in you more than you: the sublime Thing which is not 
encapsulated in a mirror image but which exceeds the 
subject in the gaze. To approach a double, therefore, is to 
approach an object: objet a.
Can't we see that Sebald's representation of these artistic 
screens forms the basis for his technique of producing that 
which Sontag calls 'obscure life' of his subjects? Sebald 
shows us, in After Nature certainly, but most of all, especially, 
in Austerlitz, that the subject may forever be at the mercy of 
the trompe-l'oeil, subject to the trap for the eye which, finally, 
signals the incidence of desire. As we remember, the trompe-
l'oeil traps the eye by forcing the subject to confront 
themselves in the picture, but this shift in perspective also 
prompts the encounter with the gaze itself. As Alain Vanier 
notes:
There is always a missing place, Lacan says, 
an absence in a picture, one that we may 
think of as a corollary of the blind spot in our 
vision. This spot "functions" as a hole. [...] 
From the place that the picture "assigns" you, 
the object appears confused, unrecognizable. 
In order to see it, you have to put yourself in 
the picture plane: it specifies you from the 
place where it is looking at you.128
The effect of the trompe-l'oeil, as Vanier says, is to ensure 
that the subject can never 'see' everything. By reorienting 
his- or herself along the lines of the picture, the subject must 
 Alain Vanier, Lacan, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 2000), 28-9.128
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adopt a compromised position: 'compromised' in the sense 
that the position is a result of a negotiation with the screen, in 
other words, with the function of dompte-regard, and 
compromised also in the sense that it jeopardises the ability 
of the subject to continue this negotiation with the picture by 
revealing the appearance of the stain of the Real in the 
picture (the irruption of the gaze). It is not possible for the 
subject to view the painting in a way which will permit the 
painting to be seen in totality, in other words, in a manner 
which will reveal both the dompte-regard and trompe-l'oeil 
simultaneously. In Austerlitz, the discovery of the photograph 
of young Jacques Austerlitz prompts an example of the 
nostalgic identification of the subject with the gaze which 
reveals this very nature of 'incompleteness':
I examined every detail under a magnifying 
glass without once finding the slightest clue. 
And in doing so I always felt the piercing, 
inquiring gaze of the page boy who had come 
to demand his dues, who was waiting in the 
grey light of dawn on the empty field for me to 
accept the challenge and avert the misfortune 
lying ahead of him. That evening in the 
Šporkova, when Vera put the picture of the 
child cavalier in front of me, I was not, as you 
might suppose, moved or distressed, said 
Austerlitz, only speechless and 
uncomprehending, incapable of lucid thought. 
Even later nothing by blind panic filled me 
when I thought of the five-year-old page.
(Austerlitz 260)  
We can see that the mere details of the picture convey 
nothing other than the marks of diegetic reality to Austerlitz. 
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Instead, it is through this pulsating, extraordinary object of 
the gaze that Austerlitz's 'incomprehension' becomes 
materialised. It seems strange to say that the picture conveys 
nothing other than the absence of comprehension, but it is 
this very absence which 'twists' Austerlitz's desire, which sets 
him towards that vacant position occupied by the figures of 
his parents. (It is interesting to note that, throughout this 
passage, Austerlitz refers to his mother as the 'Rose Queen’: 
an empty Symbolic gesture if there ever was one.) 
Austerlitz's compromise is here made only when he accepts 
that he can find nothing in the photograph merely by 
searching for it. Only once he examines every particular 
detail of the photograph does the gaze pierce him and fill him 
with 'blind panic'. What Austerlitz experiences here is akin to 
the shame of the voyeur described by Lacan:
Although this analysis brings out the agency 
of the gaze, it is not at the level of the other 
whose gaze surprises the subject looking 
through the keyhole. It is that the other 
surprises him, the subject, as entirely hidden 
gaze.
[...] The gaze is this object lost and suddenly 
refound in the conflagration of shame, by the 
introduction of the other. Up to that point, what 
is the subject trying to see? What he is trying 
to see, make no mistake, is the object as 
absence.
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 182)
For Lacan, the voyeur intends to surmount the gaze of the 
other by attaining it. It is not simply that the voyeur is 
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surprised to see someone looking at him, it is rather that the 
voyeur is surprised to find that the gaze exists where he did 
not suppose it should. Austerlitz rediscovers the gaze in the 
photograph of himself as a child. It bursts forth, disrupting the 
Symbolic and Imaginary consistency of the image itself, that 
which threatens to enlighten Austerlitz by furnishing him with 
previously unknown details of his past. The image 
disturbingly locates the gaze of the other in that estranged 
figure of the past. What Austerlitz experiences in his blind 
panic is a nostalgic desire to identify with the gaze of the 
other, to be granted access to the position from which he 
might experience that gaze and 'avert the misfortune lying 
ahead' of himself. This experience exemplifies Austerlitz's 
journey to reclaim his past. When faced with that stain of the 
Real which cannot be contained as symbolically consistent 
screen, he reacts with panic, reconfirming his own 'lostness':
As far back as I can remember, said Austerlitz, 
I have always felt as if I had no place in reality, 
as if I were not there at all, and I never had 
this impression more strongly than on that 
evening in the Šporkova when the eyes of the 
Rose Queen's page looked through me. Even 
the next day, on my way to Terezin, I could not 
imagine who or what I was.
(Austerlitz 261-2)
Upon confronting the image of himself as a child for the very 
first time in his life, Austerlitz feels no further forward on the 
journey to locate his 'authentic' self or his place in reality: in 
fact, he experiences the opposite sensation. It never strikes 
him more keenly than the precise moment in which he holds 
the record of that which he seeks. This is what Lacan means 
when he says that objet a 'only dissolves, in the final 
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analysis, owing to its failure, unable, as it is, to sustain itself 
in approaching the real’ (Encore 95): the closer we get to the 
object of our desire, the less bearable our experience 
becomes, unless we first introduce another screen with 
which to shield ourselves; conversely, introducing this screen 
is only what makes the object 'reappear' in our view. For 
Austerlitz, finding the 'record' of his past is the fantasy that he 
uses to screen that unbearable desire to keep searching, a 
desire which can never be satisfied. It is that desire which 
transubstantiates the mere material screen into an object, for 
Austerlitz, which is worthy of obsessive pursuit and 
collection. 
In Sebald's rendering of the Saint Sebastian panel of the 
Isenheim altarpiece, it is this very point, at which subjective 
experience becomes compromised in the face of the object-
cause of desire, which animates the 'obscurity' of the life of 
Mattheus Grünewald:
Through the window on his left a
landscape with mountain and valley
and the curved line of a path is visible.
The last, Zülch philosophizes, is the way
into the world, and no one took it other
than the man, vanished without trace,
to whom his research is devoted and whose 
art
he thinks he can recognize in the anonymous
picture.
(After Nature 17)
This 'curved line of a path' is that which invites the subject to 
reorient him- or herself in relation to the picture. It does not 
produce an example of anamorphosis from the point of view 
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of the viewer, as in the skull in The Ambassadors, but is 
nevertheless an example of trompe-l'oeil, at least for Zülch. 
While the body of Saint Sebastian, shot through with arrows 
— actually the body of Sebastian and more, the space of 
negotiation of Grünewald's desire, occluding and 
representing both Grünewald and Nithart's bodies — 
dominates the panel, it is to the curved path and beyond that 
Sebald directs us. This curved path holds the same power as 
the stain identified by Žižek in Munch's The Scream: 
A cursory glance at Munch's The Scream 
reveals how its surface is "drawn": the right 
half is far more anamorphotically distorted 
than the left half; that is, the painting is 
"sucked" toward its center of gravity 
approximately two-thirds of the way up its right 
side, and the homunculus is seized with horror 
at being drawn into this whirlpool.
(‘Grimaces of the Real’ 52)
While the curved path in Grünewald's painting does not 
appear to anamorphotically distort in the eyes of the viewer, 
there can be no doubt that the landscape beyond the window 
exerts a pull upon the surface of the painting beyond that 
which we would expect purely from its mimetic logic. Sebald 
notes how
The panic-stricken
kink in the neck to be seen
in all of Grünewald's subjects,
exposing the throat and often turning
the face towards a blinding light,
is the extreme repose of our bodies
to the absence of balance in nature
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(After Nature 27)
That 'panic-stricken kink in the neck' is produced in the 
painting of Saint Sebastian, too, producing an effect which 
appears to draw the Saint's (Grünewald's? Nithart's?) body 
towards the curved path, towards that 'way into the world' 
which serves only to lead towards a final 'vanishing without a 
trace'. Unlike the homunculus of The Scream, however, Saint 
Sebastian exhibits no appearance of horror as his body is 
drawn towards the world outside. Instead, his face is turned 
away from the window, apparently looking across the frame 
to the main panel of the painting, where Jesus is hung from 
the cross. We might also think of the world beyond the 
surface, where the 'other' figure of Nithart lurks. The 
overpainted figure literally looks beyond the confines of the 
panel itself, as if denying the presence of that uncomfortable 
vanishing figure which breaks the screen of fantasy: that 
'absence of balance in nature' which produces a distortion for 
subject viewing it. In this way, Sebald sketches, at the outset 
of his earliest work, the relationship between the 'obscure life' 
with the 'mortality of nature' and the 'ravages of modernity’; in 
other words, the relationship between the subject who, faced 
with the moment of exposure to unutterable trauma in history, 
cannot maintain the screen of fantasy which prevents this 
moment from bursting forth.
In a very similar manner, we realise that Sebald signals to us 
the presence of the gaze in the photograph of the Rose 
Queen's page in the manner in which he subtly reconstructs 
the picture by reproducing the encounter with it from 
Austerlitz's 'point of view'. Our view of the photograph is 
irrevocably entwined with Austerlitz's own. Before he 
mentions anything of his experience of the gaze of the young 
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boy, Austerlitz describes the various points of staining and 
blurring which appear to be located around the boy's eyes:
[...] the bare level field where I am standing 
[...]; the blurred, dark area above the horizon, 
the boy's curly hair, spectrally light around the 
outline of his head, the cape over his arm 
which appears to be held at an angle, or as I 
once thought, said Austerlitz, might have been 
broken or in a splint [...]
(Austerlitz 259-60)
Each element invites us to reappraise the photograph, to 
accept this subtle rewriting of the visual text itself, preparing 
us to accept the gaze-for-Austerlitz of the young boy, before 
we even encounter it as such. The bare field constitutes an 
empty symbolic field, ripe for the irruption of the gaze from 
within: the blurred area and the 'spectral lightness' above the 
horizon now appears to form a kind of obscure halo around 
young Austerlitz's head, creating the impression that the 
entire figure is floating away or separate from the field of the 
picture; the unexpected angle of the cape appears to signal a 
distortion of the body itself, perhaps broken, perhaps twisted 
like the necks of Grünewald's figures, which signals the 
'centre of gravity,' in Žižek's words, of the photograph, 
drawing our eyes to the young boy's head, the thing which 
appears to aetiologically orient all other aspects of the 
photograph. Like Austerlitz, we cannot help but be puzzled 
by any particular detail of the picture and instead become 
drawn inexorably towards the boy's gaze. That gaze leads, in 
a sense, to Austerlitz's 'way into the world': in piercing 
Austerlitz, the one who must look for/at himself, it signals the 
presence of an impossible desire to reoccupy the space from 
which the boy looks 'forward,' looks 'ahead' to his misfortune. 
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This moment surely repudiates critical charges of melodrama 
directed towards Austerlitz by John Zilcosky,  since it 129
constitutes an ethical rather than a melodramatic act: 
Austerlitz is not expressing 'a melodramatic desire for "total 
expressivity"' related precisely to the "ineffability" of the 
subject matter' ('Lost and Found' 695), as Zilcosky argues, 
referencing Peter Brooks' The Melodramatic Imagination; 
rather than the Holocaust (as event which orients Austerlitz's 
personal trauma) forming a core which he then seeks to 
totally expose, to make naked in its expressivity, Austerlitz 
instead seeks to prop up the screen which makes his desire 
appear anew, even with the knowledge, as an experienced 
user of the archive, that the total expressivity of the event 
itself is not possible in the act of searching for its traces. In 
other words, Austerlitz here rejects the melodramatic desire 
for total expressivity. It is only at the moment of his 
breakdown that Austerlitz approaches the point of a totality of 
history ‘made present’, in which the traumatic memory of his 
arrival at Liverpool Street Station spectrally plays before him; 
but the very fact that he succumbs to this vision is evidence 
of the fact that this moment is the dimension of experience 
which is opposed to desire: instead it belongs to the 
jouissance of the drive.
IV. The Abyss and Superposed Time
It is from that point of the mysterious young boy in the 
photograph that Austerlitz's story begins, that the name 
'Austerlitz' assumes its full power for him only once it is also 
stripped from and forgotten by him. When his foster mother 
dies, Austerlitz's foster father suffers a breakdown, leaving 
 See Zilcosky, 'Lost and Found: Disorientation, Nostalgia, and Holocaust Melodrama in Sebald's 129
Austerlitz’, MLN, 121: 3 — German Issue (Apr., 2006), 679-698.
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only the headmaster of his boarding school to reveal to the 
boy this name and nothing more: 
First, however, it was his duty to tell me that I 
must put not Dafydd Elias but Jacques 
Austerlitz on my exam papers. It appears, said 
Penrith-Smith, that this is your real name. My 
foster parents, with whom he had discussed 
the matter at length when I entered school, 
had meant to tell me about my origins in good 
time [...] As far as the other boys are 
concerned, said Penryth-Smith, you remain 
Dafydd Elias for the time being. There's no 
need to let anyone know. It's just that you will 
have to put Jacques Austerlitz on your 
examination papers [...] Penrith-Smith had 
written the name on a piece of paper, and 
when he handed it to me I could think of 
nothing to say [...] At first, what disconcerted 
me most was that I could connect no ideas at 
all with the word Austerlitz. If my new name 
had been Morgan or Jones, I could have 
related it to reality. I even knew the name 
Jacques from a French nursery rhyme. But I 
had never heard of an Austerlitz before, and 
from the first I was convinced that no one else 
bore that name, no one in Wales, or in the 
Isles, or anywhere else in the world.
(Austerlitz 93-5)
There is no better example than this of the Lacanian 
discourse of the master, which is summed up by the dictum 
that a signifier represents a subject only for another signifier. 
The signifier (the proper noun) produces the subject in the 
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act of nomination, while at the same time functioning only 
because of what it is not (which is the set of all other 
signifiers): here Austerlitz experiences what Lacan would call 
a 'subjective destitution'. Caught in between two signifiers, 
Austerlitz feels that there is no signifier of his subjectivity; for 
the first time he experiences himself, not as 'Austerlitz', but 
as the 'barred subject', $, only the reference of a name for 
another name. That to which Austerlitz relates is only that 
which is also outside himself. His subjectivity is revealed as 
radically eccentric at this moment because he discovers that 
'Dafydd Elias' is no more himself than 'Jacques Austerlitz', 
and what is more that neither name is produced as more or 
less essentially 'true' by the piece of paper which he now 
holds in his hand. When he says that he 'could connect no 
ideas' with the word itself, Austerlitz comes to face the 
realisation that his subjectivity is only represented outside of 
'himself', in the battery of signifiers which are the domain of 
the Other. That which Austerlitz here experiences as the 
word itself connects to nothing other than another signifier. At 
this moment, Austerlitz is suddenly evacuated from the 
fantasy of his self, his subjectivity revealed as fractured all 
along. What is produced for the subject in this movement of 
the signifying chain is a remainder, a surplus designated by 
Lacan by a small 'a': objet a. Austerlitz, upon seeing this 
piece of paper for the first time, is really confronted by 
another screen: a piece of paper which simultaneously 
reveals an emptied self and the promise of its rehabilitation in 
another object, a prop for the continuation of fantasy, which 
can only be produced by a ceaseless search for another, 
bearing the name Austerlitz. 
This reading, however, demonstrates the problems of 
reducing the subject purely to the Symbolic dimension of 
experience. In order to illustrate this, we might borrow Žižek's 
example and think of the way in which the game of chess is 
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defined in its Symbolic sense by the moves which the pieces 
are permitted to make:
[...] from the purely formal symbolic 
standpoint, 'knight' is defined only by the 
moves this figure can make. This level is 
clearly different from the imaginary one, 
namely the way in which different pieces are 
shaped and characterized by their names [...] 
Finally, real is the entire complex set of 
contingent circumstances that affect the 
course of the game [...]
(How to Read Lacan 8-9)
In the same way, while we in no way reduce him to the status 
of a pawn, it is clear that Austerlitz is 'shaped and 
characterised' by the names 'Dafydd Elias' and 'Jacques 
Austerlitz', and is permitted to 'move', in other words to act 
according to that signifier which represents his subjectivity, 
by the revelation of that 'original' name. But, by neglecting 
the effects of the Real, this reading fails to account for the 
very fact that Austerlitz himself does not immediately pursue 
that knowledge of his parents. In other words, he is not 
simply subject to an unconscious external 'mechanical' 
regulation of the Other, which is often incorrectly assumed to 
be the meaning or outcome of Lacan's 'decentered' or barred 
subject. Instead Austerlitz demonstrates the manner in which 
the real comes to be made 'identifiable': not as simply the 
'unsymbolisable', as in a kernel of experience resisting or 
eluding symbolisation, but as the very gap or fissure in the 
Symbolic network which is the result of the subject's 
assumption of that realm in the first place. In this sense, it 
becomes apparent that Austerlitz is suffering from the effects 
of a traumatic Real which irrupts when he encounters an 
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impasse to which there is no answer to be found in his own 
experience:
From where I stand now, of course, I can see 
that my name alone, and the fact that it was 
kept from me until my fifteenth year, ought to 
have put me on the track of my origins, but it 
has also become clear to me of late why an 
agency greater than or superior to my own 
capacity for thought, which circumspectly 
directs operations somewhere in my brain, 
has always preserved me from my own secret, 
systematically preventing me from drawing the 
obvious conclusions and embarking on the 
inquiries they would have suggested to me. It 
hasn't been easy to make my way out of my 
own inhibitions, and it will not be easy now to 
put the story into anything like proper order.
(Austerlitz, 60-1)
The fact that this symbolic difficulty persists, in attempting to 
'put the story into proper order', is an example, not of the 
Real as an external traumatic core, but of Real as that which 
is insinuated within our experience of reality. Whitehead's 
argument, that 'Sebald's characters are traumatised 
individuals, living in the shadow of the Holocaust and subject 
to the contingencies of exile and displacement' (Trauma 
Fiction 119), does not therefore fully convey the mechanism 
by which this traumatic experience comes to bear upon the 
individual in Sebald. It conceives of the Holocaust as a 
monolithic traumatic experience which removes the 
dimension of subjective insistence. Trauma in Austerlitz does 
not exist; it insists. In other words, it only assumes its full 
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understood to be the expression of an irruptive process 
which, rather than simply intruding upon the psychic life of 
the subject, is only retroactively raised to the level of 
traumatic Real. As Žižek says, 'the original fact here is the 
symbolic deadlock, and the traumatic event is resuscitated to 
fill in the gaps in the universe of meaning' (How to Read 
Lacan 74). 
This level of subjective insistence extends to the experience 
of time in Austerlitz, which is integrally associated with the 
'level' of trauma itself. Austerlitz's uncanny experience of the 
image of the camp in the wilderness demonstrates this 
relationship:
[...] my mind dwelt chiefly on the fenced 
square in the middle and the tent-like building 
at the far end, with a cloud of white smoke 
above it. Whatever may have been going on 
inside me at the time, the children of Israel's 
camp in the wilderness was closer to me than 
life in Bala, which I found more 
incomprehensible every day, or at least, said 
Austerlitz, that is how it strikes me now.
(Austerlitz 80) 
This passage exemplifies the method by which the novel 
constructs the representation of time: trapped, as we are, as 
Austerlitz is, in the stricture of memory, time itself assumes a 
superposed form. As Austerlitz recalls the memory, he 
simultaneously reinterprets it according to 'how it strikes [him] 
now': the memory is rendered as an explicitly subjective form 
which is already altered by the fact of its own observation. As 
Carole Angier suggests, 'Austerlitz explores in detail the 
theme of the unreality of time. We know from the study of 
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history that the layers of time co-exist [...] but Austerlitz longs 
to experience it'.  The text continually invites the traces of 130
the physical past 'into' the experience of the present, not 
metaphorically woven into the present as much as they 
literally form its substratum, a sedimentation, the subjective 
effects of which appear to be a resuscitation provoked only 
once the impasse in experience is encountered. Perhaps the 
most notable example of this is the case of the Bibliothèque 
Nationale in Paris, to which Austerlitz travels at the end of the 
novel in order to track down the record of his father, and 
which is constructed, in fact, upon the grounds of the 
Austerlitz-Tolbiac depot which housed the seized 
possessions of Jewish families in Paris following the German 
occupation of the city. Austerlitz's father fled Czechoslovakia 
to live in Paris at the outbreak of the war, and while Austerlitz 
searches for traces of the man within in the administrative 
records of the library, he learns from a member of the library 
staff that some of his father's possessions may have been 
buried in the foundations of the building itself:
The most valuable items, of course, were not 
sent off wholesale to the bombed cities, and 
no one will now admit to knowing where they 
went, for the fact is that the whole affair is 
buried in the most literal sense beneath the 
foundations of our pharaonic President's 
Grande Bibliothèque, said Lemoine.
(Austerlitz 403)
 Carole Angier, ''And so they are ever returning to us, the dead': The Presence of the Dead in 130
W.G. Sebald’, Melilah: Manchester Journal of Jewish Studies, Supplementary Vol. 2 — Memory, 
Traces and the Holocaust in the Writings of W.G. Sebald (2012), 5-12 (8-9).
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The effect of this sedimentation of history as metaphor for 
superposed time is a complex one of personal attraction and 
repulsion:
We were standing only a foot behind the glass 
panels which reach all the way to the ground. 
As soon as you looked down at the light-
coloured promenade deck and the darker 
crowns of the trees emerging from it, the pull 
exerted by the abyss below took hold of you, 
forcing you to step back. Sometimes, so 
Lemoine told me, said Austerlitz, he felt the 
current of time streaming round his temples 
and brow when he was up here, but perhaps, 
he added, that is only a reflex of the 
awareness formed in my mind over the years 
of the various layers which have been 
superimposed on each other to form the 
carapace of the city.
(Austerlitz 400-1)
The 'abyss below', beneath the newly constructed library, is 
the very sedimentation of layer which provokes 'the current of 
time' issuing from it, but also seems to embody something 
more than this. The subjective reaction to this abyss, in which 
the pull exerted by it is the very thing which forces Austerlitz 
to step back from it, is not simply the reaction to the 
approach towards the object-cause of desire described in 
Lacan. The abyss itself is clearly something separate from 
the screen: while, as we have seen, Austerlitz locates in 
these everyday objects of the archive that small gap in the 
Symbolic from which the Real threatens to erupt, objet a 
which transubstantiates its bearer into the object-cause of 
desire, the abyss reappears in Austerlitz as a very different 
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feature. It is, rather, the very experience of the magnetic and 
yet traumatic flow of jouissance, what Žižek calls 'the 
whirlpool of enjoyment threatening to swallow us all' (Looking 
Awry 135). Žižek here refers to the schema produced by 
Lacan at the beginning of the chapter 'Knowledge and Truth' 
in Encore, which is worth reproducing:
 
(Encore 90)
This schema indicates the process by which each of the 
three registers are 'constituted' as such. The vectors do not 
indicate causality; instead each indicates the process by 
which that register intervenes in the other: the Symbolic is 
determined as the result of the symbolisation of the 
Imaginary, the Real introduces the point at which the 
Symbolic fails, the Imaginary is the process by which it is 
imagined that the Real is grasped by the subject and made 
whole. Alongside each vector is the particular object which 
intervenes in order to prop up the subject as he or she is 
constituted by these registers: from Symbolic to Real is objet 
a, from Real to Imaginary is phi, and from Imaginary to 
Symbolic is the signifier of the lack in the Other. And, as 
Žižek says:
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The abyss in the middle (the balloon encircling 
the letter J — jouissance) is of course the 
whirlpool of enjoyment threatening to swallow 
us all, [...] exerting its fatal attraction. The 
three objects on the sides of the triangle are 
perhaps nothing but the three ways to 
maintain a kind of distance toward this 
traumatic central abyss [...]
(Looking Awry 135)
Each object is therefore a small remainder of the Real; they 
are 'excrescences of the real sticking out from common 
reality' (Looking Awry 136), but they should not be conflated 
with one another. It is no coincidence that in the two 
moments in which Austerlitz experiences the very ground 
opening up beneath his feet, and where he must confront this 
terrible abyssal space of pure jouissance, he also encounters 
the Imaginary object signalled on the schema by phi. In both 
the aforementioned moment at the Bibliothèque Nationale, 
and at Liverpool Street Station, where Austerlitz finds that he 
has unknowingly arrived at the very waiting room to which 'I 
had come on my arrival in England over half a century 
ago' (Austerlitz 193), a moment which initiates his nervous 
breakdown, the sense of a churning, gaping, unknowable 
space below is accompanied by a towering, monumental 
protuberance — the presence of the building itself. As Žižek 
says, phi is 'the impassive, imaginary objectification of the 
Real — an image which gives body to the impossible 
jouissance’ (Everything You Always Wanted to Know about 
Lacan (But Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock) 8); rather than the 
process of desire, which aims at an object (objet a) which is 
never present and can always be located 'elsewhere' (which 
for Austerlitz is always another screen object), phi 
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materialises, instead, the overpresence of the Imaginary 
object, stuck, immovable as an object which signals the 
swirling whirlpool of a traumatic jouissance 'below' it. It is a 
phallic protuberance which becomes too present for the 
subject, 'a certain image that materializes the nauseous 
enjoyment' (Looking Awry 135).
At both Liverpool Street Station and the Bibliothèque 
Nationale, Austerlitz appears to come perilously close to 
drowning in the 'whirlpool of jouissance', to plummeting into 
the abyss of history and oblivion.  This abyss 'contains' 131
 Jouissance is a kind of enjoyment which exists beyond the satisfaction of a mere drive; to be 131
swept up by jouissance is to encounter the traumatic Real itself. Can it be any clearer that that 
which Austerlitz describes as the 'agency greater than or superior' to his own ability to approach 
the object itself is an expression of the vicissitudes of jouissance, that radical enjoyment which, for 
Lacan, is beyond enjoyment and is the barrier to knowing as such, and that this object is the object 
of the Real, which takes those forms we have mentioned? This jouissance does not obey the 
pleasure principle, does not seek homeostatic discharge and is not related to the plaisir of the 
subject. It is a level of enjoyment which functions in excess of the subject's satisfaction, just as the 
‘agency’ which controls Austerlitz does not necessarily ‘intend’ for him to seek a cathartic resolution 
of his secretive past by pursuing the knowledge of his heritage. The story of Lacan's rejection of 
the word 'enjoyment' as a translation of jouissance bears repeating here as a demonstration of this 
function. On a trip to America, Lacan saw an advertisement for Coca-Cola: the slogan 'Enjoy Coke' 
signalled to him that the injunction 'enjoy' in English did not convey the level of subjective 
destabilisation associated with jouissance in French, where it enfolds a number of meanings 
including an inherently sexual connotation. (See Žižek Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in 
Hollywood and Out (New York; London: Routledge, 2001), xvii and Craig J. Saper, Artificial 
Mythologies: A Guide to Cultural Invention (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 
107, for more.) To 'enjoy' Coke, for Lacan, is to seek a reliable, dependable satisfaction; to do 
nothing more than have a nice day. Jouir is to pursue satisfaction beyond the satisfaction of any 
drive, to enjoy both what is yours and what is not yours, what it is not possible to ‘encounter’ as 
subject, and without consideration of 'cost'. Žižek, in a typical reversal, has demonstrated how 
Coke as a product succeeds in a manner which precisely repudiates the essential message of this 
marketing strategy, in other words as an exact embodiment of the surplus of enjoyment which 
Lacan describes with the function of jouissance: ‘its strange taste does not seem to provide any 
satisfaction; it is not directly pleasing or endearing; however, it is precisely as such, as 
transcending any immediate use–value [...] that Coke functions as the direct embodiment of "it"; of 
the pure surplus of enjoyment over standard satisfactions, of the mysterious and elusive X we are 
all after in our compulsive consumption. The unexpected result of this is not that, since Coke 
doesn’t satisfy any concrete need we drink it only as supplement, after some other drink has 
satisfied our substantial need — rather, it is this very superfluous character that makes our thirst for 
Coke all the more insatiable […]’ (Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian 
Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2009), 22.). In other words, the thing that the subject 
desires is in fact the very thing which cannot satisfy desire: not simply because it is impossible to 
satisfy desire as such, but because that desire is not our own, does not ‘belong’ to us, is located 
outside of ourselves. Jouissance cannot be experienced 'within' the symbolic system in which the 
subject is constituted as such; therefore it is only 'beyond' desire, in the experience of the Real, in 
which we can locate it.
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history, is constituted by oblivion itself, literally: these abyssal 
spaces are filled by the dead, have consumed history as the 
city renews itself, superposing itself upon the very moment of 
the past. Austerlitz's responses to this whirlpool, marked by 
the impassive, hulking outgrowths of the new, modernised 
buildings of the station and the library, are rather opposed to 
one another, however. Liverpool Street Station, as Austerlitz 
notes, is undergoing reconstruction, 'the new station [...] 
literally rising from the ruins of the old' (Austerlitz 191); 
Austerlitz also visits the neighbouring Broad Street Station 
during its demolition, years prior to his visit to Liverpool 
Street and his nervous breakdown, and photographs the 
remains of the dead. Broad Street (and Liverpool Street) are 
constructed 'on the site of former burial grounds and 
bleachfields' and, Austerlitz continues,
[...] excavations during the demolition work of 
1984 brought to light over four hundred 
skeletons underneath a taxi rank. I went there 
quite often at the time, said Austerlitz, partly 
because of my interest in architectural history 
and partly for other reasons which I could not 
explain even to myself [...]
(Austerlitz 184)
The discovery of the skeletons prefigures the later revelation, 
high up in the Bibliothèque Nationale, of the lost, 
uncategorised objects of history buried in the ground below. 
The apparently 'inexplicable' reason for visiting the 
demolition site of Broad Street Station is actually already 
signalled by Austerlitz when he describes his habit of waiting 
in Liverpool Street Station: 
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I would stay there at least a couple of hours, 
sitting on a bench with other passengers who 
were already tired in the early morning, or 
standing somewhere, leaning on a handrail 
and feeling that constant wrenching inside me, 
a kind of heartache which, as I was beginning 
to sense, was caused by the vortex of past 
time.
(Austerlitz 182)
Austerlitz explains the history of the site of these stations: the 
marshy meadows which froze in the Little Ice Age, and were 
drained and became the site of market gardens and parks; 
the priory of the order of St Mary of Bethlehem; the Bedlam 
Asylum; the burial grounds; each layer of the substratum of 
history, it seems, threatens to overburden Austerlitz, to upset 
his stability, and the superposition of the historical artefacts 
themselves produces, for Austerlitz, a corresponding 
experience of the superposition of time. Whenever he visits 
the station, Austerlitz is seized by a type of mania in which he 
must attempt to recall the possible history of the space itself:
I kept almost obsessively trying to imagine [...] 
the location in that huge space of the rooms 
where the asylum inmates were confined, and 
I often wondered whether the pain and 
suffering accumulated on this site over the 
centuries had ever really ebbed away, or 
whether they might not still, as I sometimes 
thought when I felt a cold breath of air on my 
forehead, be sensed as we pass through them 
on our way through the station halls and up 
and down the flights of steps.
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(Austerlitz 183)
The 'vortex of past time' is that which draws Austerlitz to the 
abyssal spaces of Liverpool Street and the Bibliothèque 
Nationale, because the vortex is that very abyssal space 
itself; what is more, that abyssal space can, conversely, only 
be materialised by the architectural protrusion which bursts 
forth from it, signalling the circulation of the Real around the 
'anchoring' point of the object itself. The station is figured in 
the text as a contradictory space: this experience of 
superposed time is reflected in the station's simultaneous 
depiction in the text as a building before and during its 
reconstruction. 'Before work began to rebuild it at the end of 
the 1980s this station, with its main concourse fifteen to 
twenty feet below street level, was one of the darkest and 
most sinister places in London, a kind of entrance to the 
underworld' (Austerlitz 180), Austerlitz says; but this 
cavernous subterranean space, complete with 'towering cast-
iron columns [...] covered in a greasy black layer formed, 
over the course of a century, by coke dust and soot, steam, 
sulphur and diesel oil' (Austerlitz 181), is also part of a 
protrusion 'literally rising from the ruins' of the old station, the 
space appearing to impossibly and uncontrollably expand:
Minutes or even hours may have passed while 
I stood in that empty space beneath a ceiling 
which seemed to float at a vertiginous height, 
unable to move from the spot, my face raised 
to the icy grey light [...] Other beams of light 
followed curious trajectories which violated the 
laws of physics, departing from the rectilinear 
and twisting in spirals and eddies [...] From 
time to time, and just for a split second, I saw 
huge halls open up, with rows of pillars and 
colonnades leading far into the distance, with 
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vaults and brickwork arches bearing on them 
many-storeyed structures, with flights of stone 
steps, wooden stairways and ladders, all 
leading the eye on and on. [...] the longer I 
stared upwards with my head wrenched 
painfully back, the more I felt as if the room 
where I stood were expanding, going on for 
ever and ever in an impossibly foreshortened 
perspective, at the same time turning back 
into itself in a way possible only in such a 
deranged universe.
(Austerlitz 189-91)
This contradictory space of expansion and contraction thus 
materialises the odd relationship of the traumatic vortex of 
jouissance and the ‘overpresent' Imaginary object which 
anchors it: the 'underworld' of the station (and the substratum 
below) is a void, a dark absent space of 'eternal 
dusk' (Austerlitz 181), while the towering columns, tumescent 
beams of light, and the suddenly engorged spaces opening 
up beyond the waiting room are overmarked by excess detail 
(for example the 'greasy black layer' covering the columns, 
which makes history repulsively present, or the impossible 
beams of light which mark the uncanniness of the space 
itself); they appear too present in comparison to the 'faint 
greyness' which dimly illuminates the remainder of the 
station. These monumental features appear to dwarf 
Austerlitz; more than this, they appear to ensnare him by 
virtue of their size, to exert a gravitational force which draws 
him further into the vortex of past time and forces him to 
contend with a flood of memory which threatens to 
overwhelm him. This moment demonstrates the effectuation 
of the drive, and the distinction between the drive and desire: 
while desire always searches for another object, the drive 
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remains inertly anchored; 'it resists being enmeshed in a 
dialectical movement, it circulates around its object, fixed 
upon the point around which it pulsates' (Looking Awry 134). 
The satisfaction of the drive, here, is the total experience of 
forbidden memory; in other words, it is satisfaction of the 
very thing which Austerlitz's desire protects him against, the 
symptom which he must enjoy: the revelation of the traumatic 
memory, which only appears as the fantasy screen of his 
desire in order to prevent the disclosure of that Real trauma 
and the revelation that that disclosure leads to nothing at all. 
V. 'Subjective Destitution' and the 'Form-of-the-
Building'
As Austerlitz encounters the 'scraps of memory beginning to 
drift through the outlying regions' (Austerlitz 191-2) of his 
mind, a final image recalls itself to him before he witnesses 
the phantasmic vision of his first meeting with the Eliases, 
the vision which instigates his nervous breakdown. Austerlitz 
recalls himself and Marie de Verneuil, his lost love, standing 
[...] in the nave of the wonderful church of Salle in 
Norfolk, which towers in isolation above the wide 
fields [...] White mist had risen from the meadows 
outside, and we watched in silence as it crept slowly 
into the church porch, a rippling vapour rolling forward 
at ground level and gradually spreading over the 
entire stone floor, becoming denser and denser and 
rising visibly higher, until we ourselves emerged from 
it only above the waist and it seemed about to stifle 
us.
(Austerlitz 192)
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There is no clearer demonstration than this of the fact that, at 
this moment in the text, Austerlitz is suffering from the failure 
to integrate this psychotic kernel of jouissance into consistent 
symbolic order. The church juts obscenely from the formless 
landscape, and Austerlitz and Marie are stranded within, high 
above the flat fields, silent as the mist encroaches upon 
them. They appear to be swallowed up in an abyss, within 
which they remain together but are unutterably separated by 
that voice stuck in Austerlitz's throat, the voix acousmatique, 
which 'could not bring out the words I should have spoken 
then' (Austerlitz 192). The framing of this memory 
demonstrates the manner in which Sebald constructs a 
textual representation of superposed time: Austerlitz, of 
course, is relaying this section of his story to the narrator in 
the Great Eastern Hotel in London in 1996; the story itself, of 
his visit to Liverpool Street Station, takes place in 1992; 
meanwhile, his recollection of Marie de Verneuil dates further 
back, to 1968. The effect is not one of time dilation, however: 
the narrative field does not appear to 'expand' with these 
repeated digressions; instead, the effect is one of 
superposition, of a radical sort of layering. The narrator notes 
that 'for Austerlitz certain moments had no beginning or end, 
while on the other hand his whole life had sometimes 
seemed to him a blank point without duration' (Austerlitz 
165): the text makes this sense of 'life without duration' 
apparent in the way that Austerlitz experiences memory 
anachronistically. Memory is not rendered as an objective 
artefact in the text; rather, it is superposed in the sense that 
the 'viewing' of it alters its state, and since this altered state 
cannot constitute an 'original' purely 'objective' memory, the 
text is not constituted by 'fragments' as such, but instead by 
a single reading of many possible states, each encapsulated 
by a particular memory. In this way, the text seems to 
condense Austerlitz's experience without reducing any single 
aspect of it. As such, his memory of Marie in the church 
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(undoubtedly another traumatic moment itself, where that 
vortex of past time threatens to swallow Austerlitz's present 
once more), is only raised to a Symbolic level at this point, in 
the action of articulating another traumatic experience. That 
is why the memory 'ends' with the mist poised to engulf Marie 
and Austerlitz completely: the 'meaning' of the rising mist 
only becomes apparent to Austerlitz in his disquisition on the 
process of his breakdown; but, conversely, the moment in 
which Austerlitz is finally stifled by the vortex of the past, by 
this traumatic whirlpool of pure jouissance, is a moment 
which cannot be symbolically articulated, and therefore the 
mist can never fully engulf him in a sense which can be 
made symbolically present. This 'chain' of memory functions, 
like the chain of signification, until a certain point is reached 
where the Real trauma simply cannot be articulated and 
escapes its grasp.
It is for this very reason Austerlitz cannot 'name' his nervous 
breakdown as such; it is something more than inexpressible:
[...] for the first time in as far back as I can 
remember I recollected myself as a small 
child, at the moment when I realized that it 
must have been to this same waiting-room I 
had come on my arrival in England over half a 
century ago. As so often, said Austerlitz, I 
cannot give any precise description of the 
state of mind this realization induced; I felt 
something rending within me, and a sense of 
shame and sorrow, or perhaps something 
quite different, something inexpressible 
because we have no words for it [...]
(Austerlitz 193-4) 
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The problem for Austerlitz is not that there are no words to 
describe his feeling; it is, instead, that the breakdown itself is 
only experienced at the point where the symbolic process 
fails. The moment is not simply inexpressible: it is non-
expression itself. As Lacan says, 'what I say is what there 
isn't' (Encore 118): we speak to make ourselves subject. The 
Real, therefore, is not simply that which cannot be spoken. If 
by speaking I say what is not there, I accomplish nothing by 
simply not speaking. The Real, instead, cannot be spoken 
because it will not be spoken. In other words, it is because it 
is the very thing which initiates the Symbolic order that it 
remains unspoken by the subject. That is why it is important 
to understand what 'type' of object Austerlitz encounters at 
this point. This is not objet a, which, as such, is never plainly 
revealed and is only glimpsed when the subject views it 
through the functional screen of his or her fantasy. This is the 
Imaginary object phi, which is experienced nakedly in the 
absence of a screen because it does not 'take' the form of 
another object for the subject, in other words cannot be 
viewed through a fantasy screen. We understand, therefore, 
why Austerlitz spends his time after his breakdown 
increasingly pursuing screens, and, indeed, why his career 
as an architectural historian formally ends at around this 
point. The mania experienced by Austerlitz in the waiting 
room of Liverpool Street Station is marked by an escalating 
tension in which 
I felt, said Austerlitz, that the waiting-room 
where I stood as if dazzled contained all the 
hours of my past life, all the suppressed and 
extinguished fears and wishes I had ever 
entertained, as if the black and white diamond 
pattern of the stone slabs beneath my feet 
were the board on which the endgame would 
 241
be played, and it covered the entire plane of 
time.
(Austerlitz 193)
It is the building — the building-as-form — which materialises 
for Austerlitz the terrifying 'mass' of history, and which acts as 
an anchor for the unbidden experience of that traumatic 
vortex. Standing in the waiting room, Austerlitz is finally 
present at the very 'open wound' of history which both 
attracts and repulses him. This simultaneous attraction and 
repulsion is exemplified in the realisation of 'how little 
practice I had in using my memory, and conversely how hard 
I must always have tried to recollect as little as 
possible' (Austerlitz 197). The experience of the vortex itself 
is therefore an experience of an overabundance of memory 
rather than its failure as such. It is the point at which 
Austerlitz must 'break' and give in to the impassive and 
traumatic jouissance of a 'total history'. The text represents 
the subjective experience of this 'break' as exactly that: as a 
break in the text, a gap explicitly signalled by the sudden 
paucity of language.
Yet this self-censorship of my mind, the 
constant suppression of the memories 
surfacing in me, Austerlitz continued, 
demanded ever greater efforts and finally, and 
unavoidably, led to the almost total paralysis 
of my linguistic faculties, the destruction of all 
my notes and sketches, my endless nocturnal 
peregrinations through London, and the 
hallucinations which plagued me with 
increasing frequency up to the point of my 
nervous breakdown in the summer of 1992. I 
cannot say exactly how I spent the rest of that 
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year, said Austerlitz; all I know is that next 
spring, when there was improvement in my 
state of health, on one of my first ventures into 
the city I visited an antiquarian bookshop near 
the British Museum [...]
(Austerlitz 199)
The 'paralysis' of Austerlitz's 'linguistic faculties', we must 
note, does not apply to his admission that he 'cannot say 
exactly' how he spent his time in the period following his 
breakdown, because his inability to account for that time, in 
language, is not a result of the linguistic paralysis which had 
affected him. Austerlitz, in 1996, suffers from no linguistic 
paralysis: instead, he simply cannot make that break in his 
subject present in language. The interesting thing is that this 
moment of the break is made present precisely because it 
appears in the midst of two opposed examples of what Lacan 
calls the tuché, the encounter with the Real.  In Liverpool 132
Street Station, the traumatic Real erupts and Austerlitz 
cannot contain it, it cannot be made consistent with his own 
desire because it materialises the Thing, the overwhelming 
vortex that obviates the revelation that mnemonic access to 
his 'total history' will not supply the deficient 'lack' in his 
subjectivity; his subjectivity breaks down because he has no 
fantasy screen with which to appease his desire and he is 
subsumed by something greater than his desire. On the 
other 'side' of the break, Austerlitz visits the book shop in 
which he again encounters the voix acousmatique, the voice 
without object issuing forth from the radio which is safely 
integrated into the screen of fantasy; in other words, it is the 
moment which 'reorients' his desire and finally sends him on 
the quest for an access to memory which is negotiated by the 
 See 'Tuché and Automaton' in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.132
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screen. Between these two moments where the Real 
threatens to burst forth into 'reality' (in Liverpool Street and 
the antique bookshop) is the actual point at which it makes 
an appearance: and this is the very moment that cannot be 
depicted in the text, just as it cannot be made consistent with 
Austerlitz's subject, because it will not be spoken by him. 
The question which remains to be answered is precisely why 
Austerlitz's response to the abyss below the Bibliothèque 
Nationale is so radically opposed to his experience of the 
abyss at Liverpool Street Station. Following his unexpected 
meeting with Lemoine in the Bibliothèque Nationale, having 
just discovered the truth of the Austerlitz-Tolbiac depot and 
the abyss of Paris below his feet, a sanguine Austerlitz 
stands gazing out at the city from his high vantage point: 'For 
a while, said Austerlitz, we stood together in silence on the 
library belvedere, looking out over the city where it lay now 
sparkling in the light of its lamps' (Austerlitz 403); a short time 
after his visit to the library, Austerlitz leaves the narrator for 
the final time, explaining that he has heard
[...] from one of the staff at the records centre 
in the rue Geoffroy-l'Asnier, that Maximilian 
Aychenwald had been interned during the 
latter part of 1942 in the camp at Gurs, a 
place in the Pyrenean foothills which he, 
Austerlitz, must seek out. Curiously enough, 
said Austerlitz, a few hours after last meeting, 
when he had come back from the Bibliothèque 
Nationale and changed trains at the Gare 
d'Austerlitz, he had felt a premonition that he 
was coming closer to his father.
(Austerlitz 404-5)
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How do we explain this shift in Austerlitz's behaviour? The 
novel concludes by offering no resolution to his quest: he and 
the narrator part company before Austerlitz leaves for the 
Pyrenees, the result of his pursuit of Maximilian never 
disclosed. In spite of its apparent form, this conclusion is not 
at all signalled by the text as a 'cliffhanger'. No tension is 
created by this apparent mystery. In fact it is quite banal: 
before it ends, the text follows the narrator's journey to 
Antwerp, to visit the fortress at Breendonk, for another five 
pages beyond Austerlitz's final 'appearance'. At the same 
time, it is also clear that this ending does not simply signal a 
textual admission that there is no 'point' to the conclusion of 
the journey, that it is 'the journey itself' which is worthwhile, 
nor indeed that the mystery of Austerlitz's origin can never be 
satisfied, in other words that there is no simple truth of his 
origins to be located (which, itself, is plainly false: there is a 
history to be 'found'). Instead, this final section signals 
Austerlitz's 'recovery', his return to the state of identification 
with his symptom rather than the identification with what 
Lacan calls the sinthome. As Žižek explains, the sinthome is 
'a fragment of the signifier, inescapably permeated with 
mindless enjoyment':
[...] no longer the 'symptom' (the homophonic 
symptome), the coded message to be 
deciphered by a process of interpretation, but 
the fragment of a meaningless letter, the 
reading of which procures an immediate jouis-
sense or 'meaning-in-enjoyment'.133
The sinthome is thus the kernel of jouissance which finally 
eludes interpretation, the point at which the subject can only 
identify with the Thing which embodies jouissance in order to 
 Slavoj Žižek, 'The Undergrowth of Enjoyment: How Popular Culture can Serve as an 133
Introduction to Lacan’, New Formations, 9 (1989), 7-29 (10).
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establish an internal consistency which does not rely on the 
'truth' of the Symbolic order. This point marks the end of the 
subject's 'relationship' with the Other; in other words, the 
subject can no longer function 'socially', having based his or 
her internal consistency solely on the identification with that 
psychotic kernel of the Real which obeys no truth other than 
enjoyment — the enjoyment of 'nothing', as such. We can 
see exactly how this 'identification' proceeds in Austerlitz: it 
finally occurs at the point in the text at which Austerlitz suffers 
his breakdown in Liverpool Street, the point at which his 
'linguistic faculties' have already become paralysed. When 
Austerlitz says that he felt in his head ‘the dreadful torpor that 
heralds disintegration of personality' (Austerlitz 174), the 
ominous warning is accompanied by the realisation that the 
'entire structure of language, the syntactical arrangement of 
parts of speech, punctuation, conjunctions, and finally even 
the nouns denoting ordinary objects were all enveloped in 
impenetrable fog' (Austerlitz 175) while the 'very thing which 
may usually convey a sense of purposeful intelligence — the 
exposition of an idea by means of a certain stylistic facility — 
now seemed to me nothing but an entirely arbitrary or 
deluded enterprise' (Austerlitz 175). The 'thing itself', for 
Austerlitz, has always been architecture:
[...] I found Austerlitz the first teacher I could 
listen to since my time in primary school. I 
remember to this day how easily I could grasp 
what he called his tentative ideas when he 
talked about the architectural style of the 
capitalist era, a subject which he said had 
fascinated him since his own student days, 
speaking in particular of the compulsive sense 
of order and the tendency towards 
monumentalism evident in lawcourts and 
penal institutions, railways stations and stock 
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exchanges, opera houses and lunatic 
asylums, and the dwellings built to rectangular 
grid patterns for the labour force. His 
investigations, so Austerlitz once told me, had 
long outstripped their original purpose as a 
project for a dissertation, proliferating in his 
hands into endless preliminary sketches for a 
study, based entirely on his own views, of the 
family likeness between all these buildings. 
Why he had embarked on such a wide field, 
said Austerlitz, he did not know [...] But then 
again, it was also true that he was still obeying 
an impulse which he himself, to this day, did 
not really understand, but which was 
somehow linked to his early fascination with 
the idea of a network such as that of the entire 
railway system.
(Austerlitz 43-5)
It is the form-of-the-building as materialisation of history 
which obsesses Austerlitz. For him, buildings accrete 
meaning, signifying the teleological process of cultural 
growth which subsumes the material history of the site itself 
and increasingly, as his mental health becomes more fragile, 
signals the 'return' of that buried history. The building is an 
object which appears to Austerlitz, therefore, to house an 
undisclosed truth which will explain something akin to a 
'network' of history. Although he does not realise it, what 
Austerlitz appears to be describing is, as Long has also 
noted, the terrible trajectory of Western culture which 
appears to lead inexorably toward the event of the 
Holocaust. But what Austerlitz also describes is the very 
structure of the Symbolic realm, that part of reality which, for 
Lacan, grants access to meaning while it forecloses the 
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impossible Real of 'ex-istence', the 'authentic core' of 
existence which is denied to the subject in the entry to the 
realm of meaning. The impulse which Austerlitz obeys, as he 
accumulates those screens which form his archive, is the 
response to the big Other, to the coded message which we 
receive from the Other and obey without knowing that it is 
our own message returned in a form which we cannot 
recognise, owing to the screen of our own fantasy. 
Austerlitz's experience of the waiting room in Liverpool Street 
Station, however, demonstrates the point at which his fantasy 
screen breaks down and he experiences total identification 
with the vortex of history beyond sense. The site becomes a 
materialisation of pure jouissance which cannot be 
represented as meaning in any sense other than as a jouis-
sense: the 'meaning-in-enjoyment', as Žižek says, which is 
nothing other than the subject's disengagement with the 
Symbolic realm, the failure to identify with the symptom and 
traverse the fantasy screen. It is interesting, too, that  
Austerlitz conceives of language, at this moment, on the 
precipice of his breakdown, as 'a kind of unhealthy growth 
issuing from our ignorance' (Austerlitz 175). The unhealthy 
growth — repulsive in its overpresence — is, as we have 
seen, the form that finally signals Austerlitz's capture in the 
whirlpool of jouissance in the station, which is preceded by 
his total destruction of his entire archive in the back garden, 
accomplished by burial. Austerlitz literally buries his screen of 
fantasy in the ground, surrenders his very access to meaning 
'under layers of rotted leaves and spadefuls of 
earth' (Austerlitz 176), primed and ready to become engulfed 
by the abyss.
The 'minimal consistency' of subjectivity which marks 
Austerlitz at this point is represented by the dream that he 
experiences after he blindly makes his way home from the 
ordeal in the station. Austerlitz lies down in 'drenched 
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clothes', falling into 'a deep, uneasy sleep' from which he 'did 
not wake until the middle of the night after the next 
day' (Austerlitz 195-6):
In that sleep, when my body feigned death 
while feverish thoughts whirled through my 
head, I was at the innermost heart of a star-
shaped fortress, a dungeon cut off from the 
outside world [...]
(Austerlitz 196)
That 'dungeon cut off from the outside world' explains the 
consistency of the subject caught completely in identification 
with the sinthome: the sinthome is the fragment of the 
signifier which is not caught in the chain of signification, 
which does not relate to the system of meaning because it is 
permeated with jouis-sense as an 'outcrop' of the Real. 
Austerlitz is 'stuck' in this dungeon throughout his 
breakdown, throughout that point in the text where no 
symbolic representation is possible, the point that we have 
already identified by its absence in the text. In this sense, the 
experience in the bookshop following Austerlitz's own 
symbolic absence is the beginning of a renewed identification 
with the symptom. The moment in the bookshop, surrounded 
by screens which negotiate for Austerlitz the possibility of a 
fulfilment of desire, represents the point beyond which 
Austerlitz can, in fact, travel no further, because it represents 
the point at which he must remain caught in his own 
particular fantasy, the fantasy of a continual search for the 
knowledge of his past. That is why, at the top of the 
Bibliothèque Nationale, Austerlitz looks down upon Paris and 
represents it thus:
 249
[...] one can look down from the so-called 
belvedere at the entire urban agglomeration 
which has risen over the millennia from the 
land beneath its foundations, which is now 
entirely hollowed out: a pale limestone range, 
a kind of excrescence extending the 
concentric spread of its incrustations far 
beyond the boulevards [...] and on into the 
outermost periphery beyond the suburbs [...]
(Austerlitz 399)
At first glance it seems that the abyss is more potent than 
ever, with Austerlitz perceiving it as encircling and engulfing 
the city completely. But the revelation of the buried objects of 
history below Austerlitz's feet, of the terrible fact of his stolen 
heritage, does not prompt a new 'break' in his subjectivity. 
There is a renewed sense that a 'proper weaving' of history 
once again occupies him — this proper weaving being the 
symbolic action conducted in the name of the Other. The 
abyss is now subtly 'ordered', the land around the city, rather 
than the city itself, becoming the 'excrescence'. Indeed, at 
the very moment following Lemoine's revelation that the 
library was built upon the buried remains of the Parisian 
Jews' possessions, Austerlitz looks down to the pine grove 
which appears to 'sink' into the building itself but is really an 
architectural feature, a 'nature reserve cut, so to speak, from 
the surface of the promenade deck and sunk two or three 
storeys deep' (Austerlitz 391), and sees only order: 'The tree-
tops of the pine grove, which from this high vantage point 
had resembled moss-covered ground, now formed a regular 
black rectangle' (Austerlitz 403). That 'regularity' signals the 
gap in the Symbolic network by which a tiny feature is raised 
to the level of object-cause of desire: objet a which signals 
the subjective access to the Other by way of our acceptance 
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of the Symbolic realm. Objet a is the remainder which 
guarantees our Symbolic stability, as opposed to the 
protrusive outgrowths which threaten us with the fall towards 
an overwhelming identification only with the jouissance of the 
Real. Contemplating 'the Cartesian overall plan of the 
Bibliothèque Nationale' (Austerlitz 392), Austerlitz 
demonstrates that he now realises the nature of this 
fragment of the Real, by way of its necessary incorporation 
into the system of meaning:
I came to the conclusion that in any project we 
design and develop, the size and degree of 
complexity of the information and control 
systems inscribed in it are the crucial factors, 
so that the all-embracing and absolute 
perfection of the concept can in practice 
coincide, indeed ultimately must coincide, with 
its chronic dysfunction and constitutional 
instability.
(Austerlitz 392-3)
There is no clearer elucidation of the process by which that 
fragment of the Real is incorporated into the system of 
meaning, and by which the subject is ultimately constituted, 
than this. The outcome for Austerlitz is that he is now 
'permitted' to enter this eternal search for the past, to ground 
his subjectivity upon the very concept of the search, the 
impossible 'completion' of his self. Standing in Gare 
d'Austerlitz, 'the most mysterious of all the railway terminals 
of Paris' (Austerlitz 406), according to Austerlitz, he is struck 
by the idea 'of his father's leaving Paris from this very 
station': 'I imagined, said Austerlitz, that I saw him leaning out 
of the window of his compartment as the train left' (Austerlitz 
405-6). This image is one of a series in which screens in the 
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station are suddenly and unsettlingly traversed: 'the Metro 
trains coming from the Bastille, having crossed the Seine, roll 
over the iron viaduct into the station's upper story, quite as if 
the facade were swallowing them up' (Austerlitz 406); 
meanwhile, as Austerlitz 'stood on the scaffolding that 
Sunday afternoon looking up through the dim light at the 
ornate ironwork of the north facade, two tiny figures which I 
had noticed only after some time were moving about on 
ropes, carrying out repair work, like black spiders in their 
web' (Austerlitz 407-8). Austerlitz is disturbed by nothing 
other than the piercing gaze of the other when he recognises 
the figures upon the screen of the station facade. In both 
cases, his contention with the material screen signals a 
proper negotiation with the form itself: with the form which 
proposes to negotiate the space, before any other mediation, 
which guarantees the subjective negotiation with the Other. 
In other words, negotiation with the very possibility of an 
uncovering of knowledge, of a meaning which presently 
eludes the subject but which, the subject supposes, can 
become present in the ceaseless movement towards it.
This is, finally, the reason that the veil which hangs in Evan 
the cobbler's workshop in Bala seems to produce an effect 
upon the very text itself, why a constant opacity seems to 
affect Austerlitz's vision and light is never effervescent but 
always dull. Evan, with whom Austerlitz spends 'every free 
moment' as a child in Bala, 'had a reputation for seeing 
ghosts' (Austerlitz 74):
Evan told tales of the dead who had been 
struck down by fate untimely, who knew they 
had been cheated of what was due to them 
and tried to return to life. If you had an eye for 
them they were to be seen quite often, said 
Evan. At first glance they seemed to be 
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normal people, but when you looked more 
closely their faces would blur or flicker slightly 
at the edges.
(Austerlitz 74-5)
This 'blurring', we know, is the appearance of the stain of the 
Real in the subject's field of vision. But that which allows this 
blurring to appear, which bestows 'the eye for them' upon the 
subject, is the screen. It is that screen which is 'draped upon' 
Austerlitz's life, which makes apparent for him the very notion 
of a presence which can be uncovered beyond that veil 
which demarcates, for the subject, two opposed states:
Hanging from a hook on the wall above Evan's 
low workbench, said Austerlitz, was the black 
veil that his grandfather had taken from the 
bier when the small figures muffled in their 
cloaks carried it past him, and it was certainly 
Evan, said Austerlitz, who once told me that 
nothing but a piece of silk like that separates 
us from the next world.
(Austerlitz 75-6)
That bier is part of the procession of the dead which Evan's 
grandfather claims to have encountered, a small troop 
'marching up the hill above the town to the soft beat of a 
drum, and only a little taller than the walls round the fields 
through which they went' (Austerlitz 75). Austerlitz witnesses 
a similar sight when he visits Marienbad with Marie in 1972, 
though it is not at all clear that he himself recognises the fact:
We were almost back in the town, said 
Austerlitz, when a little company of some ten 
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or a dozen small people emerged from the 
dark as if out of nowhere, at a place where 
white mist was already rising from the ground, 
and crossed our path.  [...] They were 
strikingly short, almost dwarfish figures, 
slightly bent, moving along in single file [...]
(Austerlitz 305)
What Austerlitz does not realise, at this stage of his life, is 
that he looks through the veil at every moment, like his friend 
Gerald's Great-Uncle Alphonso, who wears glasses 'with 
grey silk tissue instead of lenses in the frames, so that the 
landscape appeared through a fine veil that muted its 
colours, and the weight of the world dissolved before your 
eyes' (Austerlitz 124-126). It is precisely because Austerlitz 
does not understand the frame of his own fantasy that he 
cannot recollect Evan's grandfather's tale at this point, in 
spite of the striking similarities between the two scenes. 
These similarities alert us as readers to the realisation that 
Austerlitz must make if ever he is to escape the vortex of 
history which constantly threatens to pull him downwards: his 
realisation, in the Bibliothèque Nationale, of the suspicion 
Austerlitz 'had always entertained that the border between 
life and death is less impermeable than we commonly 
think' (Austerlitz 395). Now, finally, he understands that the 
veil which hangs upon his life is the screen which must be 
traversed in the act of the pursuit of desire: it is the act in 
which, searching for meaning — 'I don't know, said Austerlitz, 
what all this means, and so I am going to continue looking for 
my father, and for Marie de Verneuil as well' (Austerlitz 408) 
— we must agree to foreclose our experience of that perilous 
jouissance of 'totality', the stupid, dumb form of meaning 
which threatens to swallow us whole, the price of which is 
our very desire.
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We might recall Žižek's thoughts on the historical character 
of memory, in this light: 
[…] in Classicism, memory recalls past 
happiness (the innocence of our youth, etc.), 
while the Romantic memory recalls not a 
direct past happiness but a past period in 
which future happiness still seemed possible, 
a time when hopes were not yet frustrated — 
memories here are 'those of absence, of that 
which never was’.134
Thinking of Austerlitz, holding a photograph in which he 
contemplates the 'future gaze' of his younger self, we see a 
suggestion that, though he is a subject of modernity, his 
memory in fact remains caught in a staunchly Romantic 
mode of negotiation with the past. In his search for a screen, 
he looks back to a time — for a time — when he looked 
forward. That is why, as Barthes says, the screen is a 
‘hideout'. But it is not just a refuge for that apparent presence 
which is animated within the frame and appears to find life 
beyond the screen. In fact, it is the subject who exists in this 
hideout, who finds a place of refuge when the exigencies of 
the Real threaten to return anew all over again. In which 
case, it would seem that Barthes misunderstood that for 
whom the screen really 'works': it was, actually, the subject 
all along. To address his success in this endeavour, we 
should give proper credit and say — it was only played out 
upon a screen.
 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 2008), 249.134
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Conclusion: 
Desire of the Screen/ The Society of Perverts
In 2013, Franco Berardi posted a short essay in two parts on 
the website Through Europe. Within, he reflects upon his first 
visit to Seoul in South Korea: part-travelogue, part-socio-
historical analysis, it analyses the conditions under which 
South Korean society transformed at 'the hand of the highest 
form of contemporary nihilism'.  There is no equivocation 135
over the result of this metamorphosis. The capitalist embrace 
has, for Berardi, transformed Seoul into 'the end of line of the 
contemporary hell' ('Journey to Seoul (1)'). Žižek's analysis of 
Berardi's essay provides, as usual, a trenchant investigation 
of its broader context: 
Berardi's portrait of South Korea seems to 
follow the unsurpassed model of such 
portraits in the last decades, Baudrillard's 
famous portrait of Los Angeles (in his 
America) as a hyperreal Hell. It is all too easy 
to dismiss this genre of portraits as the 
pretentious pseudo-intellectual exercise of 
European postmodernists who use a foreign 
land or city as a screen onto which to project 
their morbid dystopias. In spite of all 
exaggerations, there is a grain of truth in 
them; or, more precisely, to paraphrase 
Adorno's well-known dictum about 
psychoanalysis, in Baudrillard's portrait of LA 
nothing is true except its exaggerations. And 
the same goes for Berrardi's impressions of 
 Franco Berardi Bifo, 'Journey to Seoul (1)'. <http://th-rough.eu/writers/bifo-eng/journey-seoul-1> 135
accessed 10/04/15.
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Seoul: what they provide is the image of a 
place deprived of its history, a worldless 
place.136
If the portrait painted by 'Journey to Seoul' is accurate 
precisely because of its exaggerations, then what Berrardi 
has to say about the role of the screen in twenty-first century 
Korean culture should be read not simply as rebuke, but as 
prophecy:
The majority of people are constantly looking 
at their small cell-phone screens. In the land 
of Samsung, girls and boys are permanently 
connected, whenever they walk or sit or stand 
waiting for the subway train to approach. Their 
hands are busy carrying iPads, their fingertips 
run ceaselessly along digital screens.
 
One day, in a park, I sat on a bench and I 
looked for fifteen minutes at a group of three 
young girls. They were standing under a tree, 
each of them looking at her phone, smiling at 
the camera, taking pictures around, taking 
pictures of herself, and showing each new 
picture to the others. All of them were standing 
silently.
 
Screens are everywhere: big screens on the 
walls of skyscrapers, middle-sized screens in 
the station’s halls. But the small private 
screens of the smart-phones take over most 
of the attention of the crowd, calmly and 
silently shuffling without looking around.
 Slavoj Žižek, Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism (London: 136
Allen Lane, 2014), 7.
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[...] In the emptied cultural space, the Korean 
experience is marked by an extreme degree 
of individualization and simultaneously it is 
headed towards the ultimate cabling of the 
collective mind.
 
These lonely monad walks in the urban space 
in tender continuous interaction with the 
pictures, tweets, games coming out of their 
small screens, perfectly insulated and 
perfectly wired into the smooth interface of the 
flow.
('Journey to Seoul (1)')
Can't we see that this portrait of a strategy of social 
integration with the screen, even as it is here explored in 
relation to a set of specific cultural conditions, demonstrates 
something very similar to that which we have witnessed in 
our analysis of these texts? The screens in Berardi's portrait 
are actually following the kind of fault line of the central 
tension which is transcribed by the dialectic of the screen. 
What the preceding analysis allows us to propose is that this 
fault line is indeed the dialectical outcome itself: the 
production of the subject. Berardi deploys the screen as 
emblem in his analysis, but it is clear that the screen is also 
more than an emblem. It is implicitly involved in the complex 
process in which the subject attempts to 'connect' to his or 
her exteriority. It structures the ability to perform this 
connective act, producing a mediated intimacy. The 
mediation of intimacy, the 'construction' of the locus of desire: 
these are the processes which are interrogated repeatedly in 
the texts which we have analysed. Peter and Bea's 
relationship, conducted and mediated via the Shoot in The 
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Book of Strange New Things; Jimmy's experience of fantasy 
and desire as the possibility for disclosure of a hidden kernel 
of 'human meaning' in Oryx and Crake; the society deprived 
of narcissism of The Tain; Austerlitz's search for the screen 
of fantasy: each text, I suggest, is involved in a work which 
dramatises — for the purpose of interrogation — the kind of 
interactions we see Berardi documenting in his South Korean 
portrait. It is this kind of cultural condition with which Paul 
Virillio contends when he writes of ‘the incontinent 
TELEVISUALISM of a world buckled in on itself, in this “real-
time perspective” of ubiquity’.  The screen begins to follow 137
us everywhere; or rather, we now notice that we are following 
the screen everywhere. In Berardi's words, the lonely monad 
is 'perfectly insulated' 'in tender continuous interaction' with 
the screen. Is this exaggeration? And, as Žižek proposes, 
does this exaggeration draw us closer to the heart of the 
matter?
The example of the girls silently and eerily captivated by their 
smartphones (the small private screens that Berardi 
mentions in the following paragraph) demonstrates the 
manner in which one type of screen is performing the 
functions of many. On one level it is true that the girls are 
enraptured by image itself, but on another it seems clear that 
there is also a correspondence between the fascination of 
the girls with the function of the screen and the 
(un-)responsiveness of that image to their present. The 
projection of this apparently 'present' moment upon the 
screen, and the occlusive function that seems to result from 
this, invites the consideration of the spatial perceptions 
experienced by the girls as they consider the screens. The 
'present' (both 'contemporary' and 'at hand') moment of the 
screen never 'catches up' with their phantasmatic reality. This 
 Paul Virillio, Art as Far as the Eye Can See, trans. Julie Rose (Oxford and New York: Berg, 137
2007), 37.
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is the 'incontinent televisualism' of real-time, and the screen 
is implicated in that function. But is this not simply a 
reformulation of one of Austerlitz's central dilemmas? The 
projective face of the screen never catches up with the 
present moment of the subject. It is always involved in a 
reality-producing process. This is to be distinguished from 
simple 'mediation', because the 'real' that the screen 
mediates is the Real. As with Austerlitz's attempt to screen 
the traces of a traumatic history, the girls chase screens: 
screens which are produced at every moment of every new 
image which is captured by their devices. Berardi suggests 
that their silence is an effect of a culture adrift in simulation. 
To advance his thesis, I suggest that we consider the manner 
in which this screen-object itself could be considered not only 
as an emblem of this 'pure solitude' but as an agent in its 
very possibility.
Something about this seems 'perverse'. If the screen 
functions as a guarantor of subjectivity, maintains the gap 
which provides the space for the negotiation of space on 
behalf of the subject, how can it also produce a 'worldless' 
society? In other words, how can it alienate the subject from 
the Symbolic superstructure itself? Of course, we understand 
that the subject is founded upon the alienation of being in the 
Real. But what, if anything, in relation to the screen, causes 
this experience to become repeated at a social level? To 
answer these questions, we should attempt to understand 
the experience of the pervert as described by Lacan. In 
Lacan, perversion describes the inversion of the fantasy of 
the subject:
In the phantasy, the subject is frequently 
unperceived, but he is always there, whether 
in the dream or in any of the more or less 
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developed forms of day-dreaming. The subject 
situates himself as determined by phantasy.
[...] the structure of perversion [...] is an 
inverted effect of the phantasy. It is the subject 
who determines himself as object, in his 
encounter with the division of subjectivity.
(The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 185)
The fantasy relation is described by Lacan as the relationship 
between the 'split' or barred subject ($) and the object of 
desire (a); for the pervert, however, identification in the 
fantasy occurs not with his or her own subjectivity but with 
the 'place' of the object. In the constitution of the subject, we 
will remember, the subject establishes a fantasy relation with 
objet a in order to objectivise their own loss; in other words, 
the fantasy situates the lack around which the subject 
coalesces, offering a 'route' towards the compensation of this 
loss through objet a. The pervert, in contrast, imagines that 
no compensation for this originary loss is necessary, as Joan 
Copjec explains:
The pervert [...] refuses all recognition of his 
own lack, even in external form. The pervert 
places himself in the position of "never being 
deprived with regard to knowledge, and most 
particularly knowledge concerning love and 
eroticism." Or, as Freud says of one variety of 
pervert, "What other men have to woo and 
make exertions for can be had by the fetishist 
with no trouble at all," for he is certain about 
love, about what the Other wants. The pervert, 
then, places himself in the real, the only place 
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where nothing is lacking, where knowledge is 
certain. That is, rather than position himself in 
relation to the imaginary form of the object a, 
he positions himself as the object a, in its real 
form.
(Read My Desire 109)
Does Berardi's portrait not present an example of a perverted 
relation to the screen? The subjective 'interaction' with the 
screen produces a stable subject, of course; this we have 
learned. But how might the pervert position him- or herself in 
the relationship with the screen-object? If one imagines 
oneself as the object of the Other's desire, in other words, as 
in possession of the knowledge, in the Real, of objet a for the 
Other, how might one approach the screen? One might 
surround oneself with screens, 'big screens on the walls of 
skyscrapers, middle-sized screens in the station’s halls [...] 
small private screens', and this might become reflected in a 
milieu in which the opportunities for screen interaction 
proliferate. It is this avenue of inquiry that we should add to a 
'standard' Lacanian reading of the scene in which Berardi 
describes the young girls interacting via their smartphones. 
In a standard reading, we might suggest that the girls make 
themselves 'present' for the Other in their strange, silent 
ritual. They each circulate the images amongst the others of 
the group, but it is clear that the 'content' of these images is 
unimportant in the context; the images are quickly replaced 
by successors, and this circulation does not cease. It is not, 
therefore, the image which substantiates the desire of the 
Other; the girls do not attempt to draw closer to the object of 
desire by identifying with the fantasy of the image. Instead, it 
is in the continuous production of a screen relationship, in the 
act of silently displaying the screen to the other, that the 
fantasy becomes manifest. The girls already propose 
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themselves as the object of desire. They presuppose a 
knowledge in the Real which based upon a perverted fantasy 
of knowledge derived from the screen — not information 
displayed by the screen, but a direct connection to the Other 
which follows an acknowledgement of the role of the screen 
in negotiating the space of subjectivity. In other words, the 
screen object makes present, 'objectivises', the work of the 
immaterial screen. By engaging directly with the form of the 
screen, the girls posit themselves as the object-cause of the 
Other's desire, enacting a symbolic cut which produces only 
silence. Each subject circumvents the 'exertions', to quote 
Freud, which accompany the pursuit of desire — the 
exertions which each subject undergoes in order to attempt 
to make present the lure of their own fantasy.
Each 'tender continuous interaction' with the screen follows 
this model of perversion. The subject becomes, for the Other 
and in the eyes of the Other, an object, assuming the 
knowledge which accompanies the 'station' of objet a. The 
subject attains a shortcut to jouissance at the expense of the 
other. The fantasy relation is manifest in terms of Imaginary 
belief, where the knowledge of the Real cannot exist. The 
subject is thus involved in an infantile relationship with the 
Other. (Freud, of course, calls the infant polymorphously 
perverse.) Is it surprising that we might read the inhabitants 
of this 'worldless place' as a society of perverts? 
But this is not to say that it is the dramatisation of the 
subjective interaction with the screen which 'produces', 
socially, this perverted relationship. In fact, I would suggest 
that we do not encounter the depiction of a perverted relation 
with the screen-object in any of the novels we have 
analysed; which is to say that neither Peter, nor Jimmy, nor 
Sholl, nor Austerlitz identify with themselves in the objective 
position which might grant knowledge in the Real. The role of 
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the screen in these texts is ultimately a stabilising one. While 
the constitution of the subject inevitably invites the irruption 
of the Real, an irruption which is experienced as breach of 
the screen which guarantees the subject, it is also true that 
the screen-objects we have read here are what makes it 
possible to attain the Symbolic knowledge which makes 
subjective experience representable within these texts. This 
reading is contrary to Fred Botting's analysis of William 
Gibson's Idoru, in which he posits the screen (crucially, in 
Botting's analysis, a mere component of a machine-Thing) as 
a consumptive object, guzzling up the subject and leaving 
only a husk in the Real: 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, when 
romance is relayed across western globalised 
culture by so many vision machines and 
terminal screens to assume a dominant 
position in the lives of consuming and desiring 
subjects, the function of the Thing changes: 
when the unrepresentable void underlying 
cultural screens is hollowed out by 
technological rewritings of reality, digital 
desiring expands to literalise jouissance 
(virtually, at least) as a general condition. [...] 
The remainder of the real defining the minimal 
in-human difference is obliterated in corporeal 
form.138
The difference between the screen in the texts we have 
analysed, and the screen in Idoru which violently strips away 
subjectivity, leaving 'Passive, formless and stupefied before 
the screen, [only] a trace of the passion that defines the 
human subject' (Sex, Machines and Navels 211), is that Idoru 
 Fred Botting, Sex, Machines and Navels: Fiction, Fantasy and History in the Future Present 138
(Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 1999), 210.
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figures the screen (as Botting suggests) as an aspect of the 
machine as inhuman Thing. In this respect, I would suggest 
that Idoru belongs to an older mode of subject-screen-
interaction, a resolutely non-twenty-first century mode of the 
kind that Nicholas Daly discusses in Literature, Technology, 
and Modernity, where the troubled intersection of technology 
and subjectivity is expressed in the figure of the ecstatic 
collision between both.  In Idoru, the machine perhaps 139
grants the ultimate wish of James in Ballard's Crash, in the 
form of the old aphorism 'be careful what you wish for: you 
just might get it!' The screen in Idoru transubstantiates the 
subject into an object in the Real, stripping it of subjectivity 
and reducing it to a base form of organic matter ruled by 
primal instinct: 'It's covered with eyes and it sweats 
constantly. The sweat runs into those eyes and makes them 
sting. It has no mouth, Laney, no genitals, and can only 
express the mute extremes of murderous rage and infantile 
desire by changing channels on a universal remote.'  This 140
is the true, Lacanian destiny of the Ballard character in Crash 
who wishes to become sublimated by the encounter with the 
machine. The final result is not a 'vanished identity 
abstracted in terms of the geometry of this vehicle' : that 141
vanished body impermeably marked upon the shell of the 
automobile prompts the question 'How much more 
mysterious would be our own deaths, and those of the 
famous and powerful?' The answer to be found in Idoru is 
that the death is no more powerful at all. The subject's 
destiny in the Real will grant access only to the being beyond 
subjectivity, the horrifyingly amorphous fleshy mass which is 
neutered and dazed by the screen-face of the terrifying 
machine-Thing.
 See, especially, the chapter 'Sensation drama, the railway, and modernity'.139
 William Gibson, Idoru (London: Penguin, 1996), 29.140
 J.G. Ballard, Crash (London: Vintage, 1995), 13.141
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This kind of relationship is not depicted in the texts we have 
analysed over the preceding pages, of course. What might 
be responsible for the development of the subject-screen-
interaction in twenty-first century literature? I would suggest 
that Marc Augé's description of the ‘decentering' of 
contemporary life in Non-Places provides a clue: ‘In the 
dwellings themselves, houses or apartments, the television 
and computer now stand in for the hearth of antiquity’.  The 142
conclusion we can draw from Augé work, and our own 
analysis of these texts, is that the screen is no longer figured 
as an exteriority of subject. The bar of subjectivity which 
forecloses the experience of 'being' from the subject forms a 
model which resounds in the screen. The particular form of 
'twenty-first century representation' for the subject, therefore, 
might be defined as one in which our distant intimacy, driven 
by the shocks of the worldless place, is formalised as 
interaction with the screen in order to represent ourselves, 
our own subjectivity, in the place where we might gain 
recognition, in order to remain constructing ourselves, and to 
make present that absent desire which strides further and 
further into the distance.
In other words, we should watch this society of perverts, and 
respond to the call for the screen which is depicted by 
twenty-first century texts. This screen does not foreclose an 
authentic mode of experience. Nor does it offer a final 
escape into a purely ‘authentic’ mode of being. We must 
remember that, each in our own way, we are engaged in the 
production of fantasy. Perhaps it would be useful to bear this 
fact in mind while we are so often entreated to renounce our 
screen-objects, to stop 'looking through a lens' and re-
 Marc Augé, Non-Places: An Introduction to Supermodernity, trans. John Howe (London and 142
New York: Verso, 2002), vii.
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engage in the practice of an 'authentic life'. The screen, after 
all, is part of us. 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